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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
~

Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)(h).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues before this Court are whether Petitioner should be granted the Homestead
Exemption, whether evidence should have been received to support Respondent's claims, and
whether fees and/or costs should be awarded to Petitioner.
Issue: Did the district court commit reversible error by interpreting and applying the Utah
Exemptions Act incorrectly?
Standard of review: This case presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (defining legal determinations as
"rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar
circumstances"). Accordingly, the proper standard of review is correctness. Id. at 936 ("appellate
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness."').
Determinative law: Utah Exemptions Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78b-5-502 to § 78B-5-504;

In Re Cornia, Bankr. Court, D. Utah 2013; P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.
2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988); Houghton v. Miller, 118 P. 3d 293 (Utah App. 2005); Sanders v.

Cassity, 586 P. 2d 423 (Utah 1978);
Issue: Did the district court commit reversible error by not receiving evidence to support
the Respondent's claim of proper service?
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Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness.
Determinative law: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 7
Issue: Whether fees should be awarded to Respondent dependent upon the outcome of
this appeal.
Determinative law: Leppert v. Leppert, 200 P. 3d 223 (Utah App. 2009)
These issues are preserved for appeal by Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's
vJ

Recommendation and hearing before the District Court Judge accepting the Commissioner's
Recommendation (R. 3051-3072; 3163-3164)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah
granting Respondent's denial of Petitioner's Homestead Exemption claim (R. 3096-3097). The
appeal centers on a final judgment from a Commissioner's recommendation. The issue was heard
v;
first before Commissioner Joshua Faulkner. Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's
recommendation. The objection was heard before Judge Darold McDade, who accepted
Commissioner Faulkner's recommendation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
References herein are to the Record of this Case, No. 094401518 (R. ).
( 1) Petitioner owned a house.
(2) During marriage, the parties titled the house to an LLC.
(3) The parties divorced via stipulation (R. 97-100).
(4) The court accepted the parties' stipulation as Decree of Divorce (R. 156-172).
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(5) The house and LLC was awarded to Petitioner free and clear (R. 164, ,I13).
(6) Respondent made a motion for a Charging Order against the LLC to sell the house (R.
2895-2936).
(7) Petitioner filed a Declaration of Homestead (R. 2990, 3032).
(8) Petitioner sold the house (R. 3023, 3028).
vi

(9) The Commissioner heard oral argument concerning the issues (R. 3037-3038).
(10) The Commissioner made a recommendation to the court denying Petitioner's

vJ

Homestead Exemption claim (R. 3037-3038).
(11) Respondent prepared a proposed order (R. 3039-3041).
(12) Respondent never served the proposed order on Petitioner.
(13) Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's recommendation (R. 3053-3072).
( 14) The Commissioner signed the proposed order (R. 3093~3095).
(15) Respondent's attorney emailed Petitioner the signed proposed order on February 23,
2016.
(16) Petitioner objected to the signed proposed order (R. 3018-3120).
(17) Petitioner submitted his proposed order (R. 3118-3120).
( 18) The judge heard all matters raised (R. 3128).
( 19) The judge accepted the Commissioner's Recommendation.
(20) The judge denied Petitioner's proposed order.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District court improperly denied Petitioner's Homestead Exemption claim. All the
criteria of the Homestead Exemption directly apply to Petitioner. The Wiles vs. Wiles case does

vJ
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not apply, since the Petitioner and Respondent are not married and are not spouses. The
Homestead Exemption must be liberally construed. Therefore, this Court should grant the
Homestead exemption to the Petitioner.
The Respondent failed to deliver to Petitioner documents, filings, pleadings, and
proposed orders in this case. The Respondent never produced any evidence to show that delivery
happened. The Court failed to receive evidence to verify Respondents delivery service.
Therefore, sanctions should be imposed for failure to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
A.

Criteria of Homestead Exemption

The issue before the Court is the Utah Homestead Exemption Act. The Act has clear and
specific requirements to qualify for the exemption. U.C.A. § 78B-5-504 defines these
requirements:
An individual may select and claim a homestead by complying with the following
requirements:
(1) Filing a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead with the recorder of the
county or counties in which the homestead claimant's property is located ...
(2) The declaration of the homestead shall contain:
(a) a statement that the claimant is entitled to an exemption and if the claimant is
married a statement that the claimant's spouse has not filed a declaration of
homestead;
(b) a description of the property subject to the homestead;
(c) an estimate of the cash value of the property; and
(d) a statement specifying the amount of the homestead claimed and stating the
name, age, and address of any spouse and dependents claimed to determine the
value of the homestead.
Vii

U.C.A. § 788-5-503 further defines:
(1) For purposes of this section:
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(a) "Household" means a group of persons related by blood or marriage living
together in the same dwelling as an economic unit, sharing furnishings, facilities,
accommodations, and expenses.
(c) "Primary personal residence" means a dwelling or mobile home, and the land
surrounding it, not exceeding one acres, as is reasonably necessary for the use of
the dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual's
household reside.
(d) "Property" means:
(i) a primary personal residence;
(ii) real property; or
(iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a divorce
decree by a court.
(2) (a) An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this
state in an amount not exceeding:
(ii) $30,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of
the individual.
In my circumstances, all the criteria apply. The household consisted of me and my
children. Primary personal residence is (was) the property at 2009 Gossling Ln., Lehi, Utah
("Property"). The Property was a primary personal residence; real property; and I had all interest
in the real property because it was awarded to me in the divorce decree (see Decree of Divorce
,I13(b), R. 164). I filed the declaration of homestead, including all necessary elements (R. 2990,
3032).
In Judge McDade's ruling, his honor said (R. 3181)
"So I don't know how you are entitled to claim that a homestead exemption,
without it being in your -- it just doesn't -- I don't think it can be done in these
circumstances."

It can be done. The way it is done is by meeting all the above mentioned requirements of
the law. Nowhere in the requirements does it make restrictions of who or what has title to the
property. Therefore, who or what has title is irrelevant.
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B.

The Homestead Exemption Must Be Construed Liberally

The "Courts must construe the homestead statute liberally to accomplish its beneficent
~

purpose". In Re Cornia, Banla. Court, D. Utah 2013 quoting P./.E. Employees Fed. Credit

Union v. Bass, 759 P. 2d 1144, 1151 (Utah: Supreme Court 1988) (''It has always been the
general policy of this and most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally
construed."). Further in P.l.E., 7 59 P. 2d at 1151 "where there is no ambiguity the plain language
of the statute must be taken as the expression of the Legislature's intent.".
The way to liberally construe the Homestead exemption is to recognize that regardless of
who or what the property was titled to, I qualified for all requirements specified in the statute.
The Homestead is a benefit "free from any personal obligation held by any creditor". P.I.E., 759
~

P. 2d at 1149. Any creditor- even an ex-spouse.
At this point, the Respondent has ceased to be a spouse, and has now converted herself
into a creditor. Her only remedy is to pursue her judgments with liens. U .C.A. § 78B-5-503(3)
declares "A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale".
Construing liberally again, is to recognize that title ownership is not an exclusively
defining requirement for the Homestead Exemption. "It is the occupancy of the premises that
gives rise to the homestead claim." (emphasis added) Houghton v. Miller, 118 P. 3d 293 (Utah
App. 2005); quoting Sanders v. Cassity, 586 P. 2d 423 (Utah 1978) further stating "It seems a
reasonable inference to draw from this policy that the homestead right is created from the
moment of taking title or possession." (emphasis added)

Cornia concludes "It is equally a principle of Utah homestead law that 'any estate or
interest in land that can be sold under execution will support a claim of homestead, because the

v:)
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homestead right is to afford protection against execution sales.' Therefore, Mr. Comia is entitled
to claim a homestead exemption in the Logan Property as long as it is his primary personal
residence." The Property involved in this matter is (was) my primary personal residence, as
defined by Utah Code.

C.

The \Viles Case Does Not Apply

The Respondent keeps bringing up the Wiles v. Wiles case ( Wiles v. Wiles, 871 P. 2d
1026 (Utah App. 1994). That case does not apply. There are differences between the Wiles case
vJ

and the present case before the court. First, the Respondent and I are NOT married and NOT
spouses. It is beyond reason for anyone to claim that we are spouses. If I try and claim on my
taxes that I am married, the IRS will audit me. If I try and keep the children with me as though
we were married, the Court will have me cited for custodial interference. If I try and claim that
child support should be equal amounts from the Respondent and I, just like regular married
couples, ORS will never allow that. Everyone involved in this case knows that we're not married,
and, thus, not spouses.
Second, in the Wiles case, a lien was placed upon the property at time of the divorce. In
the present case, I was awarded the property free and clear. (see Decree of Divorce ,Il 3(b ), R.
164). There was no lien placed against the Gossling Property at time of sale.
Third, the case is old. The Wiles opinion was offered in 1994. Cornia is from 2013. It
would stand to reason that in the course of nearly 20 years, the courts have had opportunity to
consider many matters, and their more recent opinions are based on greater understanding and
wisdom.
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Cornia is a federal opinion, while Wiles is a state opinion. "[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. It is basic to this constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be
without effect." Marylandv. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Further, Utah Rules of

"

Evidence 302 directs: "In a civil case, federal law governs the effect of a presumption regarding
a claim or defense for which federal law supplies the rule of decision." Therefore, federal
opinion should take precedence over state opinion, and the Court should consider the Cornia
case above the Wiles case.
II. IMPROPER SERVICE
The Respondent failed to serve several papers and pleadings. As far as I am aware, the
pleadings using the Wiles case (R. 3008-3011), and two proposed orders (R. 3039-3041, R.
3154-3156), were never delivered to Petitioner at all.
Concerning Orders, URCP 7(j)(2) "Within 14 days of being directed by the court to
prepare a proposed order confirming the court's decision, a party must serve the proposed order
on the other parties for review and approval as to form.". The Respondent claimed that the
papers were sent via email. In accordance with URCP 5(b )( 4), service of papers via electronic
means is complete upon sending. Anybody can say anything, therefore, it must be shown that it
was actually sent.
In the hearing before Judge McDade on March 23, 2016, I requested that if the
Respondent actually sent the filings via e-mail, that the Respondent produce verification of the
sent emails showing, at the very least, times sent (R. 3 17 5). In a later hearing before the

VP
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Commissioner, I again requested that Respondent produce something to show that things had
actually been sent. Neither the Judge nor Commissioner has ever received some form of
evidence to validate that the emails were actually sent.
III. FEES AND COSTS
I move the court to award in my favor. When a party substantially prevails, fees should
be awarded. Leppert v. Leppert, 200 P. 3d 223 (Utah App. 2009) ("As the substantially
prevailing party on appeal, Wife is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.") I
move the court to reverse the fees awarded Respondent, and award them in my favor, as a
deduction against previous judgments that Respondent is trying to collect.
CONCLUSION
This issue is about a Homestead Exemption claim. In accordance with statute and case
law, Petitioner meets all qualifications specified. According to Cornia, the Homestead exemption
must be construed liberally. Liberally "to effect their humanitarian purposes ... in favor of the
claimant of an exemption." Carlson v. Diaz (In re Carlson), 303 B.R. 478, 482 (10 th Cir. BAP
2004). In consideration that Petitioner qualifies for all statute requirements of the Homestead
Vi

Exemption, this Court should reverse the denial of the Homestead exemption.
The Respondent failed to effect proper service of several papers on Petitioner. The
Respondent failed to produce any evidence showing that service had actually been made.
Therefore, this Court should remand for further admission of evidence, and issuance of sanctions
if findings warrant it.

9
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If this Court finds in Petitioner's favor, fess and/or costs awarded to the Respondent
should be reversed and awarded in Petitioner's favor to be applied towards payment of
Respondent's judgments.

DATED this

__1_ day of _____:J::;__c..t--r-\z____, 2016.
7

~4,/rf,
Dean White

•
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303 B.R. 478 (2004)

In re Ronald L. CARLSON, Debtor.
Ronald L. Carlson, Appellant,
V.

Andres Diaz, Trustee, Appellee.
BAP No. UT-03-027. Bankruptcy No. 028-41068.
United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit.

January 6, 2004.

479

•479 Jory L. Trease of Thomas D. Neeleman, Esq., L.C., Salt Lake City, UT (Thomas D. Neeleman with him on the brief), for
Appellant.
Andres Diaz, Trustee, prose. (David N. Kelley and Gary E. Jubber of Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake City, UT, for former Appellee
Gary E. Jubber, Trustee, on the brief).
Before McFEELEY, Chief Judge, NUGENT, and RASUREill, Bankruptcy Judges.

OPINION

vJ

RASURE, Bankruptcy Judge.
480

vJ

Appellant Ronald L. Carlson appeals from an Order Sustaining Objection in which the bankruptcy court denied his *480 claim to
a homestead exemption in the trailer that serves as his primary residence. Appellant contends that the bankruptcy court erred in
concluding that Utah's homestead statute grants an exemption in a mobile home only if the claimant also owns the real property
on which the mobile home is situated. Although Utah's homestead statute is not a model of clarity, we agree with Appellant that
the statute does not require the owner of a mobile home to own land in order to claim an exemption in the mobile home. We
therefore REVERSE and REMAND.

Vii

I. Background
On December 10, 2002, Appellant filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellant owned and resided
exclusively in a 32 foot trailer equipped with the amenities of a home, including furnishings and appliances, and plumbing,
heating, air conditioning and electrical systems (the ''Trailer"). On the petition date, the Trailer was located at a recreational
vehicle park in Utah. Soon thereafter, Appellant transported the Trailer to Arizona where he resided in the Trailer over the winter
months.ill The value of Appellant's equity in the Trailer is approximately $8,000 to $11,000. On his Schedule C ("Property
Claimed As Exempt"), Appellant claimed the Trailer exempt pursuant to Utah's homestead statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3
(2002).
The Chapter 7 Trusteeru objected to Appellant's claim of exemption in the Trailer, contending that Utah's homestead statute
"does not provide for a homestead exemption in a recreational vehicle." Trustee's Objection to Debtor's Homestead Exemption at
2, in Appellant's Appendix at 9. Appellant responded that the Trailer "is the debtor's residence and qualifies as a mobile home
within the meaning of the state exemption statue (sic]." Debtor's Response to Trustee's Objection to Debtor's Homestead
Exemption at 1-2, in Appellant's Appendix at 14-15. After a hearing on stipulated facts, the bankruptcy court declined to decide
whether the Trailer was a recreational vehicle or a mobile home, or whether a recreational vehicle may be a mobile home,

\@

concluding that even if the Trailer qualified as a mobile home, it was not exempt because under the Utah homestead statute, a
mobile home may be claimed as exempt only if the claimant also owns the real property on which the mobile home is situated.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction
Neither party filed an election seeking review by the United States District Court for the District of Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

I@
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Bankruptcy Appellate •431 Panel has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1 ), (b)(1 ), and (c)(1 ).

Ill. Standard of Review
A bankruptcy court's interpretation of a state statute is subject to de novo review. See Sloan v. Zions First Nat'/ Bank {In re
Castletons, Inc.), 990 F.2d 551. 557 (10th Cir.1993), citing Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,231, 111 S.Ct. 1217,
113 l.Ed.2d 190 (1991} (rejecting the view that an appellate court should defer to the "local" federal court's interpretation of its
state law).

IV. Discussion
The sole issue on appeal is whether Utah's homestead exemption statutelfil requires the owner of a mobile home to own the land
surrounding the mobile home in order to claim an exemption in the mobile home itself.
The statute at issue, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3, states in relevant part(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "household" means a group of persons related by blood or marriage living together in the same dwelling as an
economic unit, sharing furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses;
(b) "primary personal residence" means a dwelling or mobile home and the land surrounding it, not exceeding
one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the
individual's household reside; and
(c) "property" means:
(i) a primary personal residence;
(ii) real property; or
(iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a divorce decree by a court.
(2) (a) An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this state in an amount not
exceeding:
(i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of property which is not the primary personal
residence of the individual; or
(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the individual.
(b) If the property claimed as exempt is jointly owned, each joint owner is entitled to a homestead exemption;
,.:)

however
(i) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(i), the maximum exemption may not exceed $10,000 per
household; or
(ii) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), the maximum exemption may not exceed $40,000 per
household.
(c) A person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more parcels of real property together with
appurtenances and improvements.
(3) A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale except for:
(a) statutory liens for property taxes and assessments on the property;
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of the property;

482
v)

"482 (c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children; and
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(d) consensual liens obtained on debts created by mutual contract.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )-(3) (2002).
This Court begins with the premise, true under state and federal law, that to effect their humanitarian purposes exemption laws
must be liberally construed in favor of the claimant of an exemption. See Lampe

~

v.

Williamson On re Lampe), 331 F.3d 750, 754

(10th Cir.2003): Carbaugh v. Carbaugh On re Carbaugh), 278 B.R. 512,522 (10th Cir. BAP 2002): Homeside Lending. Inc. v.
Miller. 31 P.3d 607, 613-14 (Utah Ct.App.2001}. Utah granted its citizens the right to exempt homestead property "to protect 'the

dependent and helpless' and to insure such persons shelter and support free from fear of forced sale." Sanders

v. Cassity, 586

P.2d 423,425 (Utah 1978), quoting ln_re_Mower's_Estate ...93_ Utah..J90,_73_P.2d_967,..972_(1_937}. See also P.I.E. Employees
Federal Credit Union

v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1145 (Utah 1988} (purpose of homestead exemption is to "protect citizens and their

families from the miseries of destitution").
Homestead is a creature of legislative largesse. The Utah Constitution requires the legislature to establish a minimum allotment
of a citizen's "lands" that are exempt from forced execution. As originally adopted, Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
providedvi)

The Legislature shall provide by law, for the selection by each head of a family, an exemption of a homestead
which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon of
the value of at least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale on execution.
Utah Const. art. XXII, § 1, as quoted in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber_Co.__v.yance, 32_Utah __74,,_88_P._896,_897_(1907}, and in P.I.E.
Employees Federal Credit Union, 759 P.2d at 1146.lfil That the constitution only guarantees the exemption of "lands, together

with the appurtenances and improvements thereon" does not preclude the Utah legislature from granting a more expansive
exemption, however. Recounting the debate at the Utah constitutional convention concerning the parameters of a proposed
constitutional homestead exemption, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the provision underwent various modifications until the
framers finally agreed to simply set a constitutional floor for such protection. See P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union, 759 P.2d
at 114 7. As one participant in the constitutional convention explained [W]hy should we undertake to fix these matters of detail for all time, or at least until the Constitution shall come to
483

be amended? [This is a question] of public policy, depending from time to time *483 upon the condition of the
people and the necessities which exist. ... That is to say, insist that there shall be the necessary exemptions for
the protection of poor debtors, ... but leave that necessity to be determined from time to time by the Legislature,
which is better enabled to pass upon the question ... than this Constitutional Convention.
******

Now, this constitutional provision simply guarantees that [the homestead exemption] ... shall never be obliterated.
It must be maintained in some form or other.... The Legislature, in dealing with this question, would regulate the
whole subject with reference to the exemption and necessities of the case .... [J)ust as sure as you undertake now
to cover the subject, you will ascertain that you have omitted something, when it is too late, or conditions and
necessities of your people may change.
Id. at 1147, quoting 2 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah (1898) at 1774-75, 1781-

82.
Favoring a flexible concept of homestead, the framers left crafting the definition of homestead and the boundaries of its exempt
nature to the legislature, and over the years the homestead statute has evolved as the needs of the people of Utah have
required.ill Thus, the fact that the Utah Constitution provides for an exemption only in land and things affixed to the land has no
significance in determining what type of property is exempt under Utah's current homestead exemption statute.
To interpret the current homestead exemption statute, the Court must scrutinize the language of the statute and its place in the
statutory scheme.Ifil "The goal in statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. To ascertain
that intent, it is presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended ...." Boullioun Aircraft Holding Co. v. Denver (In re Western
Pacific Airlines, Inc.), 273 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.2001 ). ''The plain meaning of the legislation should be conclusive, except in

the ·rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
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Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,242,109 S.Ct.1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Further, "the
interpretation of statutes must be informed by the policies that structured them." Id. As stated above, in the case of exemptions,
484

the articulated policy is to insure •484 a debtor the ability to maintain basic levels of shelter and support.
To ascertain the intent of the legislature in this case, tracing the evolution of the exemption statute as it relates to mobile homes is

~

instructive. Immediately prior to May 5, 1997, Utah's homestead exemption statute provided that(1) A homestead consisting of property in this state shall be exempt in an amount not exceeding $8,000 in value
for a head of family, $2,000 in value for a spouse, and $500 in value for each other dependent. A homestead may
be claimed in either or both of the following:
(a) one or more parcels of real property together with appurtenances and improvements; or
(b) a mobile home in which the claimant resides.
Utah Code Ann. 78-23-3 (enacted in 1981, as amended in 1990)(as reported by Westlaw in the UT-STANN96 historical statutes
database).Ifil Since at least 1981, Utah provided an exemption, up to the statutory amount, for "a mobile home in which the

vP

claimant resides" regardless of whether the mobile home dweller owned one or more parcels of real property and regardless of
whether the mobile home was affixed to real property. Assuming without deciding that the Trailer is a 11mobile home," the
Appellant, although landless, would have qualified for an exemption in the mobile home (up to $8,000) under the prior law.
In 1997, the legislature amended the 1981 statute, incorporating the concept of exempt mobile homes into the statute's definition
of "primary personal residence." The wording of the definition of "primary personal residence" led the bankruptcy court to
conclude that a mobile home was not exempt if the claimant did not own the land beneath it. Appellee argues that the legislature

intended to change the law in 1997 to strip away the protection then afforded to an entire class of beneficiaries, i.e., those who
own a mobile home and rent the land on which the home is situated. Appellant contends that the definition of "primary personal
residence" can be read to afford at least the same protection to mobile home owners as they enjoyed under the prior law.

~

The search for clues of legislative intent is limited to the language of the amended statute.I..1.Ql Effective May 5, 1997, the
homestead statute was amended to provide as follows (1) (a) An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this state in an amount not
exceeding $10,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the individual.
(b) If the property claimed as exempt is jointly owned, each joint owner is entitled to a homestead exemption;

485

however, for property exempt under Subsection *485 (1 )(a), the maximum exemption may not exceed $20,000.
(c) For purposes of this Subsection (1 ), "primary personal residence" means a dwelling or mobile home and the
land surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling or mobile
home, in which the individual and the individual's household reside.
{d) A person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more parcels of real property together with
appurtenances and improvements.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1) (1997) (as published by Westlaw in the UT-STANN97 historical statutes database).
In comparing the language of the prior statute to the statute as amended in 1997, it is evident that the legislature intended to
accomplish several things. The value of an individual's homestead exemption was increased from $8,000 to $10,000 for property
that qualified as a "primary personal residence." The amended statute abandoned the use of "head of family" and "spouse" in
favor of the terms "individual" and "joint owner." Rather than designating one owner of jointly owned property as the "head of
family" entitled to an $8,000 exemption and the other as a "spouse" entitled to a $2,000 exemption, the amended statute allowed
each joint owner of a primary personal residence to claim a $10,000 exemption, regardless of whether the joint owners were
married, limited only by a cap of $20,000 per household.l111 Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(a) and (b) (1997}.

It is also evident that the legislature did not intend to leave mobile home dwellers unprotected. Indeed, the amended statute
specifically includes "mobile home" within the definition of "primary personal residence." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(c) (1997).
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Accordingly, in comparing the previous statute with the statute as amended in 1997, the Court cannot conclude that the purpose
or intent of the amendment was to eliminate or restrict any exemptions previously enjoyed by Utah residents. Rather, the
amendment appears to be designed to conform the law to the realities of modern Utah life by increasing the value of the
homestead that may be sheltered and by liberalizing the concept of household to recognize that joint owners of property are not
necessarily always married to each other. In essence, the statute as a whole provides greater homestead protection rather than
less.
The statute was further amended, effective March 23, 1999, to add the current definitions of "household" and "property," to
provide for a homestead exemption in land that is not a primary personal residence, and to double the value of the exemption in
a primary personal residence. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3 (1999) (as published on Westlaw in the UT-STANN99 historical statutes
database). Thus, the legislature expanded the statute further to provide even more protection to a claimant's homestead, again

vj
486

apparently sensitive to the fact that the recently established "'486 $10,000 exemption did not offer much refuge. The 1999
amendment also expanded the definition of exempt property to include "an equitable interest in real property awarded to a
person in a divorce decree by a court," addressing another vexing modern problem not distinctly covered by the prior statute.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(c)(iii) (1999).
It is against this backdrop of statutory progression that we review the Appellant's claim for exemption and the bankruptcy court's

-..:;u

decision. In interpreting the statute, the bankruptcy court concluded that[H]omestead exemptions in this state are exemptions in one or more parcels of real property together with
appurtenances and improvements. Subsections A and B divide up those appurtenances and improvements and
allocate a certain dollar amount for them depending on whether or not the improvement is the debtor's primary
personal residence.
The definition of primary personal residence includes a dwelling or a mobile home and the land surrounding it. I
don't see a comma between mobile home and the land surrounding it. And I believe that that definition, read in
conjunction with 78-23-3(2)(c) indicates that there has to be some real property involved in this. And that's the way
I'm going to interpret this statute, that if there is real property and if there is a mobile home and land surrounding it
that is the debtor's primary personal residence, that would qualify as exempt property.
But in this instance there is no real property anywhere dealt with in the facts of this case. And, therefore, upon that
basis I'm going to sustain the objection to the exemption.
Transcript of Hearing of March 5, 2003, at 16-17, in Appellant's Appendix at41-42.

~

As indicated by the introductory sentence of the bench ruling, the bankruptcy court concluded that the general rule of exemption
was contained in subsection (2)(c) of the statute, which states that "[a] person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more
parcels of real property together with appurtenances and improvements," and that the balance of the statute contains limitations
on and refinements of that general rule. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(c) (2002). In holding that subsection (2)(c) mandated that
subsection (1 )(b) be interpreted to require the ownership of some land in Utah in order to claim a homestead exemption, the
bankruptcy court interpreted the definition of"primary personal residence" in subsection (1 )(b)- "dwelling or mobile home and
the land surrounding it" - to mean that a mobile home

must have land surrounding it in order to be a primary personal

residence.
This Court concludes, however, that the general rule of exemption is found in subsection (2)(a) of the statute, which states that"
[a]n individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this state in an amount not exceeding ... $20,000 in
value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the individual." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii)(2002).f.11.l
The general rule does not specifically require the ownership of land, just "property." In order to determine whether a claimant
owns "property" qualifying for the exemption, subsection (1 )(c) provides the following definition (c) "property" means:

,.J

487

~487 (i) a primary personal residence;

(ii) real property; or
(iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a divorce decree by a court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(c) (2002). In this case, subparts (ii) and (iii) of subsection (1 )(c) do not apply because Appellant has
no real property and is not claiming an interest under a divorce decree. but Appellant may own a "primary personal residence."
The full definition of "primary personal residence" is [A] dwelling or mobile home and the land surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for
the use of the dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual's household reside[.]
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(b) (2002).
The Court does not believe that the Utah legislature designed the phrase "mobile home and the land surrounding it'' to radically
change the law in effect for almost two decades to preclude residents of mobile homes from claiming an exemption in their home
~

unless they own the land surrounding the mobile home. The statute can just as easily be read to provide an exemption in a
mobile home and also the land surrounding it if the claimant is fortunate enough to own such land. The Court concludes that a
just and reasonable interpretation of the statute, one that is consistent with the beneficent purpose of exempting the homestead,
would allow a mobile home owner to remain, undisturbed by executing creditors, in his or her home regardless of whether that
individual had the means or desire to purchase the land beneath the home.
Further, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the phrase "and the land surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably
necessary for the use of the dwelling or mobile home" applies to both dwellings and mobile homes, and that the partial phrase
"and the land surrounding it" was not meant as a limiting qualifier applicable solely to the term "mobile home." To the extent that
the phrase is a limitation, it merely restricts the acreage subject to exemption by those owning a dwelling or a mobile home to an
amount ranging from zero to one acre.I.111
In applying the statute to the facts of this case, therefore, one need not ever reach subsection (2)(c), the subsection that heavily
influenced the bankruptcy court's decision, which allows a claimant to claim an exemption in "one or more parcels of real
property together with appurtenances and improvements." Because Appellant does not own any real property, subsection 2(c) is
simply not applicable. It is important to recall that the Utah Constitution requires that the homestead exemption statute protect, at
a minimum, "one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements." Utah Const. art. XXII, § 1. Rather
than serving as the general rule for homestead exemption, one that presupposes the ownership of real estate, subsection (2)(c)
merely satisfies the dictates of the Utah Constitution, augmenting the general rule of subsection (2)(a) by allowing a claimant to
preserve more than one parcel of real property, if the claimant happened to own more than one parcel, so long as the total value
sought to be exempt does not exceed the amount permitted in subsection (2)(a).

~

488

t488 V. Conclusion
Because we conclude that owning the land surrounding a mobile home is not a prerequisite to claiming the mobile home exempt
as homestead under Utah law, we REVERSE the Order Sustaining Objection to Appellant's homestead exemption. Further,
because the threshold issue of whether the Trailer is a "mobile home," as that term is used in the homestead statute, was not
adjudicated below, we REMAND the matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ill Honorable Dana L. Rasure, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by
designation.

gi Although statements in Appellant's brief generated some confusion as to when Appellant and the Trailer moved to Arizona, the Chapter 7
Trustee stipulated below that the Trailer was located in Utah at the time the Appellant filed bankruptcy. Transcript of Hearing of March 5, 2003, at 5,
in Appellant's Appendix at 30, II. 16-18. A debtor's right to an exemption is determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. See Lampe
v. Iola Bank & Trust (In re Lampe} 278 B.R. 205, 210 (10th Cir. BAP 2002}. aff'd, 331 F.3d 750 (10th Cir.2003}. Therefore Appellant's subsequent
relocation of the Trailer to Arizona for the winter of 2002-03 is not relevant to the resolution of this appeal.

QI On June 26, 2003, Appellant's Chapter 7 case was converted to a case under Chapter 13. On November 7, 2003, the Court entered an order
substituting the Chapter 13 Trustee for the Chapter 7 Trustee as Appellee.

fi1 See Clark v.

Brayshaw (In re Brayshawl, 912 F.2d 1255, 1256 (10th Cir.1990) ("[g]rant or denial of a claimed exemption is a final appealable
order from a bankruptcy proceeding"); Lampe v. Iola Bank & Trust (In re Lampe), 278 B.R. 205. 208 (10th Cir. BAP 2002), aff'd, 331 F.3d 750
(10th Cir.2003}.

[fil Utah has opted out of the federal exemption scheme contained in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-15
(2002).

[fil The constitutional homestead provision was amended in 1989. It currently states Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead, which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the
appurtenances and improvements thereon, from sale on execution.
Utah Const. art. XXII, § 1. The Compiler's Note to the provision states: "The 1988 amendment was proposed by Laws 1988, Senate Joint
Resolution No. 4, § 3 and approved at the general election on November 8, 1988, and became effective on January 1, 1989." Utah Const. art.
XXII, § 1 (as reported by Westlaw in the UT-STANN89 historical statutes database). Significantly, the constitutional provision continues to relegate
to the legislature the duty to enact a homestead exemption statute as the legislature deems appropriate.

I1l For instance, at the time the Utah Supreme Court decided In re Mower's Estate.

93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 967 {1937). the homestead statute
defined homestead as consisting of "lands and appurtenances not exceeding in value the sum of $2,000, and $250 additional for each minor child,"
thus surpassing the constitutional minimum of $1,500 as the value exempt from executing creditors. Id., 73 P.2d at 968. The scope and value of the
homestead exemption has expanded and increased with various successive amendments to the statute.

[fil The Court was unable to locate any case in which the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the current homestead statute as it relates to the
issue before the Court nor did the parties draw the Court's attention to any such case. Thus, the Court's task is to predict how the Utah Supreme
Court would interpret the statute under the circumstances of this case. See Johnson v. Riddle 305 F.3d 1107 1118 {10th Cir.2002) ("When the
federal courts are called upon to interpret state law, the federal court must look to the rufings of the highest state court, and, if no such rufings exist,
must endeavor to predict how that high court would rule.")
~

VP

[fil The 1990 amendment to subsection (1) of the 1981 statute consisted solely of adding "or" between subparts (a) and (b). This amendment may
have muddled rather than clarified the definition of property that may be claimed as homestead, however, because while the introductory sentence
indicates that a mobile home owner may claim homestead in both land and a mobile home, the insertion of "or" between subparts (a) and (b)
suggests that only one of the two types of property may be claimed. The current statute remedies that anomaly by clearly providing that both a
mobile home and land may be claimed. Indeed, the controversy in this case is whether the current statute requires the claimant to own both a
mobile home and land in order to claim an exemption.

llQl The Court is not aware of any published legislative history to assist in this endeavor.
ll1] Although joint owners need not be married, under the current law they are not considered members of a "household" unless they are related
"by blood or marriage." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(a) (2002). This leaves open the possibility of a "household" consisting of joint owners who
are parent-child, siblings, etc., each of whom may claim a homestead exemption.

[jl] The Court notes that neither the 1997 or the 1999 versions of the statute lead off with the "one or more parcels of real property" language,
which is where one would expect the general rule to appear. In the 1997 statute, that language is contained in subsection (1)(d) and in the 1999
statute (the current statute), it is found in (2)(c).

11.fil The statute speaks in terms of land that is "reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling or mobile home." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 )(b)
(2002). Because mobile homes may be placed on rented land, the statute contemplates a situation in which it is not necessary to claim an
exemption in any land in order for the claimant to continue to use his or her mobile home.
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118 P.3d 293 (2005)
2005 UT App 303

Jerry HOUGHTON, Susan Houghton, Kendall R. Thomas, Marlene Thomas, and the 1995 Thomas
Family Trust, Plaintiffs, Appellees, and Cross-appellants,

v.
Glen E. MILLER, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
No. 20040007-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 30, 2005.
294

•294 Glen E. Miller, Draper, Appellant Pro Se.
Douglas F. White, Bountiful, for Appellees.
Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and ORME.

OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:

1J 1 Plaintiffs cross-appea111l from the trial court's order declaring that Defendant and his wife, Lori L. Miller (Wife), are entitled to a
primary personal residence homestead exemption (PPR exemption) in their property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah
(the property). Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that the property qualified for the PPR exemption,

vJ

see Utah

Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (2002), at the time Plaintiffs established a lien on the property and that their prejudgment writ of attachment
on the property was subject to Defendant's subsequent homestead declaration. We reverse.

BACKGROUNOI21
,r 2 In November of 2000, Plaintiffs sued Defendant for fraud. On March 26, 2001, the Third District Court for Tooele County,
pursuant to rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered a prejudgment writ of attachment against the property. The
clerk of the Third District Court signed the writ of attachment on April 17, 2001, and Plaintiffs recorded the prejudgment writ of
attachment order in the Tooele County Recorder's Office on June 15, 2001. At that time, neither Defendant nor any member of his

vJ

family resided at the property-their primary residence was elsewhere in Tooele.

,r 3 On March 27, 2002, Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. The trial court found that thereafter Wife prepared
to move to the property by making repairs to the house on the property. The trial court found that Wife occupied the property in
"March or May" of 2003. On March 26, 2003, Wife filed a declaration of homestead on the property.

,r 4 On April 10, 2003, the trial court entered a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $271,398. On May 1, 2003, the trial

v)

court issued a writ of execution against the property and scheduled a sale of the property, subject to execution, for July 23, 2003.
Defendant, however, opposed the sale and filed a request for hearing on the writ of execution. The trial court ordered a stay of
execution and held a hearing on August 4, 2003. The court ruled that the property was subject to the PPR exemption. On
December 4, 2003, the trial court issued an order declaring that Plaintiffs' March 26, 2001 prejudgment writ of attachment was
subject to Wife's declaration of homestead, filed on March 26, 2003. The court ordered the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the
property, but indicated that Defendant and Wife were each entitled to a $20,000 PPR exemption in the property in accordance
with section 78-23-3. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the trial court's order.
295
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1J 5 Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's determination that the property qualified for the PPR exemption and that Plaintiffs'
prejudgment writ of attachment on the property was subject thereto. The trial court's conclusions addressed questions of law. "A
trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard; we afford no degree of deference to a trial judge's
determination of the law." United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49,119, 79 P.3d 945.

ANALYSIS
1J 6 The central issue in this case is whether Wife's homestead declaration affected the property, which was not otherwise
qualified for a PPR exemption at the time Plaintiffs' lien attached thereto.Lfil In their reply brief, Plaintiffs concede that Defendant
and his wife are each entitled to the $5000 exemption for "property which is not the primary personal residence of the individual."
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(a)(i) (2002) (emphasis added).

1J 7 Although the trial court, in its order granting Defendant the PPR exemption, correctly ruled that under Sanders v. Cassity. 586
P.2d 423 (Utah 1978), a homestead declaration may be made at any time after judgment and before sale, the court overlooked
the important distinction between making a homestead declaration and qualifying for a homestead exemption. While it is true that

v;j

a property owner may declare a homestead exemption at any time prior to sale of the property, see id. at 425, that property must
qualify for an exemption prior to attachment of a lien. In Sanders, the Utah Supreme Court declared that "the homestead is
immune from judgment lien, execution[,] or forced sale, providing a formal declaration of existing exemption is made prior to the
time set for sale or execution." Id. at 426. The court noted that the requirements of the homestead exemption are "designed to be
used as a defense against execution or forced sale to a right that is already in existence-not to create the homestead interest for
the first time through a formal recital. It is the occupancy of the premises that gives rise to the homestead claim." Id. at 425
(emphasis omitted).

1J 8 The court in Sanders relied on its previous ruling in Evans_v._Jensen,_51___Utah _1_, __ 168..~. _762 (1917),I!l and explained that in
Evans the property owner could not declare a homestead exemption because he was "not entitled to a homestead exemption at

the time the lien attached." Sanders, 586 P.2d at 426. The property owner's "subsequent change of status (becoming [qualified for
the exemption]) after the lien attached to the property could not be used to defeat the existing purchase debt by claiming a

lcl!)

homestead exemption." Id. The Sanders court reiterated that in Evans the exemption "did not previously exist and could not later
be created in order to defeat prior creditors. This is consistent with the general trend to protect the rights of a lienor providing the
lien attached before the property was devoted to homestead use or before a family relationship existed." Id. Other jurisdictions
have similarly held that the subsequent creation of a homestead right does not defeat an existing attachment lien. See Noble_v.
McKeith, ..1_27_ Mich._ 1_63,..86_ N_.W._526,.. 527..f 1901); Ex.Pprte _Morrow,_183.. S.C._ 170_,..1_90_ S.E. _506,_ 509_(1_937).

1J 9 The trial court erroneously concluded that it was irrelevant that Defendant and Wife "may not have been in occupancy on the
property at the time of the prejudgment [w]rit of [a]ttachment, or at the time of judgment." This determination was based on the
court's incorrect conclusion that occupancy is not a requirement for the PPR exemption under either statute or Utah caselaw. In
296

v;

support of this proposition, the trial court relied on Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, *296 14 Utah 2d 408, 385 P.2d 155 (1963}.
wherein the court held "[t]hat a fee owner subject to a life estate can claim a homestead exemption under our constitution and
statutes, irrespective of the question of possession." Id. at 156. Other Utah cases have similarly held that occupancy is not a
requirement of the homestead exemption. See, e.g., ?,~!]~9..~. ~-...~Y.?n~~. ~.?. .Y.~?1-~...!.~~-'"~-~. .~:~.~ . ?..1 .~:..?..?.~. P. ~~-~)_.

1J 1O We determine, however, that occupancy is a requirement for the PPR exemption. Section 78-23-3(2)(a)(i)-(ii) provides for
separate exemptions depending on whether the property is a primary personal residence or not. "Primary personal residence" is

~

defined as a "dwelling or mobile home and the land surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the
use of the dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual's household reside." Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1)
(emphasis added). The clear language of section 78-23-3(1) requires that a property owner must "reside" on the premises in
order to qualify for the PPR exemption. Id. Furthermore, our decision is not inconsistent with prior case law declaring that
occupancy is unnecessary. In Rich, for example, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the homestead exemption statute in

VJJ

existence at that time, which gave property owners the right to declare a homestead on multiple parcels of land, see Sanders,
586 P.2d at 427 {Crockett, J., concurring), but did not distinguish between a "primary personal residence" and other property, see
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(1 ). Accordingly, Defendant did not qualify for the PPR exemption until Wife occupied the premises. We
must determine, therefore, whether Defendant qualified for the PPR exemption, by Wife's occupancy of the property, before
Plaintiffs' lien attached to the property.

1J 11

Digitizedlien
by the
HowardtoW.
Hunter
Law Library,
J. 15,
Reuben
Clark
LawPlaintiffs
School, BYU.
We conclude that Plaintiffs'
attached
the
property
on June
2001,
when
tiled the trial court's order
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q= houghton+v+m ii ler&hl=en&as _sdt=6,45&case= 1873670m04357185&scilh=0

2/3

7/6/2016

Houghton v. Miller, 118 P. 3d 293- Utah: Court of Appeals 2005- Google Scholar

authorizing the prejudgment writ of attachment in the Tooele County Recorder's Office. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64C(e)(1) (2004)
("Real property, standing upon the records of the county in the name of the defendant, must be attached by filing with the
recorder of the county a copy of the writ. ... ");lfilsee also Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236,238 {1974) ("[W]hen
property is levied upon pursuant to a writ of attachment, plaintiff acquires an inchoate or contingent lien or interest in the property
attached."). Because neither Defendant nor Wife occupied the property at the time Plaintiffs' lien attached, the property did not
v;j

qualify for the PPR exemption, and Defendant could not later claim the PPR exemption after Wife moved onto the property.

CONCLUSION
1J 12 We conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the property qualified for the PPR exemption and that the PPR
vJ

exemption operated to defeat Plaintiffs' lien on the property. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's grant of the PPR exemption to
Defendant and Wife, and we modify the court's order to grant both Defendant and Wife each a $5000 exemption in the property.

See Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(a)(i) (2002) ("An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this
state in an amount not exceeding: (i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of property which is not the
primary personal residence of the individual. ..."); Utah R.App. P. 30(a) (''The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise
...;;;)

dispose of any order or judgment appealed from.").

1J 13 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges.
111 Defendant's appeal was dismissed by order of this court for his failure to file Appellant's Brief within the time permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 26(a). We, therefore, decide Plaintiffs' cross-appeal and Defendant's response thereto.

g} Although Defendant challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact, we nonetheless adopt the trial court's findings because Defendant has
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those findings. "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). "After marshaling the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the [party] must then show that
these same findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous: West Valley
City v. Maiestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (quotations and citation omitted). "Where [a party] fails to so marshal the
evidence, we need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the findings." Tanner v. Carter. 2001 UT 18,,I 17, 20 P.3d 332.

Q.1 Although Defendant raises myriad other issues, given the scope of Plaintiffs' appeal, we do not reach them.
Utah 1. 168 P. 762. 764 l 1917) involved a mechanic's lien, the issue in that case was whether the
property owner qualified for an exemption, as the head of the household, prior to the attachment of the lien.

f!l Although the lien in Evans v. Jensen, 51

Ifil We do not address any additional requirements for attachment contained in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64C as they are not at issue before us.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 64C (2004).
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In re: ALLAN JAMES CORNIA, Chapter 13, Debtor.
Case No. 13-22364.

vJ

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah, Northern Division.

April 26, 2013.
Glenn R. Bronson, T. Edward Cundick, PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER, Salt Lake City, UT, Counsel for Zions First National

Bank,N.A.
E. Kent Winward, Abraham Smoot, THE BANKRUPTCY FIRM, Ogden, UT, Counsel for Allan James Comia.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
,..,;)

JOEL T. MARKER, Bankruptcy Judge.
Zions First National Bank, NA seeks relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4001 lll so that it may foreclose against real property held in trust for the benefit of Allan James Cornia ("Debtor" or "Mr. Cornia").
Zions argues that the property titled in the name of the trust is not property of the estate and that Zions cannot be compelled to

v)

accept payments on a note to which Mr. Cornia is not a party. The Court conducted a hearing on Zions' motion on April 9, 2013.
The Court has examined the evidence properly before it, considered the arguments presented by counsel, and engaged in an
independent review of applicable law. The Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. FACTS
On May 7, 1998, the Debtor-s mother, Bessie E. Cornia, executed an inter vivos trust, which named herself as trustee and from
which she was to receive distributions during her lifetime according to her discretion. Upon her death, the trust provided that, after
payment of debts and expenses, the 11remaining trust property shall be distributed in equal shares to [her] children and to the
issue of any deceased child by right of representation." The trust named her three children: Richard Lynn Cornia and Allan

i..::J

James Cornia, who were then living, and Robert Nu non Cornia, who had died before the execution of the trust. In the intervening
years between the trust's creation and the present day, Richard Cornia died without issue. Robert Cornia had two children who
were adopted by another family and are believed to be still living.
Among the assets Ms. Cornia used to fund the trust was a parcel of real property located at 18 N. 400 E., Logan, Utah ("Logan
Property"). On or about September 2,2010, Ms. Cornia borrowed $80,000 from Zions, pledging the Logan Property as security

-.:J

for the debt. On the same date, Ms. Cornia executed a Home Equity Line Credit Agreement and Disclosure ("Note") and
Revolving Credit Deed of Trust ("Deed ofTrust"). Zions recorded the Deed ofTrust with the Cache County recorder on September
27, 2012 and holds a first position, perfected security interest in the Logan Property.
Ms. Cornia died in early January, 2012. Zions declared the Note in default on September 7, 2012 and accelerated the
indebtedness. On October 22, 2012, Zions filed a Notice of Default. Zions pursued its rights as a lienholder against the Logan
Property and noticed a foreclosure sale for March 12, 2013.
The Debtor filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 on March 11, 2013, listing a fee simple interest in the Logan
Property on his Schedule A. Zions filed the instant motion on March 12, 2013, asserting that the automatic stay should be lifted
because the Logan Property is not property of the estate. Even if it were part of the estate, Zions argues that the Bankruptcy Code

--.J

does not require it to accept payments from a debtor with whom it does not have contractual privity. Moreover, Zions argues that
cause exists to lift the stay because any right the Debtor holds in the Logan Property through the trust is subordinate to the in rem
rights of Zions pledged by the trust.

II. DISCUSSION
,..J
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li)

Therefore, the Court must determine: (1) whether the Debtor's bankruptcy estate encompasses the Logan Property; (2) whether
the Debtor can claim an exemption in that property; and (3) whether a lack of contractual privity between the Debtor and Zions is
cause for relief from stay.

A. The Bankruptcy Estate
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy case,§ 541 {a}(1) provides, with exceptions not applicable here, that the bankruptcy estate
comprises "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Courts interpret the term
"property•• generously, and "an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be
postponed."ru State law creates and defines what interests a debtor has in property.ill Therefore, we turn to Utah law to
determine Mr. Cornia's interest in the property held in trust.
Utah follows the general rule that the creation of a trust involves the division of title between the trustee, who holds legal title to
trust property, and the beneficiaries, who hold equitable title.I!l Under this principle, "every time a settlor creates a trust there is
some interest in the trust res that is not transferred to the trustee. 11Ifil Put another way, "the creation of a trust involves the transfer

~

of property interests in the trust subject-matter to the beneficiaries."Ifil
As a named beneficiary of the trust, Mr. Cornia has an equitable interest in the trust property, which includes the Logan Property.
By operation of§ 541 (a){1 ), his interest in the Logan Property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court readily distinguishes In re Biorge,fll one of its own prior decisions, to which Zions
compared the present case. In Biorge, the debtors in a Chapter 13 case brought an action for sanctions against a creditor of their
wholly-owned limited liability company. The creditor had initiated collection efforts against the limited liability company, which the
debtors alleged violated the automatic stay. While the debtors argued that the limited liability company was a dba and part of the
same bankruptcy case, this Court concluded that it was a separate legal entity that was not entitled to the protection of the
automatic stay and denied debtors' motion for sanctions.
The holding of Biorge is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Biorge recognized that a legally distinct, nondebtor entity could not
receive the protections of the Bankruptcy Code merely because its individual owners had filed bankruptcy. A limited liability
company is markedly different from property held in trust, however. Under Utah law, a trust beneficiary holds an equitable interest
in the trust res, which interest becomes part of the bankruptcy estate by operation of§ 541.

B. Exemptions
Debtors are entitled to exempt certain assets from the bankruptcy estate, and § 522 provides the framework for exemptions. What
exemptions are available, however, depends on whether a state precludes debtors from using federal exemptions and requires

~

them to use state exemptions instead. Utah has opted out of the federal exemption scheme provided under§ 522(d).Ifil
Therefore, assuming Mr. Cornia satisfies the residency requirements of§ 522(b)(3)(A), the exemptions available to him are those
provided by Utah state law.
Utah's exemption statutes permit an individual to claim a homestead exemption in property not exceeding $20,000 if the property
is the primary personal residence of the individua1.lfil In his Schedule C, Debtor applies this $20,000 homestead exemption to the
Logan Property. The question is whether a debtor's equitable interest in trust property is sufficient to claim a homestead
exemption.
The homestead exemption in Utah is rooted in the State Constitution,I.!Ql and has been expanded through the enactment of
statutes.llll Utah courts have lauded it in admiring language, describing it as 11an enlightened public policy" that is "one of the

VP

foundation stones upon which stability of government such as ours rests."llll The aim of the homestead exemption is not only to
protect citizens and their families from destitution, but also to engender "those feelings of sublime independence which are
essential to the maintenance of free institutions."Illl Courts must construe the homestead statute liberally "to accomplish its
beneficent purpose."I.Hl

va

Under Utah law, an equitable interest in property is sufficient to assert a homestead exemption. In Stucki_v. __Ellis, the Utah
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Supreme Court stated "an equitable owner of land is entitled to assert a homestead exemption."I.1.fil It is equally a principle of
Utah homestead law that "any estate or interest in land that can be sold under execution will support a claim of homestead,
because the homestead right is to afford protection against execution sales."llfil Therefore, Mr. Cornia is entitled to claim a
homestead exemption in the Logan Property as long as it is his primary personal residence.

C. Contractual Privity
Zions argues that even if the Logan Property is part of the bankruptcy estate, there is still cause to grant relief from stay because
the debtor does not have a right to alter the contractual relationship that existed between Zions and Bessie Cornia. In short, the
lack of a contractual relationship between Zions and Allan Cornia prevents him from stepping into Bessie Cornia's shoes with
respect to the loan with Zions.
Debtor admits that he is not in privity of contract with Zions, but avers that this does not constitute grounds for granting relief from
stay under§ 362(d)(1 ). Debtor represents that he will make payments on the loan, and the loan and all interest will be satisfied
within one year after the date of petition.
v;)

Because "cause" under§ 362(d)(1) is not further defined under the Bankruptcy Code, granting discretionary relief from stay is a
determination that must be made on a case by case basis.llll The Court finds a lack of contractual privity between Zions and the
Debtor is not sufficient cause to lift the automatic stay.
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code gives a debtor like Mr. Cornia the ability to cure a default on his principal residence.11.fil This

'4

ability is not conditioned on a debtor's being in contractual privity with a creditor. Here, Mr. Cornia's Petition lists the Logan
Property as his current residence. He is proposing to make payments to Zions until he sells the property to satisfy the debt
against it. The Court will permit him to exercise the rights available to him under Chapter 13 and will not lift the stay for cause
under§ 362(d)(1 ).

vJ

Ill. CONCLUSION
As a beneficiary of the trust, Mr. Cornia holds an equitable interest in the Logan Property under Utah law. That equitable interest
brings the Logan Property into the bankruptcy estate. In addition, Utah law entitles Mr. Cornia to claim a homestead exemption in
the property. Last, the lack of a contractual relationship between Mr. Cornia and Zions is not cause for lifting the automatic stay.

vJ

Therefore, Zions' Motion for Relieffrom Stay is DENIED.

ill All future statutory references are to title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated.
l6.l Segal v. Rochelle,

383 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).

QI Butner v. United States 440 U.S. 48 55 {1979}.
~

Rawlings

v.

Rawlings 240 P.3d 754 764 {Utah 2010} (citing 76 AM. JUR. 20 Trusts§ 1 (2005)).

[fil Id. (citing In re Estate of Flake 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003}).

(fil In re Hoopiiaina Trust. 144 P.3d 1129, 1138 (Utah 2006) (citation omitted).
[Zl In re Biorge, No. 10-23318, 2011 WL 1134109 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2011).

Ifil UTAH

CODE ANN.§ 788-5-513 (2013) ("No individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the property
specified in Subsection (d) of Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598), except as expressly permitted under this part.").

[fil UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-5-503(2)(a) (2013).

I.1Ql UTAH CONST. art. 22, § 1.
ill] See generally UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 788-5-503, 504 (2013).
I.11.lPanagopulosv. Manning. 69 P.2d 614 617-618 (Utah 1937).

1.111 Id.
,J

at 618.

[ll} Id. at 617. See also P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass. 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 {Utah 1988) ("It has always been the general policy of
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this and most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally construed.").

I1fil Stucki v.

Ellis, 201 P.2d 486. 490 {Utah 1949} (citing Hansen

v. Mauss, 121 P. 605 (1912)).

llfil Panagopulos. 69 P.2d at 619.
f11l Pursifull v. Eakin. 814 F.2d 1501, 1506 {10th Cir. 1987).

[!fil See§ 1322(c).
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Mark F. LEPPERT, Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-appellant,

vi

V.

Catherine L. LEPPERT, Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
No. 20060872-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

January 15, 2009.
Rehearing Denied February 4, 2009.
225
'-'

•225 Kellie F. Williams and Jared T. Hales, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee.
David C. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and DAVIS.

OPINION
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge:

,r 1 Catherine L. Leppert (Wife) appeals the district court's orders dated August 25, 2006, and November 20, 2006, as well as its
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Order and Judgment Supplementing Decree of Divorce, both
dated February 7, 2007. Mark F. Leppert (Husband) cross-appeals other aspects of these same documents. We affirm in part and

vJ

reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND
,r 2 The parties were married in 1972. Husband filed a complaint for divorce and a verified motion for a bifurcated decree of

vJ

divorce in 2004. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim as well as a motion for temporary support. The parties stipulated to a
bifurcated decree of divorce, and the district court entered a bifurcated order, granting a Decree of Divorce and reserving other
issues for further hearing. Additionally, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding temporary support matters. Based on the
parties' stipulation the district court ordered Husband to pay Wife $1100 per month for expenses, noting that the payment could
be characterized as alimony but was not to be tax deductible by Husband or taxable as income to Wife. The court also ordered

vJ

Husband to pay various household expenses of Wife, including the mortgage payment, home maintenance, phone expenses, life
insurance, utilities, auto payment and insurance, etc.

1J 3 In 2006, Husband filed a Motion for Modification of Temporary Order and Other Relief requesting, in part, that the total amount
payable to Wife not exceed $2000 per month and that the money paid to her be deemed alimony for tax reporting purposes. The
district court held a hearing on Husband's motion and after considering both the tax consequences of the temporary order and
the average monthly amount Husband paid to Wife, ordered Husband to pay taxable temporary alimony of $5708 per month to
Wife until further order of the court. The district court also ordered that Wife would be responsible for p~yment of the trust deed
notes on the marital residence, as well as utilities and other personal expenses.

1J 4 In 2006, the district court held a trial to determine alimony and the division of property, debt, and royalty payments. At trial,
"

226

*226 the court received evidence from Husband, Wife, several medical doctors, a vocational expert, a certified public accountant,
and several other experts and lay witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the court noted that, although there was conflicting
testimony as to whether Wife was capable of working, that Wife was, in fact, capable of employment earning $9 an hour and
imputed $1560 per month to Wife. The court also attributed an additional $375 per month of income to Wife as her one-half share
of anticipated income from patents and royalty payments Husband had received during the marriage. The court provided within
the order for any patents or royalties Husband was to receive within two years of the date of the order, requiring that they be

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q= leppert+v+ leppert&hl =en&as_sdt=6.45&case= 16028946606459342668&scil h=O

1/6

7/6/2016

\tP

Leppert v. Leppert, 200 P. 3d 223 - Utah: Court of Appeals 2009- Google Scholar

subject to division based upon a Woodward style analysis. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

,r 5 Regarding financial needs, the court reviewed the parties' claimed needs and found that each had included amounts and
items that were not reasonable. In particular, the court cited certain amounts of Wife's claimed needs as unreasonable and
reduced each as the court saw fit. Ultimately, the court determined that Wife had a need for $4293 per month to meet her
reasonable expenses. Thereafter, the court concluded that Wife had a need for alimony in the amount of $2358,ill and that
Husband had the ability to pay that amount. The court determined that alimony should continue until Husband retired. The court
also determined that upon Husband's retirement Wife would receive $2111 per month from the parties' retirement account and
ordered that alimony would be reduced by that same amount at that time. The court ordered that alimony was to terminate when
Wife turns sixty-six and becomes eligible to receive social security. In addition, the court determined that Wife did not have the
means to pay her attorney fees and ordered Husband to pay $8000 toward the fees Wife had incurred.

,r 6 Wife filed a Motion to Clarify and Amend the Order. In November 2006, the district court made various clarifications to the
previous order and directed Husband to file an Amended Findings and Conclusions incorporating the clarifications. On February
7, 2007, the court entered an Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order and Judgment
Supplementing Decree of Divorce.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
117 Wife first claims that the district court erred by imputing monthly income of $1560 to her despite the testimony of multiple
witnesses that she was not employable. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining a spouse's income, and

..J

determinations of income will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78. ,:I 19, 985

1

P.2d 255 ("fnrial courts have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate method of assessing a spouse's income and will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.").

1J 8 Wife also argues that the district court erred in the amount, retirement reduction, and duration of the alimony awarded to Wife.
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and [determinations of alimony] will be upheld
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. We review a trial court's conclusion
of law with respect to alimony awards for correctness, according no deference to the trial court. If, however, we are
charged with the task of reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the findings are clearly
erroneous.

vJ

Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ,:I7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1J 9 Next, Wife contends that the district court erred in its division of personal property, royalty payments, and debts. On crossappeal, Husband argues that the court erred in awarding Wife a portion of the interest based upon a Woodward style analysis
227
...)

Husband would be entitled to receive for patents or royalties awarded for a two-year *227 period after the date of the order.@
Husband, also argues that the court erred in its amended ruling fixing the date for establishing marital debt as the date of
separation rather than the divorce date.
We afford the trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity. Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property division
determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
/d.1J 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 O Lastly, Wife asserts that the district court erred in its failure to award costs and in awarding only $8000 of her attorney fees.
On cross-appeal, Husband argues that the court erred in awarding Wife any attorney fees. The district court has broad discretion
in determining whether attorney fees and costs should be granted. See id.1J 14.

ANALYSIS
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I. Imputing Income
1f 11

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring or mischaracterizing the testimony of multiple witnesses

concerning Wife's medical and psychological disabilities pertaining to her ability to work and ultimately imputing income to Wife
in the amount of $1560 of earnings and $375 as her share in royalty payments per month. The district court did not ignore
witness testimony. Indeed, the court agreed that there was "conflicting testimony on whether [Wife] is capable of working." But the
court also found that "[n]early all the experts testified that [Wife] was capable of work and in fact several felt it would result in an
improvement in her life."

1f 12 The district court's determination that Wife is capable of employment is within the sound discretion of the trial court since the
court is in an advantaged position to weigh the evidence, determine the persuasive value of the evidence, and make

,.._J

determinations based on the evidence. See Willey v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230 {Utah 1997). The district court entered detailed
findings of fact, citing the witnesses' testimony as to Wife's capabilities and employability, which adequately support the court's
decision to impute income to Wife. For example, the court cited the testimony of Dr. Daniel Clegg, who has been treating Wife
since 1981, and stated that "there is no physical basis for her complaints; she has no physical disabilities." The court also
referred to Wife's psychologist, stating that "Dr. Gregory does not believe [Wife] is unemployable." The court specifically found that
"[e]ven [Wife] stated that she would like to be employed." Finally, the court cited Kristy Farnsworth, an employment specialist, who
testified that although Wife has not worked since 1981, she is capable of generating employment income at the minimum wage
level. Generally, when a trial court enters detailed findings of fact that support its decision to impute income to a party, we will
hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by imputing income. See Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, 1115, 138 P.3d 84
(stating that a trial court acts within the bounds of its discretion so long as there is a reasonable basis for its decision). As a result,
because the decision to impute income is adequately supported, we affirm the district court's ruling imputing income of $1560 per
month to Wife.

II. Alimony Award
A. Amount of Alimony Award
1f 13 Wife asserts tryat the district court failed to make sufficient findings to support its alimony award to Wife in the amount of
$2358 per month, an amount that Wife contends constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is both less than she needs and
228

less than Husband's ability to pay. In *228 particular, Wife argues that the court erred by reducing her expenses without sufficient
findings to support the reduction. In contrast, Husband argues that the court's determination as to the amount of alimony awarded
is appropriate and based upon adequate findings and conclusions.

1f 14 Here, the district court's findings of fact addressing the parties' financial needs and Husband's ability to pay alimony are not
sufficiently detailed to disclose the process the court used in setting the amount of alimony awarded to Wife. In its alimony

,J

determination, the court did not specify whether it looked to the parties' standard of living existing at the time of separation or
determined that insufficient resources existed to satisfy both parties' legitimate needs.

1f 15 During the proceeding in which the district court made the alimony award, the court reviewed many of Wife's claimed needs
considered the reasonableness of the expense amounts and reduced various of Wife's expenses as well as expenses for both

...J

parties giving no explanation as to how the court determined the amount to be allocated.m The district court provides little
explanation for its reasonableness findings pertaining to Wife's needs and does not delineate the process used in the alimony
determination. Because the district court's findings are not sufficiently detailed, we are not able to review the basis of the court's
alimony determination. As a result, we reverse and remand this matter to the district court to articulate findings offact to support
any alimony awarded.

B. Reduction and Duration of Alimony Award
1J 16 Wife also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by reducing the alimony award to Wife when Husband retires
without knowing the actual amount of Husband's future retirement income and then again erred when it eliminated alimony
entirely when Wife became eligible to receive social security at the age of sixty-six. Husband, on the other hand, asserts that the
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the foreseeable future based upon those facts.

1f 17 The relevant alimony provision in the order specifying the alimony reduction and ultimate termination of alimony is as
follows:
[Wife], commencing September 1, 2006, should be awarded monthly alimony in the sum of $2,358[.00]. This will
continue until [Husband] retires. When [Husband] retires, the TIAA CREF becomes his main source of income.
[Wife] has the ability to receive at least $2,111 [.00) per month from her share of the retirement account. Therefore,
upon [Husband] retiring from the University, a reduction of $2,111.00, or the amount received from the retirement
account, in the total alimony due each month will be effective. When [Wife] reaches the age of 66, she is eligible to
receive social security. At this time the remaining alimony will be terminated. In the event [Wife] becomes eligible
to receive social security disability, the sum received will be offset against the amount of alimony in place. Alimony
will terminate upon the standard conditions outlined in the statute or the death of either party.

1f 18 The district court ruling reducing alimony upon Husband's retirement fails to explain the reason for offsetting alimony with
Wife's portion of the monthly proceeds from the retirement account rather than other approaches such as considering it as
offsetting imputed income or some other treatment. The district court's reasoning is not clear on its face and without an
229

explanation this court *229 cannot meaningfully review the court's reduction of alimony determination. Similarly, the district court
failed to provide an explanation of the reasoning to support terminating alimony upon Wife's eligibility to receive social security.
As a consequence, we reverse the district court's determination and remand the matter for more detailed findings. Upon remand,
the court should also determine whether Husband's and Wife's respective retirement incomes can be sufficiently calculated at
this time.

Ill. Division of Personal Property, Royalty Payments, and Debt
1J 19 The parties raise various arguments alleging that the district court erred in its division of personal property, royalty payments,
and marital debt. "In divorce proceedings, the trial court is given considerable discretion in fashioning an equitable property

\JP

distribution, and its findings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah
CtApp.1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so constitutes reversible error unless
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.
In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the

lit)

court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented.

Id. at87-88 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1J 20 Here, the district court's division determinations do not explain either the factual basis or legal analysis supporting its
determinations and, consequently, do not provide this court with enough information to allow meaningful review. As a result, we
are unable to review the district court's division determinations and must reverse and remand for more detailed findings.

1J 21

For example, the district court determined that many of the gifts Husband's family gave to the couple were heirlooms and as

such, were therefore Husband's separate property. The court's ruling fails to explain why the items designated as heirlooms are
Husband's separate property without regard to whether they were given to the couple.

1J 22 Likewise, the district court's award to Wife of an interest in future patents fails to explain its reason for awarding a future
interest to Wife and why such interest would be divided using the Woodward formula. In particular, the court fails to explain
whether the interest in future patents must have accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. Because the court provides no
such explanation, it is unclear whether the Woodward formula, generally used to divide property accrued during the marriage, is
the proper method to divide the royalty payments. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982} ("The
essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To the extent that
the right has so accrued it is subject to equitable distribution.").

1J 23 Finally, the district court's rulings regarding the division and payment of marital debt fails to explain either the factual basis or
legal analysis for a determination that the Key Bank line of credit encumbering the house, was a separate debt of Wife, ordering

~

the parties to use a portion
of the Smith Barney account as well as any tax refund to retire marital debt,1£ and setting September
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2003 as the date to determine marital debt.

1T 24 Based on the district court's findings, we cannot determine how it arrived at its conclusions regarding the distribution of the
parties' marital property, future royalty payments, and marital debt. As a result, we must reverse and remand these issues for
determination of further details.

IV. Attorney Fees and Costs
230

,i 25 Finally, Wife appeals the district court's rulings regarding attorney •230 fees and costs, and Husband cross-appeals the
court's award of any attorney fees. Both assert that the court erred by failing to enter sufficient findings of fact. "Tflhe decision to
award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound discretion."' Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008
UT App 11, 1J 10,176 P.3d 476 {quoting O/iekan v. O/iekan, 2006 UT App 405, 1J30, 147 P.3d 464). "[Tihe trial court's award or
denial of attorney fees must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id. {internal quotation marks omitted). An award for attorney fees "must be
based on sufficient findings," Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, 1J 14, 76 P.3d 716 {internal quotation marks omitted), "and the
failure to make such findings requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court," id. {internal quotation marks omitted).

,i 26 We agree with the parties that the district court did not make sufficiently detailed written findings of fact regarding attorney
fees, and we remand the matter. While a portion of the court's findings of fact regarding attorney fees does in fact address Wife's
financial need by finding that "[Wife] does not have the means to pay all of the attorney fees generated by this matter," the court
did not explain how it arrived at the amount of the award. Moreover, the court makes no mention of Husband's ability to pay or the
reasonableness of the requested fees. Although the court did address the parties' annual income and monthly expenses
regarding alimony, we reverse and remand the matter so that the district court may enter express factual findings related to the
award of attorney fees that include more detailed findings on the financial needs of Wife, as well as findings related to Husband's
ability to pay, as well as the reasonableness of the requested fees.
1127 We reverse the district court's award of attorney fees and remand the matter for further consideration of those issues. Any fee
v,j

to be awarded ultimately must be accompanied by findings sufficient to support that award.

,I 28 Regarding costs, the district court is afforded discretion to define costs as those reasonable amounts that are reasonably
expended to prosecute or defend a divorce action and in determining whether to award costs based on need and ability to pay.
See Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 {Utah CtApp.1991 }. Here, the district court denied Wife's claim for

reimbursement of the appraisal costs. "Her unilateral decision to have the personal property appraised was not warranted." This

va

finding implies that Wife failed to establish the reasonableness of the fees, and the absence of a finding regarding Wife's need for
the award or the ability of Husband to pay for the appraisal costs is not an abuse of discretion. See Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App
318, 1J 41. 35 P.3d 341 {"Utah appellate courts have denied fees, although the requesting party appeared to have significant
need and the other party had the ability to pay, because the requesting party failed to establish the reasonableness of the fees.").
Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of costs.

V. Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal
,I 29 Wife also requests attorney fees on appeal. "Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party
who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272,275
(Utah CtApp.1993} (internal quotation marks omitted). Husband has prevailed on the imputed income issue by our affirming the
district court's ruling imputing income of $1560 per month to Wife. Wife has substantially prevailed on the other issues, except for
her request for costs, by our remanding for further findings offact. As the substantially prevailing party on appeal, Wife is entitled
to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. On remand, the district court should determine the amount of that award.

CONCLUSION
1130 The district court entered detailed findings of fact regarding Wife's capabilities and employability that are sufficient to support
231

Vii

the district court's decision to impute income to Wife. Therefore, we affirm the "231 district court's order imputing income in the
amount of $1560 to Wife. However, with respect to the remaining issues, the voluminous evidence and complicated issues in this
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reverse and remand for more detailed findings of fact and explanations of the following issues: alimony award, including the
amount, reduction, and duration of said award; division of personal property and royalty payments; division and payment of debt;
and attorney fees.

,r 31
vJ

We determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife's costs without considering Wife's needs or

Husband's ability to pay costs since the court ultimately found those costs unreasonable. As a result, we affirm the court's denial
of costs.

,r 32 Regarding attorney fees on appeal, this court concludes that Wife has substantially prevailed on all but the imputed income
and request for costs issues and we remand the issue of Wife's entitlement to attorney fees incurred on appeal to the district court
for its valuation.

vi

1133 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge.

1f 34 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT ONLY: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
ill This amount represents Wife's financial need of $4293 per month minus $1935 per month, which amount is comprised of $1560 of imputed
earnings plus patent and royalty payments of $375.
~ Husband does not appeal the court's division of income from patents and royalties that Husband had previously received during the marriage.

[fil For example, regarding Wife's phone service expense of $213 the court found:
A review of [Wife's] exhibit shows that she has three phone services. The Court would not say [W"ife] cannot have such services, but to daim it is
reasonable for all of them to be part of her needs is not.... The Court determines that a reasonable amount for phone service is the same that is
claimed by [Husband], $125.00. Another example is in the court's finding on gift giving, which states: "Gift giving, when the issue before the Court is
the reasonable needs of the party, is not a line item that mandates inclusion. Certainly, a nominal amount for gift giving is proper, but $146.00
claimed amount is not. The Court will allot $50.00 to each party."

[£ The parties had one stock interest, which was sold, converted to cash, and maintained in the Smith Barney account. The district court also
ordered that any taxes associated with the exercising of this stock option be paid for with the funds maintained in the Smith Barney account.
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451 U.S. 725 (1981)

MARYLAND ET AL.
V.

~

LOUISIANA.
No. 83, Orig.
Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 19, 1981.
Decided May 26, 1981.
ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORTS OF SPECIAL MASTER.
727
~

"727 Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were David H.
Feldman, Diana Gribbon Motz, and Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorneys General of Maryland; Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney

General of Illinois, Hercules F. Bolos, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas J. Swabowski, Assistant Attorney General;
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana, and William E. Daily and Robert B. Wente, Deputy Attorneys General; Francis
X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Alan D. Mandi, Assistant Attorney General; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General
of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Arthur E. D'Hondt, Don L. Keskey, and John M. Dempsey, Assistant

Attorneys General; Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Shirley A. Siegel, Solicitor General, and Paulann M. Caplovitz

viJ

and Richard W. Golden, Assistant Attorneys General; Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Stephen
728

Lichatin Ill, Assistant Attorney General; and *728 Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Charles A. Bleck,

Assistant Attorney General, and Steven M. Schur.
Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for intervenors United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCrea,
~

Jerome M. Feit, and J. Paul Douglas.
Frank J. Peragine argued the cause for intervenor pipeline companies. With him on the briefs were H. Paul Simon, C. Mc Vea
Oliver, William W. Brackett, Daniel F. Collins, Arthur J. Waechter, Jr., Herschel L. Abbott, Jr., Gene W. Lafitte, John M. Wilson,
Ernest L. Edwards, Margaret R. Tribble, James H. Napper II, and Melvin Richter.

v;

Eugene Gressman and Robert G. Pugh argued the cause for defendant. With them on the briefs were William J. Gusta, Jr.,

Attorney General of Louisiana, Carmack M. Blackmon, Assistant Attorney General, and William C. Broadhurst.tl
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this original action, several States, joined by the United States and a number of pipeline companies, challenge the

"2J

constitutionality of Louisiana's "First-Use Tax" imposed on certain uses of natural gas brought into Louisiana, principally from the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), as violative of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.

vj

The lands beneath the Gulf of Mexico have large reserves of oil and natural gas. Initially, these reserves could not be developed
due to technological difficulties associated with offshore drilling. In 1938, the first drilling rig was constructed off the coast of
729

Louisiana, and with the advent of new technologies, *729 offshore drilling has become commonplace.Lll Exploration and
development of the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico have become large industries providing a substantial percentage of the natural
gas used in this country.ral Most of the gas being extracted from the lands underlying the Gulf is piped to refining plants located in

'\fiP

coastal portions of Louisiana where the gas is "dried"-the liquefiable hydrocarbons gathered and removed-on its way to
ultimate distribution to consumers in over 30 States. It is estimated that 98% of the OCS gas processed in Louisiana is eventually
730

sold to out-of-state consumers with the 2% remainder consumed within *730 Louisiana.ill The contractual arrangements
between a producer of gas and the pipeline companies vary. Most often, the producer sells the gas to the pipeline companies at

VO
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ownership rights and simply pay a flat fee for the use of the pipeline companies' facilities.Ii!
The ownership and control of these large reserves of natural gas have been much disputed. In United States v. Louisiana. 339 U.
S. 699 {1950), the Court applied the principle of its holding in United States v. California. 332 U. S. 19 (194 7}-that the United
States possesses paramount rights to lands beneath the Pacific Ocean seaward of California's low-water mark-to the offshore

VP

areas adjacent to Louisiana. In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S. C. §§ 1301-1315, ceding any federal
interest in the lands within three miles of the coast, while confirming the Federal Government's interest in the area seaward of the
3-mile limit.Ifil See United States v. Louisiana. 363 U.S. 1 {1960); United States v. Maine 420 U. S. 515, 524-526 (1975). In the
same year, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S. C. §§ 1331-1343 (OCS Act), which declared that
the "subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control,

vi

and power of disposition ...." § 1322. The OCS Act also established procedures for federal leasing of OCS land to develop
731

mineral resources. While the passage of these Acts established the •731 respective legal interests of the parties, there has been
extensive litigation to establish the legal boundaries of the federal OCS domain. See generally United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.
S. 253, 254-260 (1980) (detailing the history of the "long-continuing and sometimes strained controversy" between the United
States and Louisiana concerning the OCS lands).
In 1978, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a tax of seven cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gaslfil on the "first use" of any
gas imported into Louisiana which was not previously subjected to taxation by another State or the United States. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann.§§ 47:1301-47:1307 (West Supp. 1981) (Act). The Tax imposed is precisely equal to the severance tax the State imposes on
Louisiana gas producers. The Tax is owed by the owner of the gas at the time the first taxable "use" occurs within Louisiana.§
1305B. About 85% of the OCS gas brought ashore is owned by the pipeline companies, the rest by the producers. Since most

\JJ

States impose their own severance tax, it is acknowledged that the primary effect of the First-Use Tax will be on gas produced in
the federal OCS area and then piped to processing plants located within Louisiana. It has been estimated that Louisiana would
receive at least $150 million in annual receipts from the First-Use Tax.IZl
732

*732 The stated purpose of the First-Use Tax was to reimburse the people of Louisiana for damages to the State's waterbottoms,
barrier islands, and coastal areas resulting from the introduction of natural gas into Louisiana from areas not subject to state
taxes as well as to compensate for the costs incurred by the State in protecting those resources.§ 1301 C. Moreover, the Tax was
designed to equalize competition between gas produced in Louisiana and subject to the state severance tax of seven cents per
thousand cubic feet, and gas produced elsewhere not subject to a severance tax such as OCS gas.§ 1301A. The Act specified a
number of different uses justifying imposition of the First-Use Tax including sale, processing, transportation, use in manufacturing,
treatment, or "other ascertainable action at a point within the state."§ 1302 (8).Ifil

vi

The Act itself, as well as provisions found elsewhere in the state statutes, provided a number of exemptions from and credits for
the First-Use Tax. The Severance Tax Credit provided that any taxpayer subject to the First-Use Tax was entitled to a direct tax
credit on any Louisiana severance tax owed in connection with the extraction of natural resources within the State. La. Rev. Stat.
733

vJ

Ann.§ 4 7:64 7 (West Supp. *733 1981 ).lfil Second, municipal or state-regulated electric generating plants and natural gas
distributing services located within Louisiana, as well as any direct purchaser of gas used for consumption directly by that
purchaser, were provided tax credits on other Louisiana taxes upon a showing that "fuel costs for electricity generation or natural
gas distribution or consumption have increased as a direct result of increases in transportation and marketing costs of natural
gas delivered from the federal domain of the outer continental shelf ... ," which implicitly includes any increases resulting from
the First-Use Tax. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 4 7:11 B (West Supp. 1981 ).I.1.Ql Furthermore, imported natural gas used for drilling oil or

vi

gas within the State was exempted from the First-Use Tax. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47:1303A (West Supp. 1981 ). Thus, Louisiana
consumers of OCS gas for the most part are not burdened by the Tax, but it does uniformly apply to gas moving out of the State.
734

The Act also purported to establish the legal effect of the Tax in terms of defining the proper *734 allocation of the Tax among
potentially liable parties. Specifically, the Act declared that the "tax shall be deemed a cost associated with uses made by the
owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas."§ 1303C. Any contract which attempted to allocate the cost of the Tax to any

\Jp

party except the ultimate consumer was declared to be "against public policy and unenforceable to that extent." Ibid.
On March 29, 1979, eight States filed a motion for leave to file a complaint under this Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Art.
Ill,§ 2, of the Constitution. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the First-Use Tax was unconstitutional under: (1) the
Commerce Clause, Art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; (2) the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2; (3) the Import-Export Clause, Art. I,§ 10, cl. 2; (4) the
Impairment of Contracts Clause, Art. I,§ 10, cl. 1; and (5) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff

~
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commerce as well as a refund of taxes already collected. We granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file on June 18, 1979. 442 U.
S. 937. Subsequently, as is usual, we appointed a Special Master to facilitate handling of the suit. 445 U. S. 913 (1980). To date,
the Special Master has issued two reports. In the first report, dated May 14, 1980, the Special Master recommended that the
Court approve the motions of New Jersey, the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG), and 17
pipeline companies to intervene as plaintiffs. The Master's second report was issued on September 15, 1980, and essentially
made two recommendations. First, the Master recommended that we deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss and reject the

VJ};

submissions that the plaintiff States had no standing to bring the action and that the case was not an appropriate one for the
exercise of our original jurisdiction. Second, on the plaintiff States' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the
735

Tax was unconstitutional on its face, the Special Master, while recognizing •735 that the statute was constitutionally suspect in
certain respects, recommended that the motion be denied and that further evidentiary hearings be conducted. We heard oral

v;J

argument on the exceptions filed to the reports.

II
Initially, we must resolve Louisiana's contention, rejected by the Special Master, that the case should be dismissed. In support of

VD

its motion, Louisiana presents two principal arguments. First, Louisiana contends that the plaintiff States lack standing to bring
the suit under the Court's original jurisdiction. Second, Louisiana argues that even if the bare requirements for exercise of our
original jurisdiction have been met, this case is not an appropriate one to entertain here because of certain pending state-court
actions in Louisiana in which the constitutional issues sought to be presented may be addressed. See Arizona v. New Mexico,
425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976}. See also Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp .. 401 U.S. 493, 501 (1971 }. We agree with the Special
Master that both contentions should be rejected.

v2)

A

1

VP

The Constitution provides for this Court's original jurisdiction over cases in which a "State shall be a Party." Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
Congress has in turn provided that the Supreme Court shall have "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between
two or more States." 28 U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill). In order to constitute a proper "controversy" under our original
jurisdiction, 11it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing

vi

ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to
736

the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of '"736 jurisprudence." Massachusetts v. Missouri. 308 U.S. 1, 15
(1939}. See New York v. lllinois 1 274 U.S. 488,490 (1927): Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,405 {1939).illl
Louisiana asserts that this case should be dismissed for want of standing because the Tax is imposed on the pipeline companies
and not directly on the ultimate consumers. Under its view, the alleged interests of the plaintiff States do not fall within the type of

.,.:ii)

"sovereignty" concerns justifying exercise of our original jurisdiction. Standing to sue, however, exists for constitutional purposes
if the injury alleged "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S.
26, 41-42 {1976). See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group. Inc" 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978). This is clearly
the case here. The plaintiff States are substantial consumers of natural gas.l111 The First-Use Tax, while imposed on the pipeline

~

companies, is clearly intended to be passed on to the ultimate consumer. Indeed, the statute forbids the Tax from being passed
on or back to any third party other than the purchaser of the gas and explicitly directs that it should be considered as a cost of
737

preparing the gas for market. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47:1303C {West Supp. *737 1981 ). In fact, the pipeline companies, with the
approval of the FERG, have passed on the cost of the First-Use Tax to their customers. See Louisiana First-Use Tax in Pipeline
Rate Cases, Docket No. RM78-23, Order No. 10, 43 Fed. Reg. 45553 (1978).llfil Thus, the Special Master properly determined
that "although the tax is collected from the pipelines, it is really a burden on consumers." Second Report, at 12. It is clear that the
plaintiff States, as major purchasers of natural gas whose cost has increased as a direct result of Louisiana's imposition of the
First-Use Tax, are directly affected in a "substantial and real" way so as to justify their exercise of this Court's original jurisdiction.

~
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Jurisdiction is also supported by the States' interest as parens patriae. A State is not permitted to enter a controversy as a
nominal party in order to forward the claims of individual citizens. See Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938);
New Hampshire v. Louisiana. 108 U.S. 76 (1883). But it may act as the representative of its citizens in original actions where the
injury alleged affects the general population of a State in a substantial way. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901 ):
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 (1902); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907). See generally Note, The
738

Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. •73s Rev. 665, 671-678 (1959). Cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251. 257-259 (1972) (the Court has recognized the right of a State to sue as parens patriae "to prevent or repair
harm to its ·quasi-sovereign' interests" in original jurisdiction suits).
In this respect, this case is functionally indistinguishable from Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. 262 U.S. 553 (1923) in which the
Court entertained a suit brought by one State against another. In that case, West Virginia, then the leading producer of natural
gas, required gas producers in the State to meet the needs of all local customers before shipping any gas interstate. Ohio and
Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a complaint under the Court's original jurisdiction claiming that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause in that the statute would have the effect of cutting off supplies of natural gas to those States. Both States
claimed to be protecting a twofold interest-"one as the proprietor of various public institutions and schools whose supply of gas
will be largely curtailed or cut off by the threatened interference with the interstate current, and the other as the representative of

vj

the consuming public whose supply will be similarly affected." The Court granted leave to file, finding both interests to be
substantial. With respect to representing the interests of its citizens the Court stated:
"The private consumers in each State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities but
constitute a substantial portion of the State's population. Their health, comfort and welfare are seriously
jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave public
concern in which the State, as the representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals
affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one which is immediate and recognized by law." Id., at 592.
739

"739 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia counsels that we should not dismiss this action. Plaintiff States have alleged substantial and
serious injury to their proprietary interests as consumers of natural gas as a direct result of the allegedly unconstitutional actions

'J

of Louisiana. This direct injury is also supported by the States' interest in protecting its citizens from substantial economic injury
presented by imposition of the First-Use Tax. Nor does the incidence of the Tax fall on a small group of citizens who are likely to
challenge the Tax directly. Rather, a great many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of natural gas
and are faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year. As the Special Master observed, individual
consumers cannot be expected to litigate the validity of the First-Use Tax given that the amounts paid by each consumer are

~

likely to be relatively small. Moreover, because the consumers are not directly responsible to Louisiana for payment of the taxes,
they of course are foreclosed from suing for a refund in Louisiana's courts. In such circumstances, exercise of our original
jurisdiction is proper.

B
With respect to Louisiana's second argument, it is true that we have construed the congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction
under§ 1251 (a) as requiring resort to our obligatory jurisdiction only in "appropriate cases." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.
S. 91, 93 (1972}: Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S., at 796-797. This view is consistent with the general observation that the
Court's original jurisdiction should be exercised "sparingly." United States v. Nevada 412 U.S. 534,538 (1973}. See Ohio v.

~

Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S., at 501: Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 at 18-20.(ll]. In City of Milwaukee, we noted
740

that what is *7 40 "appropriate" involves not only "the seriousness and dignity of the claim," but also "the availability of another
forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate
relief may be had." 406 U.S., at 93. Louisiana urges that presently pending state lawsuits raising the identical constitutional
issues presented here constitute sufficient reason to forgo the exercise of our original jurisdiction.

vJ

There have been filed in various lower courts several suits challenging the constitutionality of the First-Use Tax. The first suit was
brought by Louisiana in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the First-Use Tax is constitutional. Edwards v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. 216,867 (19th Judicial Dist., East Baton Rouge Parish). Among the named defendants
were all of the pipeline companies doing business in the State. The pipeline companies sought to have the Tax declared
unconstitutional.llfil Other lawsuits were filed in state court seeking a refund of taxes paid under protest. Southern Natural Gas

~
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granted plaintiff States' motion for leave to file their complaint.llfil ·7 41 Since under Louisiana law there is no provision for interim
injunctive relief, the pipeline companies were required to pay the Tax. The receipts have been put in an escrow account subject
to refund with interest paid on the account at the rate of 6%. Neither the plaintiff States, the United States, nor the FERC is a
named party in any of the state actions nor have they filed leave to intervene, although Louisiana represented at oral argument
that such a motion would not be opposed.llll The final suit was commenced by the FERC against various state officials, seeking

vJ

to enjoin enforcement of the First-Use Tax on constitutional grounds. FERG v. McNamara, No. C. A. 78-384 (MD La.). That action
is presently stayed.
In City of Milwaukee, on which Louisiana relies, the proposed suit by Illinois against four municipalities did not fall within our
exclusive grant of original jurisdiction because political subdivisions of the State could not be considered as a State for purposes

i./J9

of 28 U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill). 406 U.S .. at 94-98. Similarly, the decision in Wyandotte Chemicals did not involve
§ 1251 (a), since it was a suit between a State and citizens of another State and so did not fall under our exclusive jurisdiction.

742

Louisiana also relies, *7 42 however, on Arizona v. New Mexico for an example of a case where we determined not to exercise
our exclusive jurisdiction in a case between States because the matter was "inappropriate" for determination.llfil
In that case, we denied Arizona's motion for leave to file a complaint against New Mexico. Arizona was suing to challenge New

vJ

Mexico's electrical energy tax which imposed a net kilowatt hour tax on any electric utility generating electricity in New Mexico.
Arizona sought a declaratory judgment that the tax constituted, inter a/ia, an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate
commerce. Arizona brought the suit in its proprietary capacity as a consumer of electricity generated in New Mexico and as

parens patriae for its citizens. Arizona further alleged that it had no other forum in which to vindicate its interests. New Mexico
asserted that the three Arizona utilities affected by the statute had chosen not to pay the tax and instead had jointly filed suit in

l.t!P

state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax was unconstitutional. This Court held that "P]n the circumstances of this
743

case, we are persuaded that the pending state-court action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered *7 43
here may be litigated." 425 U.S., at 797 (emphasis in original).
Of course, the issue of appropriateness in an original action between States must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Despite the facial similarity with Arizona v. New Mexico, there are significant differences from the present case that compel an
opposite result. First, one of the three electric companies involved in the state-court action in New Mexico was a political
subdivision of the State of Arizona. Arizona's interests were thus actually being represented by one of the named parties to the
suit. In this case, none of the plaintiff States is directly represented in the tax refund case.f..lfil It is also important to note that
Arizona had itself not suffered any direct harm as of the time that it moved for leave to file a complaint since none of the utilities
had yet paid the tax. Unlike the present case, it was highly uncertain whether Arizona's interest as a purchaser of electricity had
been adversely affected.~ New Mexico's procedure did not limit the utility companies to seeking a refund of taxes already paid,
but rather permitted the companies to refuse to pay the tax pending a declaration of the statute's constitutionality. In contrast,
Louisiana requires the Tax to be paid pending the refund action with interest accruing at the rate of 6%. As recognized by the
Special Master, the effect of the limited interest rate is to permit Louisiana to benefit from any delay attendant to the state-court
proceedings even if the Tax is ultimately found unconstitutional.

vii)

The tax at issue in the Arizona case did not sufficiently implicate the unique concerns of federalism forming the basis of our
744

original jurisdiction. At most, the New Mexico tax ''7 44 affected only some residents in one State. In the present case, the
magnitude and effect of the First-Use Tax is far greater. The anticipated $150-million yearly tax is intended to be and is being
passed on to millions of consumers in over 30 States. Unlike the day-to-day taxing measures which spurred the Court's
observations in Wyandotte, it is not at all a ''waste" of this Court's time to consider the validity of a tax with the structure and effect
of Louisiana's First-Use Tax. Indeed, there is nothing ordinary about the Tax. Given the underlying claim that Louisiana is
attempting, in effect, to levy the Tax as a substitute for a severance tax on gas extracted from areas that belong to the people at
large to the relative detriment of the other States in the Union, it is clear that the First-Use Tax implicates serious and important
concerns of federalism fully in accord with the purposes and reach of our original jurisdiction.

v;J

The exercise of our original jurisdiction is also supported by the fact that the First-Use Tax affects the United States' interests in
the administration of the OCS-a factor totally absent in Arizona v. New Mexico. While we do not have exclusive jurisdiction in
suits brought by the United States against a State, see 28 U.S. C. § 1251 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. 111), we may entertain such suits
as original actions in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See also United

States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 186. n. 2 (1975). To be sure, we "seek to exercise our original jurisdiction sparingly and are
~

particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his claim."
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which necessarily would notinclude the plaintiff States, would be an inadequate forum in light of the present posture of this case.
In addition, because of the interest of the United States in protecting its rights in the OCS area, with ramifications for all coastal
745

States, as well •7 45 as its interests under the regulatory mechanism that supervises the production and development of natural
gas resources, we believe that this case is an appropriate one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction under§ 1251 (b) (2) .

..J

For the reasons stated above, we reject Louisiana's exceptions to the report of the Special Master, and accept the
recommendation that we deny Louisiana's motion to dismiss.Illl
746

vJ

•745

Ill

On the merits, plaintiffs argue that the First-Use Tax violates the Supremacy Clause because it interferes with federal regulation of
the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce. The Supremacy Clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. It is basic to this constitutional command
that all conflicting state provisions be without effect. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,427 (1819). See also Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941 }. Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did
not intend to displace state law. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (194 7). But as the Court stated in Rice:
"Such a purpose [to displace state law] may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may
be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S.
148. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may
747

reveal the same purpose. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 439; Charleston •747 & W. C.R. Co.
v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597; New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 14 7; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., [272 U. S. 605). Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.

vJ

Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538." Ibid.
Of course, a state statute is void to the extent it conflicts with a federal statute-if, for example, "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963) or
where the law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."

Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67. See generally Ravv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-158 (1978): City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal. Inc., 411 U.S. 624. 633 (1973).
Plaintiffs argue that§ 1303C of the Act violates the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 717-71 ?w (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill) (Gas Act),
748

vi

as amended by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.1fll In 1938, Congress enacted the Gas Act to assure "748 that consumers of
natural gas receive a fair price and also to protect against the economic power of the interstate pipelines. See FPC v. Hope

Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 610 612 (1944); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York. 360 U.S. 378, 388389 (1959}. The Gas Act was intended to provide the Federal Power Commission, now the FERC, with authority to regulate the
wholesale pricing of natural gas in the flow of interstate commerce from wellhead to delivery to consumers. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672. 682 (1954).

~

Under the present law, natural gas owners are entitled to recover from their customers all legitimate costs associated with the
production, processing, and transportation of natural gas. See FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 386 U.S. 237. 243 (1967) (cost
of service normally includes proper allowance for taxes and this allowance is "obviously within the jurisdiction of the
Commission"). As part of the First-Use Tax, Louisiana has directed that the amount of the Tax should be "deemed a cost
749

~

associated with uses made by the owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas."§ 1303C.Il.fil •7 49 The Act further
provides that an owner shall not have an enforceable right to seek reimbursement for payment of the Tax from any third party
other than a purchaser of the gas, ibid., even though the third party may be the owner of marketable hydrocarbons that are
extracted from the gas in the course of processing.
The effect of§ 1303C is to interfere with the FER C's authority to regulate the determination of the proper allocation of costs
associated with the sale of natural gas to consumers. The unprocessed gas obtained at the wellhead contains extractable
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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processing costs between these related products, and insists that the owners of the liquefiable hydrocarbons bear a fair share of
the expense associated with processing.~ See generally FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. supra, at 243 ("income and
expense of unregulated and regulated activities should be segregated"). By specifying that the First-Use Tax is a processing cost
to be either borne by the pipeline or other owner without compensation. an unlikely event in light of the large sums involved. or
passed on to purchasers, Louisiana has attempted a substantial usurpation of the authority of the FERC by dictating to the
750

pipelines the allocation of processing costs for the interstate shipment •750 of natural gas. Owners of natural gas are foreclosed
by the operation of§ 1303C from entering into valid contracts requiring the owners of the extracted hydrocarbons to reimburse
the pipelines for costs associated with transporting and processing these products. The effect of§ 1303C is to shift the incidence
of certain expenses, which the FERC insists are incurred substantially for the benefit of the owners of extractable hydrocarbons,
to the ultimate consumer of the processed gas without the prior approval of the FERC.
The effect of§ 1303C is akin to the state regulation overturned in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n of
Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 92 {1963). In Northern Natural Gas, a state administrative agency's rule required an interstate pipeline

company to purchase natural gas ratably from all the wells in a particular field. The Court held that the rule violated the superior
interests of the Federal Government under the Gas Act. The state Commission's order shifted the burden of performing the
"complex task of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells within the State" to the pipeline company. This
requirement "could seriously impair the Federal Commission's authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the
purchasers' cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States. This relationship is
a matter with respect to which Congress has given the Federal Power Commission paramount and exclusive authority." Ibid.
While the Special Master noted that the FERC was of the opinion that the First-Use Tax was impermissible, the Special Master

v;

refused to recommend that the Court grant plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the Supremacy Clause issue respecting § 1303C
because he discerned a factual issue concerning the nature of the gas-drying process. Under the Special Master's view, if the
facts demonstrated that processing was done for the profit of the owners of the extractable hydrocarbons, then the position of the
751

FERC that such costs "751 should not be passed on to the consumers was correct. If, however, the processing was done as a
means of standardizing the heat content of the gas for sale to consumers, then it would be reasonable to pass the Tax forward,
and thus § 1303C would be consistent with Gas Act policy. The Special Master concluded that this question was best resolved
after suitable factual development, and that in any event, it may be that "in the end FER C's orders can be adjusted so that the
laws will mesh without conflict."
It is our view, however, that the issue is ripe for decision without further evidentiary hearings. Under the Gas Act, determining
pipeline and producer costs is the task of the FERC in the first instance, subject to judicial review. Hence, the further hearings

~

contemplated by the Special Master to determine whether and how processing costs are to be allocated are as inappropriate as
Louisiana's effort to pre-empt those decisions by a statute directing that processing costs be passed on to the consumer. Even if
the FERC ultimately determined that such expenses shou Id be passed on in toto, this kind of decisionmaking is within the
jurisdiction of the FERC; and the Louisiana statute, like the state Commission's order in Northern Natural Gas, supra. is
inconsistent with the federal scheme and must give way. At the very least, there is an "imminent possibility of collision;i ibid.rafil
The FERC need not adjust its ruling to accommodate the Louisiana statute. To the contrary, the State may not trespass on the
752

authority of the federal agency. As we see it. plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the pleadings that "752 § 1303C is invalid
under the Supremacy Clause. To that extent, therefore, we sustain plaintiffs' exceptions to the Special Master's second report.Ilfil

753

•153

IV

vJ
Plaintiffs also argue that the First-Use Tax violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution which provides that"
754

[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o *754 regulate Commerce ... among the several States ...." Art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. Prior case
law has established that a state tax is not per se invalid because it burdens interstate commerce since interstate commerce may
constitutionally be made to pay its way. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 {1977). See Western Live Stockv.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 {1938}. The State's right to tax interstate commerce is limited, however, and no state tax may

be sustained unless the tax: (1) has a substantial nexus with the State; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State. Washinq_~~!.l.. f?evenue P._ept. v. Washington

.§.~~~~q-~1.~ri?. ~~~~.:, . ~-~.?.. Y.:. ~.:.?..~~.,. ?..?..9...P.~.!..~.l- One of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no
State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may "impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local business." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

450,458 (1959}. See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n. 429 U.S. 318,329 (1977}. This antidiscrimination principle
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=maryland+v+louisiana&hl=en&as_sdt=6,45&case=5928193595258536204&scilh=0

7/17

7/6/2016

vJ

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 US 725- Supreme Court 1981 - Google Scholar

"follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause" to prohibit the multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of
the free commerce anticipated by the Constitution. Boston Stock Exchange, supra. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
356 (1951 }.
Initially, it is clear to us that the flow of gas from the OCS wells, through processing plants in Louisiana, and through interstate
pipelines to the ultimate consumers in over 30 States constitutes interstate commerce. Louisiana argues that the taxable "uses"
within the State break the flow of commerce and are wholly local events. But although the Louisiana "uses" may possess a

vJ
755

756

sufficient local nexus to support ''755 otherwise valid taxation,llll we do not agree that the flow of gas from the wellhead to the
consumer, even though "interrupted" by certain events, is anything but a continual flow of gas in interstate commerce. Gas
crossing a state line at any stage of its movement to the ultimate consumer is in interstate commerce during the entire journey.
California *756 v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co .. 379 U.S. 366,369 (1965}. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S.
157, 163 (1954 }; FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464. 472-4 73 (1950}; Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC, 24 7 F. 2d 882, 887-888
(CA5 1957). See generally Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 503-504 (1942} (fact of
sale does not serve to change the "essential interstate nature of the business").

A state tax must be assessed in light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with other provisions of the State's tax scheme.
"In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation
work discrimination against interstate commerce." Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455-456 (1940}. See Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64 69 (1963); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Querx 286 U. S. 4 72 478-480 (1932}. In this case, the
Louisiana First-Use Tax unquestionably discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local interests as the necessary
result of various tax credits and exclusions. No further hearings are necessary to sustain this conclusion. Under the specific
provisions of the First-Use Tax, OCS gas used for certain purposes within Louisiana is exempted from the Tax. OCS gas
consumed in Louisiana for (1) producing oil, natural gas, or sulphur; (2) processing natural gas for the extraction of liquefiable
hydrocarbons; or (3) manufacturing fertilizer and anhydrous ammonia, is exempt from the First-Use Tax.§ 1303A. Competitive
users in other States are burdened with the Tax. Other Louisiana statutes, enacted as part of the First-Use Tax package, provide
important tax credits favoring local interests. Under the Severance Tax Credit, an owner paying the First-Use Tax on OCS gas
receives an equivalent tax credit on any state severance tax owed in connection with production in Louisiana. § 4 7:64 7 (West

~

v;

75 7

758

Supp. 1981 ). On its face, this credit favors those who both own OCS gas and engage in *757 Louisiana production.raID The
obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the production of OCS gas
to invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather than to invest in further OCS development or in
production in other States. Finally, under the Louisiana statutes, any utility producing electricity with OCS gas, any natural gas
distributor dealing in OCS gas, or any direct purchaser of OCS gas for consumption by the purchaser in Louisiana may recoup
any increase in the cost of gas attributable to the First-Use Tax through credits against various taxes or a combination of taxes
otherwise owed to the State of Louisiana.§ 4 7:11 B (West Supp. 1981 ). Louisiana consumers of OCS gas are thus substantially
protected against the impact of the First-Use Tax and have the benefit of untaxed OCS gas which because it is not subject to
either a severance tax or the First-Use Tax may be cheaper than locally produced gas. OCS gas *758 moving out of the State,
however, is burdened with the First-Use Tax.ra.fil
The Special Master was aware that the effect of the Louisiana tax system is to favor local interests. With respect to the Severance
Tax Credit, the Special Master noted that "[s]ince there is no apparent relation between the ownership of outer continental shelf
gas and the production of gas in Louisiana, it is hard to understand Louisiana's motive in permitting this credit, but it obviously
aids an intrastate operation in a way not available to a pipeline engaged only in interstate transportation or producing gas
outside of Louisiana." Second Report, at 34. Moreover, the credit available to electrical generating plants, gas distributing
services, and direct purchasers resulted in Louisiana customers being "protected in whole or in part from the incidence of the tax
which is passed on to consumers out of the State." Ibid. Despite these concerns, the Special Master did not recommend granting
plaintiffs' motion to invalidate the Tax under the Commerce Clause because, as he saw it, it was difficult to tell the effect of the
various credits, given the totality of the operation of the state tax provisions. Thus, instead of being discriminatory, the "actuality of
operation" test required by Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reilv, supra at 69, might demonstrate after a full hearing that
the First-Use Tax is a proper "'compensating' tax intended to complement the state severance tax as the use tax complemented
the sales tax in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co .• 300 U.S. 577 (1937)." Second Report, at 35.

Vt)

759
v;)

In our view, the First-Use Tax cannot be justified as a compensatory tax. The concept of a compensatory tax first requires
identification of the burden for which the State is attempting to compensate. Here, Louisiana claims that the *759 First-Use Tax
compensates for the effect of the State's severance tax on local production of natural gas. To be sure, Louisiana has an interest in
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resources from its soil. See Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 137 So. 2d 308. appeal dism'd, 371 U.S. 2 (1962): Edwards v.

Parker, 332 So.2d 175 (la. 1976). But the First-Use Tax is not designed to meet these same ends since Louisiana has no
sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of resources from the federally owned OCS land. The two events are
not comparable in the same fashion as a use tax complements a sales tax. In that case, a State is attempting to impose a tax on a
substantially equivalent event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the State. No such equality

'<II

exists in this instance.
The common thread running through the cases upholding compensatory taxes is the equality of treatment between local and
interstate commerce. See Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S., at 331-332; Hennefordv. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-584
(1937). See generally Halliburton Oil, 373 U.S., at 70 ("equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is
the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state"). As already demonstrated, however, the pattern
of credits and exemptions allowed under the Louisiana statute undeniably violates this principle of equality. As we have said,
OCS gas may generally be consumed in Louisiana without the burden of the First-Use Tax. Its principal application is to gas
moving out of the State. Of course, it does equalize the tax burdens on OCS gas leaving the State and Louisiana gas going into
the interstate market. But this sort of equalization is not the kind of "compensating" effect that our cases have recognized.

,.JJ

760

It may be true that further hearings would be required to provide a precise determination of the extent of the discrimination •760
in this case, but this is an insufficient reason for not now declaring the Tax unconstitutional and eliminating the discrimination. We
need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates. Accordingly, we grant plaintiffs'
exception that the First-Use Tax is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it unfairly discriminates against
purchasers of gas moving through Louisiana in interstate commerce.

V
In conclusion, we hold that§ 1303C violates the Supremacy Clause and that the First-Use Tax is unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. Judgment to that effect and enjoining further collection of the Tax shall be entered. Jurisdiction over the case

vi

is retained in the event that further proceedings are required to implement the judgment.
So ordered.
JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration of decision of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.

i.J

There is much validity in JUSTICE REHNQUISTS dissenting opinion, and it should keep us alert to any effort to expand the use
of our original jurisdiction. However, I am satisfied that the Court's resolution of this case is sound, and I therefore join the Court's
opinion.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
There is no question that this controversy falls within the literal terms of the constitutional and statutory grant of original
jurisdiction to this Court. U.S. Const., Art. 111, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill). As the Court stated in Illinois v.
761

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972} however, "[w]e construe 28 U.S. C. § 1251 (a) (1 ), as we do •761 Art. Ill,§ 2, cl. 2, to honor
our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only in appropriate cases." Because of the nature of the interests which the

'-'

plaintiff States seek to vindicate in this original action, and because of the existence of alternative forums in which these interests
can be vindicated, I do not consider this an "appropriate case" for the exercise of original jurisdiction. The plaintiff States have
not, in my view, established the "strictest necessity" required for invoking this Court's original jurisdiction, Ohio v. Wyandotte

Chemicals Corp .• 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971), and therefore I would grant defendant Louisiana's motion to dismiss the complaint.

It has been a consistent and dominant theme in decisions of this Court that our original jurisdiction should be exercised with
considerable restraint and only after searching inquiry into the necessity for doing so. As we noted in Illinois v. Milwaukee, "[i]t
has long been this Court's philosophy that ·our original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly."' 406 U.S., at 93 (quoting Utah v.

United States. 394 U.S. 89,
95 (1969)).
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176 U.S. 1, 15. The reasons underlying this restraint have also been long established. The Court has wisely insisted that original
jurisdiction be sparingly invoked because it is not suited to functioning as a nisi prius tribunal. ''This Court is ... structured to
perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of factfinding and so forced, in original Ourisdiction] cases, awkwardly to
play the role of factfinder without actually presiding over the introduction of evidence." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp .• supra,
762

at 498.lli *762 Over 40 years ago, when the Court's docket was considerably lighter than it is today, Chief Justice Hughes
articulated the concern that accepting original-jurisdiction cases "in the absence of facts showing the necessity for such
intervention, would be to assume a burden which the grant of original jurisdiction cannot be regarded as compelling this Court to
assume and which might seriously interfere with the discharge by this Court of its duty in deciding the cases and controversies
appropriately brought before it." Massachusetts v. Missouri. 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939). The Court has recognized that expending its
time and resources on original-jurisdiction cases detracts from its primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal. "The breadth of

~

the constitutional grant of this Court's original jurisdiction dictates that we be able to exercise discretion over the cases we hear
under this jurisdictional head, lest our ability to administer our appellate docket be impaired." Washington v. General Motors
Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972). See also Illinois v. Milwaukee. supra, at 93-94 ("We incline to a sparing use of our original
jurisdiction so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer''). Original-jurisdiction cases represent an
"intrusion on society's interest in our most deliberate and considerate performance of our paramount role as the supreme federal

\Ji>

appellate court ...." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp .• supra. at 505.
None of these concerns are adequately answered by the expedient of employing a Special Master to conduct hearings, receive
evidence, and submit recommendations for our review. It is no reflection on the quality of the work by the Special Master in this
763

case or any other master in any other original-jurisdiction case to find it unsatisfactory to delegate the *763 proper functions of
this Court. Of course this Court cannot sit to receive evidence or conduct trials-but that fact should counsel reluctance to accept

V9

cases where the situation might arise, not resolution of the problem by empowering an individual to act in our stead. I for one
think justice is far better served by trials in the lower courts, with appropriate review, than by trials before a Special Master whose
rulings this Court simply cannot consider with the care and attention it should. It is one thing to review findings of a district court or
state court, empowered to make findings in its own right, and quite another to accept (or reject) recommendations when this
Court is in theory the primary factfinder. As Chief Justice Stone put it in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439,470 (1945)
{dissenting opinion}: "In an original suit, even when the case is first referred to a master, this Court has the duty of making an
independent examination of the evidence, a time-consuming process which seriously interferes with the discharge of our everincreasing appellate duties."

II
The prudential process by which the Court culls "appropriate" original-jurisdiction cases from those which are inappropriate
involves two inquiries. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, supra, at 18, the Court noted:
"In the exercise of our original jurisdiction so as truly to fulfill the constitutional purpose we not only must look to
the nature of the interests of the complaining State-the essential quality of the right asserted-but we must also
inquire whether recourse to that jurisdiction ... is necessary for the State's protection."
This dual inquiry was reaffirmed in Washington v. General Motors Corp .• supra. at 113. Or, as put in Illinois v. Milwaukee. 406 U.
S. at 93, "the question of what is appropriate concerns, of course, the seriousness and dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it
764

\JI

necessarily involves the availability of another •754 forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues
tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had." The first prong of the inquiry thus involves an assessment
of the "nature of the interests of the complaining state," "the essential quality of the right asserted," "the seriousness and dignity of
the claim," and the second prong an examination of the availability of an alternative forum.
The Court accepts original jurisdiction in this case for two separate reasons: because the plaintiff States are injured in their
capacity as purchasers of natural gas, ante, at 736-737, and because the plaintiff States may sue as parens patriae, ante, at 737-

~

739. In ruling that jurisdiction exists because of the plaintiff States' own purchases of natural gas, the Court does not even purport
to consider the nature or essential quality of the States' claim or whether it is of sufficient "seriousness and dignity" to justify
invoking our "delicate and grave" original jurisdiction. The Court recognizes that "unique concerns of federalism" form the basis
of our original jurisdiction, ante, at 743, but does not explain how such concerns are implicated simply because one State levies
a tax on an item which is eventually passed on to consumers, one of which happens to be another State. The "nature of the

I.ii)
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I would hold that. as a general rule, when a State's claim is indistinguishable from the claim of any other private consumer it is
insufficient to invoke our original jurisdiction. The Court in the past has referred to claims by a State in its capacity simply as
consumer or owner as mere "make-weights." See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, at 450: Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
765
~

Co., 206 U.S. 230,237 (1907): see also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,611 *765 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907}. I do not think such a makeweight should suffice to invoke our original
jurisdiction, particularly since States now act as consumers in a vast array of areas.
The fact that States now purchase countless varieties of items for their own use which were not purchased 50 or even 25 years
ago suggests that concern for our own limited resources is not the only factor which should motivate us in allowing our original
jurisdiction to be invoked sparingly. With the greatly increased litigation dockets in most state and federal trial courts, there will be

"'

the strongest temptation for various interest groups within the State to attempt to persuade the Attorney General of that State to
bring an action in the name of the State in order to make an end run around the barriers of time and delay which would confront
them if they were merely private litigants.If! Thus in permitting indiscriminate use of our original jurisdiction we not only consume
our own scarce resources, but permit in effect the bypassing of ordinary trial courts where private parties are required to litigate
the same issues. Such a departure from past practice risks the creation of an entirely separate system for litigation in this country,

v»

standing side by side with the state-court systems and the federal-court system. It will obviously be tempting to many interests of a
11

variety of persuasions on the merits of a particular issue to start at the top," so to speak, and have the luxury of litigating only
before a Special Master followed by the appellate-type review which this Court necessarily gives to his findings and
recommendations.
766

If all that is required to invoke our original jurisdiction *766 is an injury to the State as consumer caused by the regulatory activity
of another State, the list of cases which could be pressed as original-jurisdiction cases must be endless. The Court's opinion
contains no limiting principle, as mandated by the frequent statements that our original jurisdiction be sparingly invoked and the
required inquiry into the nature of the State's claim.
I would require that the State's claim involve some tangible relation to the State's sovereign interests. Our original jurisdiction

vsb

should not be trivialized and open to run-of-the-mill claims simply because they are brought by a State, but rather should be
limited to complaints by States qua States. This would include the prototypical original action, boundary disputes, and the familiar
cases involving disputes over water rights. In such cases, the State seeks to vindicate its rights as a State, a political entity.Lfil
Since nothing about the complaint in this case involves sovereign interests, I would hold that there is no jurisdiction on the basis
of the States' own purchases of natural gas.fil
767

''767 Nor is this an appropriate case for the plaintiff States to invoke original jurisdiction as parens patriae. The Court announces
that a State may sue in this capacity in an original action "where the injury alleged affects the general population of a State in a
substantial way," ante, at 737, but the established rule, which may be different than the Court's paraphrase, was articulated in

Pennsylvania v. New Jersey. 426 U.S. 660, 665 {1976) (per curiam} in these terms: "It has ... become settled doctrine that a
State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a
volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." In Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394 {1938) Chief Justice
Hughes stressed that the principle that a State may sue as parens patriae "does not go so far as to permit resort to our original
jurisdiction in the name of the State but in reality for the benefit of particular individuals, albeit the State asserts an economic
interest in the claims and declares their enforcement to be a matter of state policy."
Here the plaintiff States are not suing to advance a sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest. Rather they are suing to promote the
economic interests of those of their citizens who purchase and use natural gas. Advancing the economic interests of a limited
group of citizens, however, is not sufficient to support parens patriae original jurisdiction. In Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. 220 U.S. 277,289 (1911 ), the Court ruled that a State had no standing to challenge in an original action unreasonable
freight rates imposed by citizens of another State affecting shippers within the State. In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76
768

{1883) *768 the Court rejected an effort by New Hampshire to collect as assignee on Louisiana state bonds, when the proceeds
would end up in the hands of the assignors, New Hampshire citizens. And in North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 {1923),
the Court turned back an effort by the plaintiff State to sue for flood damage to farmers' land. In my view this suit, brought to
benefit state consumers of natural gas, is closer to these cases than those cited by the Court, Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208,

241 {1901) (health menace to entire State from spread of contagious diseases specifically noted); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S.
125 (1902) (rights to water); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 {1907) (rights to air in unpolluted State).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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indistinguishable" from the case before us. Ante, at 738-739. I think Pennsylvania v. West Virginia decided over the dissents of
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and McReynolds, is readily distinguishable, "functionally" or otherwise. The harm in Pennsylvania v.

West Virginia was the threatened complete cessation of deliveries of natural gas. This harmed all the citizens of the State, since it
would have prevented any of them from purchasing the natural gas. The harm involved was also far more serious than the harm
in this case. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. the harm was the complete halt in deliveries of a commodity upon which citizens of

VJJ

the plaintiff State depended. The opinion there stressed the direct link to the "health, comfort and welfare" of the citizens of
Pennsylvania and the serious jeopardy they would be in if their supply of heating gas were suddenly cut off. 262 U.S., at 591592. Such a direct link to health and welfare is simply not present in this case. The distinction between an increase in the cost of
a commodity passed on to consumers complained of here, and the complete cessation of a service upon which citizens
depended, seems palpable.

vj

769

*769

Ill

The exercise of original jurisdiction in this case is particularly inappropriate since the issues the plaintiff States would have us
decide not only can be, but in fact are being, litigated in other forums. Although this case would come within our original and
~

exclusive jurisdiction if appropriate, the question whether it is appropriate depends in part on the availability of alternative forums.
See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S .• at 93; Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 796-797 (1976).lfil
The precise issues which the Court finds it somehow necessary to reach today are raised in actions which are currently pending
in a Louisiana state court. An action by Louisiana seeking a declaratory judgment that its First-Use Tax is constitutional is
pending, Edwards v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp .. No. 216,867 (19th Judicial Dist., East Baton Rouge Parish), as is a
refund suit brought by the 17 pipeline companies actually liable for the tax, Southern Natural Gas Co. v. McNamara, No. 225,533
(19th Judicial Dist., East Baton Rouge Parish). The pipeline companies raise in the Louisiana proceeding the identical
challenges raised by the plaintiff States in the present case.Ifil
770

~

In view of the foregoing I consider Arizona v. New Mexico, supra. controlling. There the Court declined to exercise original "770
and exclusive jurisdiction over a suit brought by Arizona challenging injury to it and its citizens as consumers of electricity
generated in New Mexico and subject to a New Mexico tax. As here, the tax was imposed on utilities, not directly on the
consumers. The Court quoted language from Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra. and Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939),
concerning the sparing use of our original jurisdiction and the appropriateness of considering alternative forums, and noted that
the utilities, like the pipeline companies here, had sued in state court. The Court concluded that "V]n the circumstances of this

~

case, we are persuaded that the pending state-court action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may
be litigated" (emphasis in original). 425 U.S., at 797. Although the Court in this case stresses that the plaintiff States are not
parties in the Louisiana state-court proceedings. in Arizona v. New Mexico we specifically emphasized that the relevant question
was whether the issues could be litigated elsewhere.

IV
The basic problem with the Court's opinion, in my view, is that it articulates no limiting principles that would prevent this Court
from being deluged by original actions brought by States simply in their role as consumers or on behalf of groups of their citizens
as consumers. Perhaps the principles sketched in this dissent are not the best limiting principles which could be devised, but the
difficulty in developing such principles does not lessen the need for them. The absence of limiting principles in the Court's

vi

opinion, I fear, "could well pave the way for putting this Court into a quandary whereby we must opt either to pick and choose
arbitrarily among similarly situated litigants or to devote truly enormous portions of our energies to such matters." Ohio v.
771

Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S., at 504.IIl The problem *771 is accentuated in this case because it falls within our original
and exclusive jurisdiction, which means that similar cases not only can be but must be brought here.

vi

In conclusion I can do no better than quote from a dissent Justice Frankfurter penned under similar circumstances:
"Jurisdictional doubts inevitably lose force once leave has been given to file a bill, a master has been appointed,
long hearings have been held, and a weighty report has been submitted. And so, were this the last as well as the
first assumption of jurisdiction by this Court of a controversy like the present, even serious doubts about it might

~

well go unexpressed. But if experience is any guide, the present decision will give momentum to kindred litigation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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way, the faculty of self-generating extension. Therefore, in pricking out the lines of future development of what is
new doctrine, the importance of these issues may make it not inappropriate to indicate difficulties which I have not
been able to overcome and potential abuses to which the doctrine is not unlikely to give rise." Texas v. Florida, 306

U.S. 398,434 (1939).Ifil

tI Frederick Moring filed a brief for Associated Gas Distributors as amicus curiae.
ill The earliest offshore oil production occurred in 1896 off the coast of California. The early ventures were extensions of onshore drilling projects.
U. S. Dept. of Interior, Mineral Resource Management of the Outer Continental Shelf, Geological Survey Circular 720, p. 2 ( 1975). The first
offshore well drilled from a mobile platform, the dominant technology used today, located out of sight from land was drilled 12 miles from the
Louisiana coast in 1947. Ibid. In its proffer of evidence. the State of Louisiana estimated that there exist over 13,000 wells operating in OCS lands in
the Gulf of Mexico. See Proffer of Proof of Louisiana to Special Master 8. According to one source, 948 offshore wells were drilled off the coast of
v;)

Louisiana in 1978. Braunstein & Allen, Developments in Louisiana Gulf Coast Offshore in 1978, 63 AAPG Bull. 1310 (Aug. 1979).

L6,1 In 1970, South Louisiana, an area induding both the onshore and offshore area adjacent to Louisiana, was responsible for the production of
approximately 33% of domestic natural gas production. See Federal Power Comm'n, Bureau of Natural Gas, National Gas Supply and Demand,
1971-1990, Staff Rep. No. 2, pp. 20-22 (1972); J. Schanz & H. Frank, Natural Gas in the Future National Energy Pattern, in Regulation of the
Natural Gas Producing Industry 18-19 (K. Brown ed. 1972). As of 1973, over 25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas had been produced from
Louisiana's offshore lands, with approximately 77% coming from federal OCS areas. Geological Survey Circular 720, supra, at 28 (Table 13). It has
been estimated that the present reserves in the offshore area adjacent to the Gulf States is approximately 38 trillion cubic feet of gas. J. Hewitt, J.
Knipmeyer, & E. Schluntz, Estimated Oil and Gas Reserves, Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Geological Survey, Dec.
31,1979).
ra} See Proffer of Proof of Louisiana to Special Master 21 (Fact No. 43).

f!l See id.,

at 11-13 (Facts Nos. 19-22).

[fil Representatives from the State of Louisiana, as well as from other Gulf States, appeared before Congress in support of a measure to provide
the States with a share of any income from that part of the OCS abutting their respective States. See Hearings on S. 1901 before the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 185-186, 187-188, 191-193, 265-266 (1953).

Ifil A thousand cubic feet of gas was defined, as is commonplace in the industry, as that amount of gas which occupies that volume at a
temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit and 15.025 pounds per square inch of pressure absolute. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47:1303 (8) (West Supp.
1981).

IZI Estimates of the annual revenues from the First-Use Tax have varied. The plaintiff States and the United States estimated the annual receipts to
be $225 million, while the pipeline companies suggested $275 million. See also, Note, The Louisiana First-Use Tax: Does It Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 53 Tulane L. Rev. 1474 (1979) ($170 million); First-Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. No. 31 (Oct. 1978) ($185 million in first year).

0j

Part II of the First-Use Tax Act created the First-Use Trust Fund. Receipts of the Tax were to be placed in the fund and expended in accordance
with the terms of the Act. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4 7:1351 (West Supp. 1981 ). Specifically, the Act provided that 75% of the proceeds would go
towards retirement of the general debt of the State. § 1351 A (2). Also 25% of the proceeds were to be deposited in a Barrier Islands Conservation
Account to be used to fund capital improvements for projects designed to "conserve, preserve, and maintain the barrier islands, reefs, and shores
or the coastline of Louisiana." § 1351 A ( 3).

[fil A taxable "use" was defined as:
"the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at the inlet of any processing plant; the transportation in the state of unprocessed
natural gas to the point of delivery at the inlet of any measurement or storage facility; transfer of possession or relinquishment of control at a
delivery point in the state; processing for the extraction of liquefiable component products or waste materials; use in manufacturing; treatment; or
other ascertainable action at a point within the state." La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47:1302 (8) (West Supp. 1981).

Ifil The Severance Tax Credit bill was passed at the same time as the First-Use Tax, and provides as follows:
Jib
"A. ( 1) Every taxpayer liable for and remitting taxes levied and collected pursuant to [the First-Use Tax] and each taxpayer who bears such taxes as
a direct result of contractual terms or agreements appfied in disregard of R. S. 47:1303 (C), shall be allowed a direct tax credit, at any time following
payment of such tax, but, not in excess of the amount which must be borne by such taxpayer, against severance taxes owed by such taxpayer to
the state, the amount of which credit shall not exceed the amount of severance taxes for which such taxpayer is liable to the state as a direct
consequence of the privilege of severing natural resources from the surface of the soil or water of the state."
The tax credit also assigns the order in which the credit shall be applied depending on the type of severance credit paid. The credit is first applied to
oil severance taxes and lists in descending order the other resources subject to severance tax credit.§ 647A (2). The tax credit does not affect any
severance taxes assessed by the local parishes.§ 647C.

l.1Ql The statutory provision exempts from the tax credit provision any increases in wellhead price attributable to inflation.

ll.11 See generally New
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be established by clear and convincing evidence").

1111 As alleged in the complaint, the annual increase in natural gas costs directly associated with the First-Use Tax with respect to each of the
plaintiff States is as follows: Maryland ($60,000); New York ($300,000); Massachusetts ($25,000); Rhode Island ($25,000); Illinois ($270,000);
Indiana ($70,000); Michigan ($650,000); Wisconsin ($70,000); New Jersey ($20,000). See Complaint, at 12-16. Total direct injuries to the plaintiff
States was estimated to be $1.5 million, and injury to the citizen consumers was estimated at $120 million. Id., at 16.

U1J. In approving the pass-through, the FERC did not accept the constitutionality of the First-Use Tax; FERC has consistently taken the position that
the Tax is unconstitutional. Moreover, approval of the pass-through was expressly conditioned on the pipeline companies' taking legal action to
determine the legality of the Tax, and to provide for refund to the customers should it be declared unconstitutional. Administrative proceedings
before the FERC are continuing, and the agency has issued an order to show cause why the gas producers should not be required to pay the
portion of the First-Use Tax relating to liquid or liquefiable hydrocarbons transported with or extracted from the gas subject to the Tax.

I.!£ In Ohio v.

Wyandotte Chemicals Corp .• 401 U.S. at 497, the Court noted that "(a)s our social system has grown more complex, the States
have increasingly become enmeshed in a multitude of disputes with persons living outside their borders. Consider, for example, the frequency with

which States and nonresidents clash over the application of state laws concerning taxes, motor vehicles, decedents' estates, business torts,
government contracts, and so forth. It would, indeed, be anomalous were this Court to be held out as a potential principal forum for settling such
controversies."

[1fil The pipeline companies removed the case to federal court. Louisiana's motion to remand was granted, essentially on the ground that the
intervention of the Federal District Court would be contrary to the provisions of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. Edwards v.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp .• 464 F. Supp. 654 (MD La. 1979).

[1fil By granting plaintiffs' motions for leave to file, we rejected Louisiana's motions that the case should be dismissed. Moreover, when we referred
the case to the Special Master we expressly referred to him all pending motions except for Louisiana's motion to dismiss. See 445 U.S. 913 (1980).
Usually, when we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction, we do so by denying the motion for leave to file. See Arizona v. New Mexico. 425 U.S.
794 {1976). Although it is arguable that the Special Master was not empowered to consider Louisiana's motion since we did not refer the question
to him, we nonetheless rely on his report in light of the fact that we must consider Louisiana's motion to dismiss on the merits in any event, and
because the matter went forward before the Special Master on the assumption that the motion to dismiss had been referred. Accordingly, we now
see no reason not to acquiesce in the Special Master's views that the issues were properly before him.

l11l See Tr. of Oral Arg.

55-58. It is acknowledged that but for the "invitation" there exists no procedural mechanism in Louisiana for the plaintiff
States or the United States to be made parties to the state refund suit.

~

[1fil In Pennsylvania v. New Jersev, 426 U.S. 660 {1976) we denied leave to file to a number of States challenging commuter income tax
provisions adopted by certain other States. That case, however, clearly has no applicability to the present action. In Pennsylvania, the only reason
that the complaining States were denied tax revenues was because their legislatures had determined to give a credit for taxes paid to other States,
and, to this extent, any injury was voluntarily suffered. Id., at 664. Moreover, jurisdiction was not proper under the parens patriae doctrine since the
claims represented the aggregation of individual claims for wrongfully paid taxes which the individual commuter taxpayers were able to contest. Id.,
at 665-666. See generally Massachusetts v. Missouri. 308 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1939). In this case, the plaintiff States are not responsible in any way for
the economic impact of the Tax. Moreover, unlike the situation in Pennsylvania, individual citizens have no forum in which to challenge the Tax
because they did not directly pay the Tax and are not entitled to bring refund actions in Louisiana.

Wll Despite the fact that these parties have been invited to intervene, seen. 17, supra, the Louisiana refund action is an imperfect forum, primarily
because no injunctive relief prior to the determination on the merits is possible under Louisiana law. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 47:1575, 47:1576
(West 1970 and Supp. 1981).

ra.Ql See 425 U.S. at 798 {STEVENS, J., concurring).
[lll We note in passing that Louisiana's other arguments against the exercise of our original jurisdiction are lacking in merit. First, our original
jurisdiction is not affected by the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment which only withholds federal judicial power in suits against a State "by

~

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Thus, an original action between two States only violates the Eleventh
Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover for injuries to specific individuals. Hawaiiv. Standard Oil Co .• 405 U.S. 251. 258-259. n.
12 { 1972). Second, the Tax Injunction Act, which by its terms only applies to injunctions issued by federal district courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, is
inapplicable in original actions. We thus reject Louisiana's exceptions based on these grounds.
Louisiana also excepted to each of the recommendations made by the Special Master in his first report concerning various preliminary matters.
Given the above determination on Louisiana's motion to dismiss, we reject each of Louisiana's exceptions and adopt the recommendations
contained in the Special Master's first report. Specifically, we agree that New Jersey, whose allegations of injury are identical to that of the original
plaintiff States, clearly has standing and should be permitted to intervene. Second, we believe that the United States' interests in the operation of
the OCS Act and the FERC's interests in the operation of the Natural Gas Act are sufficiently important to warrant their intervention as party
plaintiffs, see supra, at 7 44 and this page. We have often permitted the United States to intervene in appropriate cases where distinctively federal
interests, best presented by the United States itself, are at stake. See, e.g., Arizona v. California. 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Oklahoma v. Texas 253 U.
S. 465 { 1920}. Third, the Master recommended that we grant the motion of 17 pipeline companies to intervene as plaintiffs. Given that the Tax is
directly imposed on the owner of imported gas and that the pipelines most often own the gas, those companies have a direct stake in this
controversy and in the interest of a full exposition of the issues, we accept the Special Master's recommendation that the pipeline companies be
permitted to intervene, noting that it is not unusual to permit intervention of private parties in original actions. See Oklahoma v. Texas. 258 U. S. 57 4
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l2Zl The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was enacted to alleviate the adverse economic effects of the disparate treatment of intrastate and interstate
natural gas sales. Under 15 U.S. C. § 3320 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), a price for the first sale of gas shall not be considered to exceed the maximum
lawful price if it is necessary to recover "any costs of compressing, gathering, processing, treating, liquefying, or transporting such natural gas, or
other similar costs, borne by the seller and allowed for, by rule or order, by the Commission."
Plaintiffs also argue that the entire scheme of taxation in Louisiana with its series of tax credits and exemptions, see text, infra, at 756-758,
necessarily interferes with the FERC's comprehensive authority to regulate the price of gas. The Special Master determined that the decision was
difficult to make given the fact that the FERC had permitted the cost to be passed on. The Special Master concluded that it may ultimately be
decided that some of the costs are beyond the reach of the FERC, or that the Tax is not a "substantial hindrance" to the Commission. We do not
need to reach plaintiffs' exception on this point given our resolution on the other issues presented.

\JP

~ Section 1303C provides:

"[The First-Use Tax) shall be deemed a cost associated with uses made by the owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas. Any
agreement or contract by which an owner of natural gas at the time a taxable use first occurs daims a right to reimbursement or refund of such
taxes from any other party in interest, other than a purchaser of such natural gas, is hereby declared to be against public policy and unenforceable
to that extent. Notwithstanding any such agreement or contract, such an owner shall not have an enforceable right to any reimbursement or refund
on the basis that this tax constitutes a cost incurred by such owner by virtue of the separation or processing of natural gas for extraction of liquid or
liquefiable hydrocarbons, or that this tax constitutes any other grounds for reimbursement or refund under such agreement or contract, unless
there has been a final and unappealable judicial determination that such owner is entitled to such reimbursement or refund, notwithstanding the
pubfic poficy and purpose of this part and the foregoing provisions of this Subsection C. In any legal action pursuant to this Subsection, the state
shall be an indispensable party in interest."

if£ See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC.

157 U.S. App. D. C. 235, 238-240, 483 F. 2d 1238 1241-1243 {1973); Detroit v. FPC. 97 U.S. App. D. C. 260.
269-271. 230 F. 2d 810, 819-821 {1955). cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956): Union Oil Company of California, Docket No. Cl77-828 et al., p. 11
(FERC, Apr. 12, 1978); Canadian Superior Oil (U.S.) Ltd., Docket No. Cl77-802 et al., p. 4 (FERC, Mar. 28, 1978); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,
38 F. P. C. 691,698 (1967); Continental Oil Co., 27 F. P. C. 96, 107-108 (1962). Removal reduces both the volume and heat content of the natural
gas ultimately received by the gas consumers. See Area Rate Proceeding, 40 F. P. C. 530, 611 (1968), aff'd, 428 F. 2d 407 (CA5), cert. denied,
400 u. s. 950 (1970).
~

It is no answer to note that the FERC has administratively determined that the Tax may be passed on. The agency's position is that the Tax is
unconstitutional as an invasion of its authority: and as a condition for permitting the pipeline companies to pass the Tax through to consumers, has
required that the companies "undertak[e) all legal action ... to determine the constitutionality of the tax," and secure means for an effective refund
should any taxes paid be returned upon a final finding that the Tax was unconstitutional. 43 Fed. Reg. 45553 (1978).

[Zfil The United States argues that once§ 1303C is found unconstitutional the entire Act falls under§ 4 of the Act which provides that in the event
of a "final and unappealable judicial decision" upholding the right of any owner to "enforce a contract or agreement otherwise rendered
unenforceable by R. S. 47:1303 (C)," the following consequences would occur:
"(2) If the right upheld arises from the provisions of a contract or agreement requiring any other party to reimburse or refund to an owner costs or
expenses incurred by such owner by virtue of separation or processing of natural gas for extraction of liquid or liquefiable hydrocarbons, then this
Act shall be null and void and the secretary shall forthwith return to each taxpayer all taxes previously paid, together with interest at the rate of six
percent per annum from the date of payment."
Since a specific contractual provision is not involved here, the precise terms of the Louisiana statute are not met despite the fact that a final and
unappealable determination of the unconstitutionality of§ 1303C has been made. Accordingly, we are not in position, based on the provision
contained in § 4, to determine that the entire Act is null and void.
Plaintiff States, as well as the pipeline companies, also press another Supremacy Clause issue, contending that the First-Use Tax is inconsistent
with the OCS Act, 43 U.S. C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill). Under§ 1332, it is declared to be the policy of the United States that "the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition
as provided in this subchapter." Section 1333 (a) (1) expressly extends the Constitution and laws of the United States to the subsoil and seabed of
the shelf. While the Act borrows "applicable and not inconsistent" state laws for certain purposes, such as were necessary to fill gaps in federal law,
see Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.• 395 U.S. 352, 355-359 {1969). it expressly declares that "(s)tate taxation laws shall not apply to the
outer Continental Shelf."§ 1333 (a) (2) (A). Moreover, the OCS Act provides that the provision for adopting state law "shall never be interpreted as
a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf,
or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom."§ 1333 (a) (3). By passing the OCS Act, Congress "emphatically
implemented its view that the United States has paramount rights to the seabed beyond the three-mile limit ...." United States v. Maine, 420 U.S.
515,526 {1975).

vii

Plaintiff States contend that despite the fact that the First-Use statute declares that it is not taxing the gas itself and thus is not a state-imposed
severance tax on OCS production, the inevitable intent and result of the Act is to impose a tax on the OCS production in contravention of the
express prohibition of the OCS Act. It is clear that a State has no valid interest in imposing a severance tax on federal OCS land. In part, Louisiana
purports to justify the Tax as a means of alleviating the alleged discrimination against Louisiana gas caused by the fact that Louisiana gas must pay
the state severance tax while OCS gas does not. But if correcting the claimed imbalance were the sole justification asserted for the First-Use Tax,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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within the province of the Federal Government. Even if the United States were to decide to open up development to all comers at no charge in
order to spur development of natural gas, Louisiana would have no interest in overriding that decision by imposing a tax to equalize the cost of local
production with that on the federal OCS area. Permitting the States to exercise such power would adversely affect the price which the Government
could command from private developers in their bid price. As clearly required by the OCS Act, Louisiana's sovereign interest in the development of
offshore mineral interests stops at its 3-mile border. Louisiana, however, presses certain environmental interests as well in support of its First-Use

vi

Tax, and in light of this submission, we do not resolve the issue whether the Tax necessarily infringes on the sovereign interests of the United States
in the OCS.
The intervening pipeline companies also argue that Louisiana has no valid environmental interest in imposing the First-Use Tax since the measure is
pre-empted by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1280, as amended, 16 U.S. C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The
Coastal Zone Management Act provides federal funds to compensate States for environmental damage occurring as a result of offshore energy
development to States which agree to comply with the standards mandated by the Act. The importance of the concerns for environmental damage

~

are expressly recognized in the OCS Act. See 43 U.S. C. § 1332 (4) (A) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill). We need not reach this contention in light of our
disposition of the other claims, and to this extent the exceptions of the plaintiff States and the pipeline companies are overruled.
~ The United States suggests that the uses enunciated in the Act do not have a sufficient local nexus to support the Tax under the Commerce

Clause. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert. 347 U.S. 157 (1954}. While the local nexus of certain of the uses is suspect, other uses
would appear to have a substantial local nexus so that on the present record it would be difficult to say that the entire Tax was unconstitutional on
this ground. The Act contains a severability clause providing that if any use is found to be an unconstitutional basis for taxation, the next use would

viJ

be taxed. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47:1303F (West Supp. 1981 ). Given our resolution on the discrimination charge, we find it unnecessary to
reach the local nexus claim especially in light of the severability clause. To this extent, the exception of the United States and the FERC is overruled.
The United States and the plaintiff States also argue that the First-Use Tax is not fairly apportioned. To be valid, a tax on interstate commerce must
be reasonably apportioned to the value of the activities occurring within the State upon which the Tax is imposed. See Washington Revenue Dept. v.

Washington Stevedoring Assn. 1 435 U.S. 734 746-747 (1978l. It is submitted that several factors suggest this principle is being violated. First, the
Tax is imposed on each use as a function of the volume of the gas subject to the use, without attempting to tailor the amount of the Tax depending
on the nature or extent of the actual use of the gas within Louisiana. Second, the use of the proceeds of the First-Use Tax demonstrates that the
Tax is substantially in excess of the amount fairly associated with the local uses. Under the Act, 75% of the proceeds are used to service Louisiana's
general debt, while only one-quarter is directly used to alleviate the alleged environmental damage caused by the pipeline activities. Third, the State
has not demonstrated a sufficient relationship between other services provided by the State and the amount of the First-Use Taxes provided. In
fight of our determination that the Tax is discriminatory, however, we need not determine the apportionment issue. The exceptions of the United
States, the FERC, and the plaintiff States to this extent are also overruled.
~

The United States has provided an example which the Special Master used to illustrate the possible discrimination:

"This difference can be illustrated by the following example. Owner A has 1000 mcf of OCS gas; owner B has 500 mcf of OCS gas and 500 mcf of
gas subject to Louisiana's severance tax. A owes $70 of first use tax; B owes $35 of first use tax and $35 in severance tax. B, however, pays only
$35 in first use taxes. He owes no severance tax because he can credit the first use payment against the severance tax liability." Second Report, at
34, n. 18.
It has been observed that the credit means that "gas extracted offshore and gas extracted in Louisiana will be treated the same for Louisiana tax
purposes only when the First Use Taxpayer has no severance tax liability to absorb the First Use Taxes." As a result, First-Use Tax-payers have an
incentive to "undertake mineral extraction activities in Louisiana so as to minimize their effective First Use Tax burden and to compete on equal
terms with other First Use Taxpayers whose First Use Tax burden has already been so minimized." W. Hellerstein, State Taxation in the Federal
System: Perspectives on Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, Shell Foundation Lecture at Tulane University School of Law (Nov. 20, 1980),

v;J

pp. 23-24.
~

Of course,§ 1303C itself may result in substantial discrimination since owners of gas subject to the state severance tax are not prohibited from

allocating that cost to someone other than the ultimate consumer.

[ll It is true that in this case the Court decides that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate, and that therefore it is not necessary to conduct a trial.
I do not understand the Court, however, to be ruling that original jurisdiction is appropriate only when a trial is not necessary, and therefore in
accepting original jurisdiction of this case the Court opens the door to similar cases which may necessitate a trial.

1f1 Experience teaches that these are not empty concerns. See,

e.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana. 108 U.S. 76 89 (1883} (State suing as
assignee of bondholders, bondholders funding lawsuit and to collect any award); North Dakota v. Minnesota. 263 U.S. 365. 375 '1923} (State
suing for flood damage to farmers' land, farmers funding lawsuit and to collect any award).

viJ

[fil Requiring that a State's claim implicate sovereignty interests also serves the oft-repeated expression in our opinions that the Court will not
interfere with action by one State unless the injury to the complaining State is of "serious magnitude." See Alabama v. Arizona 291 U.S. 286 292
(1934); Colorado v. Kansas. 320 U.S. 383. 393. and n. 8 (1943). The Court cites this concern, ante, at 736, n. 11, but does not explain why a tax
of seven cents per thousand cubic feet of gas is an injury of "serious magnitude."
~

It is true that the Court has exercised original jurisdiction in cases where the right asserted by a complaining State cannot truly be considered a
right affecting sovereign interests. I do not doubt the Court's power to exercise original jurisdiction in such cases, nor do I in this case. The decision
that a particular type of case was an "appropriate" one for original jurisdiction a century ago, however, does not mean that the same sort of case is
an appropriate one today. Justice Harlan explicitly recognized in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp .• 401 U. S. 493, 497-499 ( 1971), that societal
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in which to exercise original jurisdiction. The increase in state regulatory efforts on the one hand and the role of States as consumers on the other
suggests that new considerations need to be brought to bear on the present question.

Ifil The Court's dismissal of the significance of Illinois v. Milwaukee and Ohio v.

Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. as cases not within the exclusive

jurisdiction of this Court thus simply does not wash. Illinois v. Milwaukee indicated the appropriateness of considering the existence of alternative
forums in the context of original and exclusive jurisdiction. Arizona v. New Mexico makes the appropriateness of such consideration in original and
exclusive jurisdiction cases quite clear.

Ifil The fact that the pipeline companies have seen frt to bring suit on their own behalf undermines the analysis of the Court that the consumers of
the gas, both the States and the States' citizens, are the real parties in interest. The pipeline companies obviously have a sufficient interest to justify
their suit.

III It is hardly satisfactory simply to note, as does the Court, that "the issue of appropriateness in an original action between States must be
determined on a case-by-case basis." Ante, at 743.

[fil Because of my views on the jurisdictional question I find it unnecessary to address the merits of this case, beyond noting that the pressure in
original actions to avoid factual inquiries which this Court of course cannot make may go far to explain the entry of judgment on the pleadings over
the ruling by the Special Master that further factual development is necessary to a proper resolution of the issues.

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.
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759 P.2d 1144 (1988)

P.1.E. EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.

JoAnn BASS, an individual, Rex Paul Bass, an individual, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 19766.
Supreme Court of Utah.

June 2, 1988.
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1988.
Paul Franklin Farr, Bruce L. Richards, Mark A. Wolfert, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Jon C. Heaton, James A. Boevers, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
STEWART, Justice:
JoAnn Bass appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for payment of her homestead exemption from amounts received by
plaintiff, P.1.E. Employees Federal Credit Union (P.I.E.), from a foreclosure sale of her home. We affirm.

I. FACTS
On October 19, 1979, while still married, Bass and her ex-husband, Rex Paul Bass, signed a promissory note in favor of P.1.E.
1145 which was secured by a nonpurchase money second mortgage on their home. Subsequent *1145 to their divorce in 1980, JoAnn
Bass retained possession of the mortgaged property and continued to reside there with her two children. P.1.E. filed a complaint
February 10, 1982, to foreclose the second mortgage because of defaults in the payments on the note. Bass then recorded a
declaration of homestead on the property on March 29, 1982, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4 (1987). On January 24,
1983, P.I.E. obtained a judgment, a decree of foreclosure, and an order of sale from the district court. The property was sold
pursuant to the court's order for an amount in excess of Bass's homestead exemption. Prior to bringing this action and after the
sale of the property, Bass's attorney sent two letters to P.1.E.'s attorney demanding payment of the homestead exemption in the
~

amount of $11,000. P.I.E. denied having an obligation to remit money to Bass for her homestead exemption. The issue was
submitted to the district court. Bass's motion asserting that under Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(b) (1987),ill her homestead
exemption prevailed over P.1.E.'s mortgage lien and that no security interests, purchase money or otherwise, may be excluded
from the debtor's homestead exemption provided in Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
On appeal, Bass argues that to be constitutional under Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution,§ 78-23-3(2)(b} must be
limited to purchase money liens. If the statute is so construed, then P.I.E.'s non purchase money note and mortgage do not take
priority over Bass's homestead exemption, and she is entitled to receive the amount of her homestead exemption from P.I.E.
P.1.E. asserts three alternative arguments in support of the trial court's ruling. The first is that nothing in Article XXII, Section 1
precludes the enforcement of voluntary encumbrances on the homestead because that section only exempts homestead

vj

property from "sale on execution" and a mortgage foreclosure is not a "sale on execution," as that term is used in the Constitution.
Second, P.I.E. asserts that§ 78-23-3(2}(b) creates a constitutionally valid exception to the homestead exemption for enforcement
of non purchase money as well as purchase money security interests in property. And third, P.I.E. argues that if appellant is found
to have a valid homestead exemption, she has waived it by voluntarily signing the note and second mortgage.

~

II. CONSTITUTIONAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The common law recognized no homestead exemption. Zunigay_Evans .. 87 __Utah_1_98_..21_8,.48__ P.2d._5_1_3.,_52_1J1_935}; ~

.t!.!.9.!.~Y....~.9.. ~J~.~..?.:?..~.:..~.?.. .~:..~~-~ ..P.~.~~J. Consequently, homestead exemptions exist only by a legislative act. !.i!9.t~.~. .!.9. . Y~~~. ~-!
229,..37 _P.. at_336-37. The majority of states, either under constitutional provisions supplemented by statutes or solely by statutes,

\JP
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The general purpose of a homestead exemption is to protect citizens and their families from the miseries of destitution. See, e.g.,

P~lJ.EJCJ,Of?,Ulo~ v. fv!anning,, 93 Uta_h 198, 203, 69 p.2d 614 1 ~.17 (1937); Gammett_v._ Storrs, ..1_5.. Utah_ 336,_340,._ 49 _P. 642,..64.~
1146

UJmll; K'ff!..<!.~~f.l ..~..t!~.~!.!.!?..~Efl.:.. ~.." 1146..~~~-~...?.Q~.:..?9..~.1.~.Q. P.:..!..1~.:. !.?..~...P.~.~?.J. Absent constitutional or statutory restrictions, the
homestead may be mortgaged and subjected to sale through foreclosure proceedings. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
~-~(!_.'(e_n_~,. 93 .~.9~!. . ~ 1, .1.!, 17 P.2~ ~4 1 ~~ !.1..~~2.); 40 Am.Jur.2d Homestead§ 115 (1968).
· ······

v;J)

Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states:
The Legislature shall provide by law, for the selection by each head of a family, an exemption of a homestead
which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon of
the value of at least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale on execution.
The first issue we consider is whether the phrase "sale on execution," as used in Article XXII, Section 1, was intended by the
framers of the Utah Constitution to encompass the judicial enforcement of consensual liens, such as the non purchase money
mortgage securing the promissory note involved here.

A. Framer's Intent

vi

When interpreting constitutional language, it is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the framers' intent, State v. Betensen,
14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 ( 1963 }; Gammon

v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 189, 190, 364 P.2d 417, 418

(1961 ): General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 5 Utah 2d 326, 334,301 P.2d 7 41, 7 46 (1956), including the record of debates
during the constitutional convention. American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 1072 (Utah 1985): General Electric Co.,
301 P.2d at 746; \(gke~:~qrq_~cro~ Lufl?~~r 9.0. v. _\!anq_~_, 3?. .'=-1t~_bJ~.'--~~- ~~ . P.. ~-~6 1 ~~~ p ~.97). Those debates indicate that the
wording of the homestead provision was given careful consideration. The framers initially considered adopting verbatim the
homestead article from the Michigan constitution. It read:
Every homestead of not exceeding forty acres of land, and the dwelling house thereon, and the appurtenances to
be selected by the owner thereof, and not included in any town plat, city or village; or instead thereof, at the option
of the owner, any lot in any city, village or recorded town plat, or such parts of lots as shall be equal thereto, and
the dwelling house thereon, and its appurtenances, owned and occupied by any resident of the State, not
exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars, shall be exempt from forced sale on execution, or any other final
process from a court, for any debt contracted after the adoption of this Constitution. Such exemption shall not
extend to any mortgage thereon, lawfully obtained; but such mortgage or other alienation of such land by the

0§

owner thereof, if a married man, shall not be valid without the signature of the wife to the same.
Mich. Const. of 1850, Art. 16, § 2 (emphasis added.)
Opposition to this proposal centered on three main issues. First, it was not as generous to large families as the then-existing Utah
statute which allowed the head of the household $1,000, an additional $500 in value for his wife, and another $250 for every
minor child. Second, Utah was considered unique in that many Utahns had small city lots with larger noncontiguous acreage
outside the city, and the proposal did not take this into consideration. Third, the proposal was thought to be too specific for
constitutional enactment. See 2 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah, 1769-1771
(1898) (hereinafter 2 Proceedings).
Several amendments to the Michigan provision were proposed to correct the first two problems, none of which was acceptable to

l.,;j

the delegates. A Mr. Creer offered an entirely new provision for consideration based on the law in Wyoming, which read:
A homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale, under any process of law, and shall not be
alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife, when that relation exists, but no property shall be exempt
1147

from sale for taxes, or for the payment of obligations • 114 7 contracted for the purchase of said premises, or for the
erection of improvements thereon.
2 Proceedings, at 1772 (emphasis added). The Creer proposal was criticized because it "contemplate[d] matters that might
properly be left to the Legislature" and was promptly rejected by the committee. Id. at 1773-74.
The proposal eventually adopted by the Convention was suggested by Mr. Varian and later amended at Mr. Richards' prompting
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delegates as a vehicle to secure permanently a minimum homestead exemption, while at the same time allowing future
legislatures flexibility to modify the exemption amount and other details to accommodate current conditions. At the Convention,
Mr. Varian stated:
[W]hy should we undertake to fix these matters of detail for all time, or at least until the Constitution shall come to
be amended? [This is a question] of public policy, depending from time to time upon the condition of the people
and the necessities which exist.... That is to say, insist that there shall be the necessary exemptions for the
protection of poor debtors, ... but leave that necessity to be determined from time to time by the Legislature, which
is better enabled to pass upon the question ... than this Constitutional Convention.
2 Proceedings, at 1774-75. Mr. Varian also stated in response to delegate questions:
Now, this constitutional provision simply guarantees that [the homestead exemption] ... shall never be obliterated.
It must be maintained in some form or other.... The Legislature, in dealing with this question, would regulate the
whole subject with reference to the exemption and necessities of the case .... [J]ust as sure as you undertake now
to cover the subject, you will ascertain that you have omitted something, when it is too late, or conditions and
necessities of your people may change.

Id. at 1781-82.
There was virtually no discussion at the Convention as to what significance, if any, should be attached to the use of the term "sale
on execution" in the final wording instead of the "forced sale" or "forced sale on execution" terminology used in various other
proposals.
The Utah statutes, prior to and during the constitutional convention, provided that enforcement of certain types of liens was
outside the scope of the Article XXII, Section 1 homestead exemption. The Compiled Laws of Utah,§ 3429(11) (1888), stated in
pertinent part:
No ... property mentioned in this section is exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its
purchase price, or any portion thereof, or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage or a mechanics' or
laborers' lien thereon, or exempt from sale for taxes.
Two comments made by Mr. Varian at the Convention support the conclusion that the delegates viewed the existing homestead
statute as harmonious with Article XXII, Section 1 as adopted. Mr. Varian stated: "[A]s it stands now, with this provision in the
~

Constitution, the existing law will be maintained until the Legislature shall modify or change il..." 2 Proceedings, at 1782. Mr.
Varian also stated:
[L]et me call the attention of the committee to the fact that we have, I presume, what is deemed to be a good
exemption law. It has been on the statute book for a number of years. Under this Constitution it would be
continued in force until changed by the Legislature.

Id. at 1781.
Moreover, if the 1888 statute was in conflict with the language of Article XXII, Section 1, the Legislature certainly had the
opportunity in 1896, the first year following the Convention, to change the statute. However, the Legislature retained the pertinent
language of the 1888 statute. See Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI § 1 (1896).
1148 * 1148 Thus, both the framers of the Constitution, and the members of the first Legislature {many of whom were delegates to the
Constitutional Convention) apparently did not intend the "sale on execution" language of Article XXII, Section 1 to apply to the
sale of homestead property pursuant to a mortgage foreclosure. If the framers of the Utah Constitution had intended to exempt
homesteads from all forced sales pursuant to a foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien, they failed to evidence that intention.

B.Scope
However, if the framers did not intend all mortgage foreclosures to be subject to and within the scope of the constitutional
homestead exemption, it is unclear why an exception for all mortgages from the exemption was provided for by statute.
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statutory exceptions to the homestead exemption, or (2) that the statute simply defined what types of liens did or did not fall under
the term "sale on execution" used in Article XXII, Section 1.
This Court held in '(£?/f~pr:~gg~g[.qff _4.!!..P..q~r.Co.y.yance •..~.~.Utah__74._ 85,. 88 _P._§96,__8~9.{19~~). that because Article XXII,
Section 1 does not itself provide for any exceptions to "sale on execution," the Legislature is not free to create statutory
exceptions.Ill The Court stated, "[IJt is obvious that the constitutional provision exempts a homestead from execution sale without

~.?.. ~:.

restriction, limitation, or exception of any kind." Y'?l~~!.:~~£~q~q~,}.~...Y..~.~-~.~..~.1..t .
~.!.~~g. Revised Statutes of Utah,§ 1156
(1898), allowed the enforcement of mechanic's liens against homestead property. The Court held that the enforcement of such
liens was a statutory form of execution sale and an unconstitutional narrowing of Article XXII, Section 1. _'(olker-Scowg!.9.~; ..~.?..

.Y..~.~-~!.~.1..t~-~ P. at 89~.
However, the Court specifically distinguished the enforcement of a purely statutory lien from the enforcement of a consensual
security interest The Court construed Article XXII, Section 1 not to provide any restriction on voluntary encumbrances of the
homestead and concluded that a lien on the homestead arising from a voluntary contract between the parties was outside the
scope of the homestead exemption -

impliedly because the nature of a sale of such mortgaged property would be a judicial sale

not within the term "sale on execution." The Court stated:
In the absence of an express contract creating it, the lien which a materialman or mechanic may become entitled
to depends solely upon the statute for its existence .... The decree ordering the property sold in satisfaction of the
judgment obtained rests alone for its authority upon the statute, and not upon any contract made by the defendant,
and hence the order of sale is clearly an execution sale within the meaning of the Constitution.
~

Volker-Scowcroft, __ 32 Utah..at_83-84,_88 _P._at 899.

Although the Legislature has no power to restrict, defeat, or in any way impair the homestead right given in Article XXII, Section 1,
Panaqopulos v. __Mannina, ..93_Utah __at_203,. 69_P.2d_at_6_1_7; Utah_Builders' Supply Co.__v. __Gardner,. 86 _Uta_h_257._259._42_P.2d_989.

990 (1935), the Court in Volker-Scowcroft recognized that because Article XXII Section I is not self-executing, the Legislature is
authorized to "provide remedies for the protection of the homestead rights created and secured by the Constitution, and [it] may
regulate the claim of the right so that its exact limits may be known and understood .... n .'!.C?.!.~~!.~Scowcro~...~~-- Utah at 82, 88 P. at
~

(emphasis added).

1149 Utah case law supports the proposition that the enforcement of consensual security interests is outside the scope of Article • 1149
XXII, Section 1. In Kimbally. __ Salisbury, 17 Utah 381._53 __P._1037_(1_898), this Court considered the homestead statute found in
Compiled Laws of Utah,§ 3429(11) (1888), amended by Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI (1896). The Court construed the
term "sale on execution" in Article XXII, Section 1 narrowly. In discussing the purpose for the homestead statute, and by
implication Article XXII, Section 1, the Court declared:
The object of the statute was to foster families as factors and beneficiaries of society, and thus promote the general
welfare, and secure their permanency, and protect their homesteads from forced sale, as far as could be done
~

without injustice to others.

Kimba//, __ 1_7_Uta,h__ap91.,. 53_P._at_1_0~9 (emphasis added). See also Folsom_v._Asp~r..25_ Utah.. 299,_306,_71___P.}1_5._317 (1_90,3)
(states have right to establish homestead and other exemptions from forced sales on execution).
In an apparent attempt to distinguish the applicability of the homestead exemption as against secured obligations, the Court
stated, "Under this statute, the head of the family ... has his home and lands set apart for a homestead for the benefit of himself
and family, free from any personal obligation held by any creditor.... " Kimball,. 17. Utah.. at 39_1,,..53 P._ at. 103~. (emphasis added).
As recently as 1978, this Court stated, relying on Panagopulos, "The purpose of the homestead exemption of Article XXII, Section
1 of the Utah Constitution is to protect 'the dependent and helpless' and to insure such persons shelter and support free from fear
of forced sale." Sanders v. Cassity, 586 P.2d 423. 425 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).

~~§.J~.~-~D.t

In this case, appellant argues that ~.~.~~~~9.!1...~ ..ti9..P.P..!9..~.~Et.~~--~-~.!: ..
supports the conclusion that at the time of Utah's
Constitutional Convention, a nonpurchase money mortgage foreclosure was considered to be a "sale on execution" subject to
the reach of Article XXII, Section 1. We do not agree that Hom blower so holds. The court in Hornblower construed the homestead
provision of the California Constitution, which exempted property from "forced sale" in relation to the homestead statute which
exempted property from "'forced sale on execution, or other final process."' Id. at 276 (emphasis added). The issue was whether
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a nonpurchase money second mortgage could be foreclosed against the homestead property. The court distinguished "forced"
from 'Voluntary" sales, holding that if the owner of a homestead consents (i.e., by giving a mortgage) to a sale under execution or
other legal process, it is not a forced sale. Id. The court concluded that a foreclosure sale pursuant to a judicial decree is not a

"forced sale," but a voluntary sale, and therefore the homestead exemption did not prohibit the enforcement of nonpurchase
money mortgages. Id. at 277. The court did not specify, however, whether it considered the mortgage foreclosure an execution
sale or a sale by "other legal process."
At least one court has concluded that Hornblower specifically did not equate a foreclosure sale with an execution sale. According
to Nevada Nat'/ Leasing Co. v. Hereford, 144 Cal. App.3d 622, 192 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1983), Hornblower"held that an execution or
foreclosure sale of real property consented to by the owner was not a 'forced sale' ...." Id. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (emphasis added).
Although Hornblower and most case law hold that a mortgage foreclosure is not a forced sale, this Court on at least one occasion
has reached a different conclusion. In Local RealJx C,o.-. v._4f17g,quist,_96_ ~tah.297, 30~~_85__P.,~q.,770._775(1_93,8} 1 the Court
declared that there are three types of forced sales that are against the will of the debtor: (1) execution sales generally, (2)
foreclosure sales, and (3) tax sales. However, Lindquist is distinguishable from Hornblower because Lindquist did not determine
the nature of a foreclosure sale in the context of the constitutional provision.

l.t!I

There has been much confusion as to the meaning and interrelationship of the terms "execution," "execution sale," "sale on
1150 execution," "forced sale," "foreclosure sale," and "judicial sale," both at *1150 common law and recently. Historically, "judicial
sales" and "execution sales" were viewed as fairly distinct and separate concepts.ill The difference in their nature was articulated
by one commentator in 1878:
In making ordinary execution sales, simply by virtue of his office, the sheriff or marshal! acts as a ministerial officer
of the law - not as the organ of the court .... His authority to sell rests on the law and on the writ, and does not, as
in judicial sales, emanate from the court.
D. Rorer, A Treatise on the Law of Judicial and Execution Sales,§ 590 (2d ed 1878) (hereinafter Rorer). Discussing the nature of
judicial sales, Rorer observed, "Judicial sales ... occur only in proceedings wholly or partly in rem. In this respect they are widely
contradistinguished from execution sales, at law, where the judgment is exclusively in personam, and wherein the sale is that of
the officer and not that of the court." Id. at§ 31 (footnotes omitted).I!l In discussing mortgage foreclosures, Rorer states:
Judicial sales, in proceedings partly in rem and partly in personam, are where the proceedings are of a mixed
nature, being directly against the property and also, personal against the owner, as in proceedings to foreclose
deeds of mortgage by judicial sale. In such cases, there is a proceeding in rem against the property, and at the
same time personal process against the mortgagor to bring him as defendant into court....
Yet the sale is none the less a judicial sale, and the sale of the court.
Id. at§§ 53-54 (footnote omitted). Rorer makes clear his view that mortgage foreclosures are judicial sales, as is any sale

''whenever a right or proceeding is enforced, by a sale made by a judicial order or decree, under direction of the court as
~

contradistinguished from sales on execution." Id. at§ 29.
Nevertheless, the distinctions between a "judicial sale" and an "execution sale" are unclear, especially in a jurisdiction like Utah
which does not require judicial confirmation of a foreclosure sale. First Nat'/ Bank v. HaY'1?.9.n.~.'-~-~--~~b...~.? 1, 157-58 57 ~:.~~1401_,_ 1405..(1_936}. Moreover, recent Utah decisions do not seem to treatjudicial and execution sales as mutually exclusive
categories. Executions have been characterized as a form of judicial or forced sale, Larsen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. Inc., 564
P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1977}: Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 29. 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971 }, much like mortgage foreclosures.
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 {Utah 1983).

The Utah statute authorizing mortgage foreclosures states:
~

There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in accordance with the provisions of the chapter. Judgment shall
be given adjudging the amount due, ... and the sale of mortgaged property ... to satisfy said amount ... and
directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution,
and a special execution or order of sale shall be issued for the purpose.

vN

(1987). This Court has held, however, that the reference in§ 78-37-1 to provisions relating to sale on
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-37-1
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execution does not indicate that a foreclosure sale is the same in nature as an execution sale generally, although they are
1151 somewhat analogous. 1-i'l.c/Q'!.f.~t. 96_,Utah,.· 1151 at_301_.__ 85_P.2d_ at_772_. The reference "has merely procedural significance" and
simply "directs that in making the sale under foreclosure proceedings the sheriff shall proceed in the same way as he does in
making sales under executions generally." Id.
Accordingly, we hold that a mortgage foreclosure sale is not a "sale on execution" for purposes of Article XXII, Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution.

Ill. STATUTORY HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The present statute was adopted in 1981 as part of a comprehensive change in Utah's exemption laws.Ifil This change was
implemented by the passage of the Utah Exemption Act, which was modeled after the Uniform Exemption Act. Appellant insists
that the phrase "for the purchase price of such property" modifies both "security interests" and "judicial liens." This construction is
urged upon the Court for two reasons. First, the statute is ambiguous and therefore should be given a broad and liberal
construction in favor of the homestead right in order to accomplish the remedial and beneficial purposes for which it was

vJ

designed. Second, to interpret it otherwise would be to create an exception not provided in the Constitution.
It has always been the general policy of this and most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally construed.
However, this preference for liberal construction should not be used to protect debtors from the performance of "just obligations."
Zan one_ v.. Sprague,._ 16. Cal. App._333___ 337 ...116. P.. 989. _990 _( 1911 }. Moreover, homestead exemption statutes "must be construed
and interpreted to give effect to the purposes and objects the framers of the Constitution and the Legislature had in mind in the
enactments." Panagopulos •. 93 _Utah __at 204-05._ 69_P.2d _at_6_1_8.
The statute which preceded Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (1987) unquestionably excepted all lawful mortgages, whether for
purchase money or not, from the homestead exemption, see Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3 (1953), (repealed 1981 ), as has every
homestead statute ever enacted in Utah, including those in effect prior to statehood. Accordingly, we must decide whether the
Legislature intended to effect such a radical departure from over one hundred years of statutory precedent. We conclude it did
not.
When the language of a particular provision of a statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt. following principles of statutory
construction, to ascertain the intention of the Legislature; but where there is no ambiguity the plain language of the statute must
be taken as the expression of the Legislature's intent. Mi/esy.__ Wel/s .. 22__ Utah_55,__62._61 __ ~. 534.__536_(1900}. "The best evidence of
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. lntermountain Health
Care, Inc.• 679 P.2d 903, 906 {Utah 1984}. In the present case, a literal reading of the statute, i.e., "security interests in the
property and judicial liens ..." (emphasis added), precludes appellant's construction without torturing the syntax of the provision.
This conclusion is in harmony with the only other case we have been able to find construing Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(b)
(1987). The court in In re Williamson. 43 B.R. 813 (Bankr.D.Utah 1984 l held that the provision denominated two distinct
exceptions and that the phrase "for the [sic] debts created for the purchase price of such property" modifies only the term "judicial
liens" and does not modify the term "security interests." Id. at 829. The court further held, "[t]he term ·security interest' as used in
the Utah statute, was meant to embrace any consensual security interest in the property by which the owner of said property
voluntarily pledges that property as security for a debt regardless of the purpose of the debt." Id. We agree. We find no ambiguity
in the statute or any indication that the Legislature intended to alter the long-standing law of this state. Therefore, we hold that

~

1152 Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(b) (1987) is a legislative expression that enforcement of all consensual· 1152 security interests,
whether they are the result either of purchase money or of non purchase money obligations, is not within the scope of the
homestead exemption as created by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The owner of property should not be allowed to hold that property out as security for a debt, with the credit received very possibly
contingent on that security interest, and then have the opportunity to cut off the security by claiming a homestead exemption. See
In re Williamson 43 B.R. at 829-30. The power to sell the homestead includes the power to mortgage it. S. Thompson, A Treatise
on Homestead and Exemption Laws,§ 456 (1878). As the court in Hom blower recognized: "Concede to the owner of the
homestead the power to give the mortgage, and the remedy for its enforcement by foreclosure and sale necessarily follow[s]."

fjornbl<:!..'("8'i

~.~

C~J:..~~..??~- Furthermore, the policy of allowing a consensual security interest, including a non purchase money

mortgage, to be enforced against the homestead makes sense in light of the history of the Utah homestead exemption.
~
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homestead property from "sale on execution" created by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, all
consensual security interests in land may be enforced against homestead property. Because we hold that Article XXII, Section 1
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2)(b) do not provide a homestead exemption from foreclosure sale, the
issue of appellant's waiver of that exemption by signing the mortgage is not reached.
Affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
[ll Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3( 1) and (2) provide:
( 1) A homestead consisting of property in this state shall be exempt in an amount not exceeding $8,000 in value for a head of family, $2,000 in
value for a spouse, and $500 in value for each other dependent. A homestead may be claimed in either or both of the following:
(a) one or more parcels of real property together with appurtenances and improvements;
(b) a mobile home in which the claimant resides.
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution or forced sale except upon the following obligations:
(a) statutory liens for taxes and assessments on the property:
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of such property; and
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children.

mOther courts have agreed that a legislature's power to create exceptions from a constitutional exemption is limited. In re Vonhee, 238 F. 422.
424 {W.D.Wash. 1916}: Hodges
(1897}; Tuttle

v.

v.

Cookse~ 33 Fla. 715 733 15 So. 549 552 (1894}: Burrows

v.

Brooks. 113 Mich. 307. 310 71 N.W. 460. 461

Strout. 7 Minn. 465 466 (1862): Donaldson v. Voltz. 19 W. Va. 156. 159 {1881}.

QI See Nat'/ Reserve Life Ins.

Co. v. Kemp. 184 Kan. 648,656, 339 P.2d 368. 375 (1959}; First National Bank v. Barons. 109 Kan. 493. 495. 200 P.
297. 298 (1921); 50 C.J.S. Judicial Sales§ 1 (1947). One early commentator recognized that some sales are not easily categorized. Special
executions were seen at common law as "partly partaking of the nature of an execution at law and of an order of sale in chancery.... It may be

judicial and it may be ministerial, as either feature predominates; and it may partake of the qualities of each in some respects." D. Rorer, A Treatise
on the Law of Judicial and Execution Sales,§ 592 (2d ed. 1878).
~

A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is considered an action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. First Nat'/ Credit Corp. v. Von Hake.

511 F. Supp. 634 639 <D.Utah 1981}: Boucofskiv. Jacobsen. 36 Utah 165. 178. 104 P.117. 122 (1909).

[fil See footnote 1.
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586 P.2d 423 (1978)

Harold S. SANDERS and Eleanor Sanders, Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.
Donn E. CASSITY, Trustee, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 15515.
Supreme Court of Utah.

October 13, 1978.

I.@

424

*424 James B. Tadje, Romney, Nelson & Cassity, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
This case involves a dispute over the status of a judgment lien that existed prior to the date the debtor claimed a homestead
exemption and prior to the time when the debtor conveyed the property to the respondents (hereafter referred to as "Sanders").
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Leoda Dunham (hereafter referred to as "Dunham") owned an undivided one-half interest in certain described real property

i.ij

together with two of the defendants. On May 14, 1971, the defendants, by and through their trustee (hereafter referred to as
"appellant") obtained a judgment against Dunham for $11,549.43 plus costs of suit. An execution was issued on August 1, 1972,
whereby the sheriff was directed to levy upon the property of Dunham. Sale was noticed up for September 13, 1972. On
September 11, 1972, two days prior to the sale, Dunham signed a Declaration of Homestead in the amount of $4,600 and
~

asserted the value of the property to be $3,600. The document was recorded with the Summit County Recorder. No sale was
held.
On November 29, 1972, Dunham conveyed her interest in the property to Sanders, reserving a life estate for herself. In
425

November, *425 1976, appellant again issued a writ of execution upon all non-exempt personal and real property belonging to
Dunham in an attempt to satisfy the judgment. A sheriffs sale was held on December 7, 1976, and appellant bid the entire

\JP

amount of his judgment for the property in the belief that he was acquiring the interest previously conveyed to Sanders.
Sanders instituted a quiet-title action against all the parties and the trial court granted their motion for summary judgment.
Appellant now appeals the decision below, and the major issue to be resolved is whether or not the trial court erred in concluding
that the conveyance from Dunham to Sanders passed free and clear of the appellant's prior lien.
U.CA, 1953, 28-1-1 provides that a homestead is exempt from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale unless certain
obligations exist. These exceptions are for (1) taxes, (2) judgments secured by mortgage and on debts created for the purchase
price of the property, and (3) judgments rendered due to failure to support dependent children. None of the exceptions are
involved in this matter.
It is further provided by statute as follows:
The homestead must be selected and claimed by the homestead claimant by making, signing, and acknowledging
a declaration of homestead ... which declaration must, before the time stated in the notice of sale on execution, or

on other judicial sale, as the time of sale, of premises in which the homestead is claimed, be delivered to and
served upon the sheriff or other officer conducting the sale or recorded [with the county recorder] .... If no such
claim is filed or served as herein provided, title shall pass to the purchaser at such sale free and clear of all
homestead rights.ill [Emphasis added.]
Thus, a declaration of homestead may be made at any time after judgment and before sale in order to claim the protection of
Section 28-1-1. The debtor in the case before us complied with the statute by recording her homestead declaration two days prior
to sale.
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Appellant, however, argues that the statute exempts property from execution and forced sale pursuant to a judgment lien only
when the homestead exists at the time the judgment lien is created. In other words, once a judgment lien is docketed, it is a valid
lien that cannot be defeated by a subsequent homestead declaration. He relies on the wording of U .C.A., 1953, 78-22-1 which
states:
From the time the judgment is docketed it becomes a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution ...
We are unpersuaded by this line of reasoning. The purpose of the homestead exemption of Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution is to protect "the dependent and helpless" and to insure such persons shelter and support free from fear of forced
sale.(g! It seems a reasonable inference to draw from this policy that the homestead right is created from the moment of taking title
or possession, not merely from the time a formal declaration is made. Therefore, the requirements of Section 28-1-1 O are
designed to be used as a defense against execution or forced sale to a right that is already in existence - not to create the
homestead interest for the first time through a formal recital. It is the occupancy of the premises that gives rise to the homestead
claim.lli The formalities in Section 28-1-10 also have as their purpose that of protecting innocent purchasers, who take at a
judicial sale, from having their interest diminished by a subsequent homestead claim. Thus, the requirement is that any
~

homestead interest must be declared prior to sale.
426

•426 If the legislature intended otherwise, the statute could easily have required that the declaration be made prior to judgment
or upon conveyance or devise. It is obvious that the reason this was not done is because it is not necessary to raise the
homestead exemption until after a judgment lien has been obtained and the occupant is faced with dispossession due to
execution or forced sale.
The statutes must be read together and the most reasonable construction is that the homestead is immune from judgment lien,
execution or forced sale, providing a formal declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or
execution.
Appellant relies on only one case to support his proposition, McMurdie v. Chugg,I!I and cites the following language therein:
"Existing liens on property cannot be defeated by subsequently claiming said property as a homestead."Lfil (I.e., after sale is
made.) An examination of that case shows, however, that the debt in question there arose from the purchase price of the property,
one of the exemptions that defeats the homestead claim in Section 28-1-1. Furthermore, the language referred to above was
taken from Evans v. Jensen,lfil a case where the owner was not entitled to a homestead exemption at the time the lien attached.
The court there held that a subsequent change of status (becoming the head of the household) after the lien attached to the

_ property could not be used to defeat the existing purchase debt by claiming a homestead exemption.
In the case before us, Dunham was qualified as head of the household and was entitled to the exemption before the judgment
lien was recorded. That she formally declared her already existing status after the judgment was docketed is of no consequence.
In Evans, the exemption did not previously exist and could not later be created in order to defeat prior creditors. This is consistent
with the general trend to protect the rights of a lienor providing the lien attached before the property was devoted to homestead
use or before a family relationship existed.ill
Having determined that Dunham's homestead right is properly within Section 28-1-1 and thus protected from judgment lien and
execution or forced sale, we next must consider what effect the conveyance by Dunham to Sanders has on appellant's prior,
existing lien.
The general rule is that the grantee of land on which a homestead is claimed acquires title exempt from the claims of the grantor's
creditors; and if the claims cannot be asserted against the property while the title is in the grantor, they may not be enforced
against the grantee.ffil
U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-2 codifies this general concept by describing the effect of a conveyance in the following language:
When a homestead is conveyed by the owner thereof such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any lien
or encumbrance to which it would not be subject in the hands of the owner; ...
It is clear, therefore, that property which is beyond· the reach of the creditor due to a homestead exemption in the debtor will still
be protected once the property is conveyed to another.
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The trial court found that the value of the conveyed one-half interest in the subject property was less than the statutory exemption
and that appellant produced no evidence of record to show the value exceeded the amount declared; therefore, the entire
interest passed to Sanders free and clear of any lien represented by appellant's judgment.
427

Appellant claims this was error since in the action to quiet title he alleged that •427 the property was worth $15,000. However,
any objection to the value stated should have been raised at the time Dunham recorded her declaration of homestead interest.
This was not done and no hearing was requested on the issue of value. The appellant's failure to raise an objection in the earlier
proceeding constitutes a waiver, and he is estopped from raising it in a subsequent proceeding involving different parties, or from
raising it now on appeal.
Since we find that the property interest was conveyed to Sanders free and clear of appellant's judgment lien by operation of law,

~

it is unnecessary to discuss the issue raised as to whether or not Dunham's homestead interest also passed to the grantee. Such
a determination would have no effect on appellant's lien. All other issues raised by appellant are without merit, and we decline to
review them at this time.
The judgment is affirmed with costs awarded to Sanders.

l,j£)

MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring with comments):
I agree with the holding of the main opinion that the conveyance of the subject property to the plaintiffs Sanders by their
predecessor Leoda S. Dunham, who declared a homestead exemption therein, vested title to the plaintiffs free of any effect
thereon by the defendant's judgment lien. However, I think it advisable to state some reservations from agreeing with the certain
statements in the main opinion which are not necessary to the resolution of the issue presented in this case and which, if
excerpted and applied in other circumstances, may give rise to difficulty.
My first reservation is to the statement that "the homestead right is created from the moment of taking title or possession, not
merely from the time a formal declaration is made." It is undoubtedly true that the right to declare a homestead in property arises
at the time the owner takes title. However, he may own more than one piece of property. Consistent with the intent and purpose
that is expressed in the homestead statute and decisional law thereon, he has a right to choose whichever tract of his property he
desires (within the value limits) in selecting and declaring his homestead.
The second reservation is to the statement that "It is the occupancy of the premises that gives rise to the homestead claim." Based
on the same reasons and purposes of the homestead act, I do not believe that the claimant must be in possession of the land to
claim a homestead exemption thereon. The property so claimed might be land upon which he is planning to build his home, or it
could be a home which he is leasing to another while he is compelled to be away on a work assignment, or some other kind of
mission. Though it is true that some cases talk about possession of a homestead, it will generally be found that it depends upon
the circumstance and upon the wording of the statutes.

lj

Our statute says nothing about occupying the land, but gives the right to declare a homestead "consisting of lands." This Court
has previously met this problem and has recognized that under our Constitution and statutes, the right of a homestead exemption
does not depend on possession. In the case of Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin 14 Utah 2d 408 385 P.2d 155, 156 Chief
Justice Henriod speaking for a unanimous court stated:
... a fee owner subject to a life estate can claim a homestead exemption under our constitution and statutes,

irrespective of the question of possession. [Emphasis added.]

ill U.C.A.,

1953, 28-1-10.

Lf1. In Re Mower's Estate,

VP

ml Panaqopulos v.

93 Utah 390 73 P.2d 967 ( 1937).

Manning 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937}.

[1199 Utah 403, 107 P.2d 163 (1940).

Ifil Id. at 408,
Ifil 51

107 P.2d at 166.

Utah 1, 168 P. 762 (1917).

ill 40 Am.Jur.2d,
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Jose Carlos PENA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 930101.
Supreme Court of Utah.

vj

February 15, 1994.
934

*934 R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen. and David B. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Jose Carlos Pena appeals the trial court's denial of several motions to suppress evidence prior to his guilty plea for attempted
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (7). Pena raises four
claims of error regarding the trial court's evidentiary rulings: (i) The initial stop by police was not supported by reasonable
suspicion; {ii) Pena did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; {iii) the misdemeanor arrest was a pretext for the strip search;
and (iv) the strip search that produced the critical evidence was unlawful. This case was certified to this court by the Utah Court of
Appeals under rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm.
On April 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Police Department received a call from a ?-Eleven clerk reporting a theft of prophylactics by
a Hispanic male. A description of the suspect and the vehicle in which he was riding, including the license number, was
broadcast. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dale Bench sighted the suspect vehicle and pulled it over. The vehicle contained the driver
and one passenger. The passenger was later identified as defendant Pena.
A second officer, Officer Buckholts, arrived to assist Officer Bench, and the suspects were then asked to step out of the car. Pena
apparently matched the description of the theft suspect. A third officer, Officer Stevens, arrived and recognized Pena as having
recently been arrested for a drug offense. Officer Stevens could not remember Pena's name. Pena, who had no identification, told
police his name was Marcello Flores. However, on two occasions, he was unable to spell the last name correctly, giving police
the spelling M-a-r-c-e-I-I-o F-o-s-e-s.
Pena's inability to spell "Flores" led police to suspect that he was lying about his identity. Officer Buckholts, who knew that the
prior drug arrest would be entered on the police computer, requested that a dispatcher search the records for the arrest under the
name Marcello Flores. No record was found. The officers then arrested Pena for giving false personal information to an officer, a
misdemeanor.ill See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507.
While transporting Pena to jail, Officer Buckholts saw Pena "moving around quite a bit in the seat, ... putting his [handcuffed)
hands down the back of his pants ... , [and) trying to move them around to the front." These actions led Buckholts to believe that
Pena was concealing narcotics. When they arrived at the jail, Buckholts requested that Pena be strip searched. During that
search, jail personnel discovered cocaine.
Pena was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony under section 58-37-8{2)(a)(i), and
with giving false personal information to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor under section 76-8-507. Pena moved to
suppress statements he made prior to the arrest as well as to suppress the cocaine. He argued that the police violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1, sections 12 and 14 of the Utah
Constitution. The trial court denied the motions. Pena then entered, and the court accepted, a conditional guilty plea to the lesser
offense of attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor. The conditional plea preserved
Pena's right to appeal the suppression ruling. He appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, and the matter was argued to a panel of
the court. That court certified the case to us before decision, pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

\jp

We first address the proper standard of review for determinations of reasonable suspicion, which appears to be the reason for the
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935

"935 court of appeals' certification of this case.fZI The State argues that we should apply the clearly erroneous standard because
reasonable-suspicion determinations are fact intensive and clearly erroneous is the standard that we have suggested is
appropriate for fact questions. Pena, on the other hand, argues that the standard of review should be correctness because
reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion. Both parties find support for their contentions in various of our opinions and those of
the court of appeals.
We recognize that this court and the court of appeals have created some confusion with regard to standards of review, perhaps in
part because this court has not focused much attention on the articulation of those standards until recently, when they assumed
an increased level of importance. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 1268-69 {Utah 1993). In State v. Mendoza, we reviewed
a reasonable-suspicion determination regarding an investigatory stop under a clearly erroneous standard, upholding the trial
courfs ruling. 7 48 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). However, in State

v.

Ramirez. we suggested that all applications of law to findings

of fact that produce conclusions of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness. 817 P.2d 774. 781-82
(Utah 1991 }. Until recently, the court of appeals tended to follow the language we used in Mendoza, concluding that the issue
was one of fact, because the deferential standard ofreview had been used.ru See State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991 }, cert. denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah CtApp.1990): State
792 P.2d 489. 493 (Utah Ct.App.1990}; State v. Sert 758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah Ct.App.1988}. In State
~

v.

Talbot,

v. Munsen, however, the

court of appeals applied a correction-of-error standard in reviewing a reasonable-suspicion determination. 821 P.2d 13, 14-15
(Utah Ct.App. 1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). We endeavored to clarify this matter generally in Thurman, but did
not specifically address the standard of review for reasonable suspicion in that case. 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11.
Determination of the proper standard of review requires a brief discussion which we hope will bring some clarity to discussions of
the issue. At the most basic level, two different types of questions are presented to a trial court: questions of law and questions of

vi)

fact. Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review
-Looking Beyond the Labels. 74 Marq.L.Rev. 231,236 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]. Legal determinations, on the other hand, are

defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities
and status in similar circumstances. Id.
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court
936

under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual "936 findings made
by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court's determination. See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985): see also United States v.

~

United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395, 68 S.Ct. 525. 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the

trial court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is adduced. The judge of that
court is therefore considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record. In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158.
1161 {Utah 1983}.
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the standard of review is not phrased as "clearly
erroneous." Rather, appellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term "correctness."
Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993}: see Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381. 1383 (Utah 1993}. This is because appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power

0j

and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 751, 779 (1957); see Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1266. In other words, one can

visualize the traditional standard-of-review scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at either end by the clearly erroneous
and correction-of-error standards, which correspond with whether the issue is characterized as one of fact or of law.
The parties here have characterized the standard-of-review question before us in terms of this fact/law distinction and argue the
issue as though the options were metaphorically black and white -

one option being "clearly erroneous" and the other

"correctness," with the first requiring very broad deference to the trial court and the second none. It is common for parties to
characterize the standard-of-review debate in such a polarized manner. Steven A. Childress, A Standards of Review Primer:
Federal Civil Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1989); see Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of
Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 239-45 (1991 ). However, we think that these

distinctions tend to obscure the real issues. Although the universe of questions presented for review has often been
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characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact or law, there is really a third category- the application of
law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law. It is
this determination that is at the heart of the dispute between the parties over the appropriate standard of review for reasonablesuspicion determinations. And it is a dispute with real consequences.
Although implicitly recognizing this fact-to-law category of issues, the parties act as though there are only two possible standards
of review -

correctness and clearly erroneous. The State would like us to defer to a trial judge's determination that on a

particular set of facts reasonable suspicion was present, thus raising a very substantial hurdle to one challenging such a trial
court determination. On the other hand, Pena would like the opportunity to convince an appellate court that the trial judge's
factual findings do not satisfy the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. He wants us to make this decision without deferring at
all to the trial judge on the application of the legal standard to the facts: in other words, to address the matter entirely de novo
under a correctness standard.
This third category of determinations raises thorny issues. In the abstract, the effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and,
therefore, one on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's determination. In recognition of this fact, the

937

standard of review for such determinations is termed one of "correctness." This is •93 7 the message in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-

§..& and in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11. and it contradicts the State's claim that a clearly erroneous standard of review is
appropriate here. To this degree, Pena is correct as to the stated standard of review.
Nonetheless, the critical question, and one of some subtlety, arises only after we have said that an issue is a question of law and
no deference is owed the trial court. At this point, we must attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a
set of facts -

a rule that we establish without deference to the trial courts -

embodies a de facto grant of discretion which

permits the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking
reversal. This is really the point of the debate before us. Put in terms of this case, does the legal standard of reasonable suspicion
grant any discretion to the trial judge in applying that standard to a set of facts? We think it does. How much? Any answer
requires a brief discussion of the discretion that may be given trial judges to determine the application of stated legal principles to
facts.
As stated earlier, it is our role as an appellate court to define what the law is, and we never defer to any degree to a trial court on
that count. That statement does not, however, tell us much about how closely we should scrutinize the application of a statement
of legal principle to a specific set of facts. Yet this is a critical question, for at bottom, what a legal principle means in reality can
often be determined only by considering how its general terms are given sharp definition through their application to a series of
specific fact situations. See Hofer at 234. Determining what the law is actually involves an inductive process as much as a
deductive one. The governing legal standard is as often derived by abstraction from specific applications as it is defined in the
abstract and then applied to specific situations. Yet while we generally consider de nova a trial court's statement of the legal rule,
we often review with far less rigor the court's determination of the legal consequences of facts. The question before us today is
whether we can derive any principles to determine when such scrutiny should be close and when it should not and what those
principles tell us about reviewing a finding of reasonable suspicion.
We find much useful analysis on the rather arcane topic of the degree of discretion to be accorded a trial court's application of
legal propositions to facts in an excellent article by Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed
From Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635 (1971) [hereinafter Rosenberg]. Professor Rosenberg describes the spectrum of discretion
that may be granted to a trial judge on questions of law as running from "correctness" to "abuse of discretion." However, we
decline to use this terminology because in Utah, we have used the term "correctness" to refer to the concept that an appellate

Vi

court need not defer to a trial court in the determination of what the law is, including the legal consequences of a particular set of
facts, and we think that the term "abuse of discretion" has no tight meaning. Compare Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,
799 (Utah 1991} (applying abuse-of-discretion standard for judgment notwithstanding the verdict) with State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232, 239-40 {Utah 1992} (abuse-of-discretion standard for rule 403 rulings). But if the terminology is altered to fit our
conceptual framework by labeling the spectrum of discretion in functional terms, running from "de novo" on the one hand to
"broad discretion" on the other, Professor Rosenberg's discussion is directly pertinent to the questions before us.
The helpful metaphor Professor Rosenberg uses in describing these degrees of discretion is that of a pasture. To the extent that a
trial judge's pasture is small because he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate courts and given little room to roam in
applying a stated legal principle to facts, the operative standard of review approximates what can be described as "de nova."
That is, the appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the legal effect of specific facts. But to the extent that the pasture is
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appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio but will *938 not reverse - in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong
without incurring reversal. Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or when the appellate court feels comfortable in
more closely defining the law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial judge's decision exceed the
broad discretion granted.
As can be imagined, the real amount of pasture permitted a trial judge will vary depending on the legal issue, although the
terminology we use to describe the operative standard of review does not begin to reflect the many shades of this variance. The
best we can do is to recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate review of the
application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.
Our case law provides some examples of legal issues that can be placed at points along this spectrum of discretion, although we
have never spoken of what we are doing in quite these terms. At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a decision
by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. See Hansen

v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah

1988}: see a/so Utah R.Civ.P. 50(d). In reviewing this sort of decision, we give the trial court a great deal of pasture. See
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 799: Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17. Also toward the broad end of the spectrum is the decision to admit or

exclude evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40. Other rulings on the admission of
evidence also generally entail a good deal of discretion. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 212 Utah 12,852 P.2d 997. 999 (1993):
State

v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232. 1241 (Utah), cert.

.~.:§:..

denied, .

:.1.1_4 S.Ct._476,_126_L.Ed_.2d_427_l1_993.).

On the other hand, there are situations in which we narrow the pasture considerably for policy reasons. One such example
involves consent to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment. See Thurman 846 P.2d at 1269-71. Finally, at
11

the de novo end of the spectrum are issues such as whether a municipal function" has been delegated to a state commission in
violation of article VI, section 28 of the Utah Constitution. See Utah_ Assoc.. Mun. _Power Sys.. v. __Public_ Serv.. Comm 'n,. 7 89 __ P.2d_
298,..301_-02.JUtah 1_990}; CityofWestJordan v. State RetirementBd.• 767 P.2d 530,533 (Utah 1988}.
Occasionally, we expand or contract the size of the pasture in response to things we learn over time. A recent example is
evidenced by our decision in Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993}. In a series of
earlier cases, we had ruled that waiver was or was not present as a matter of law on the specific facts of those cases. This
entailed fairly close scrutiny of the application of the general stated waiver principles to particular fact situations. In the course of
those decisions, we attempted to incorporate into the statement of the law of waiver those facts that led us to decide each of those
cases as we did. See Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 {Utah 1983}. Over time, we appeared to have developed hopelessly
inconsistent elaborations on the basic statement of waiver principles. In Soter's, we acknowledged that fact, as well as the futility
of attempting such elaborations. 857 P.2d at 939. We then stripped the statement of the law back to its most basic form and told
the trial courts to apply it. Id. at 942. The net effect was to say that waiver is a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot
profitably review de nova in every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of
such decisions. In terms ofour present discussion, Soter's increased the size of the trial court's pasture because we found
ourselves unable to describe the shape of the smaller one with adequate clarity.
All the foregoing helps in understanding the reality that underlies the rather wooden characterization of standards of review
which we often use when discussing the application of law to facts. And that reality suggests criteria for determining when some
degree of deference may be given a trial court's application of a particular principle of law to specific facts. A number of reasons
usually given for granting trial judges discretion on legal questions are canvassed by Professor Rosenberg. He finds three

939

reasons that are *939 useful in discerning when some degree of discretion ought to be left to a trial court: (i) when the facts to
which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these
facts can be spelled out; {ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that
appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative; and (iii) when
the trial judge has observed "facts," such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts. Rosenberg at 662-63.
Of course, there are countervailing policy reasons for not granting broad discretion to a trial court. For example, in Thurman, we
found that while there were varying fact patterns that would be relevant to determinations of voluntariness of consent, they were
not so unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal rules regarding consent to search, given
the substantial Fourth Amendment interests lost as a result of such consents. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
With these considerations in mind, we move on to the question of the standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion
determinations. We conclude that the proper standard of review to be applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific
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set offacts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as
opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for clear error.1.41 We further conclude that the reasonable-suspicion legal
standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of facts.
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but we would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the other hand, a
sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion requirement are served.Ifil

940

•940 Our decision to characterize the review as something less than de novolfil is largely due to the first factor spelled out by
Professor Rosenberg: Reasonable-suspicion determinations are highly fact dependent, and the fact patterns are quite variable.

ill It would be impractical for an appellate court to review every reasonable-suspicion determination de nova and then
pronounce whether each unique factual setting rises to the level of reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. If we were to try, it is
likely that the resulting case law would be confusing and inconsistent. Our recent experience with the law of waiver, discussed in
Soter's, shows that this concern is not fanciful. On the other hand, we are not precluding this court or the court of appeals from
effectively fencing off parts of the discretionary pasture from trial judges once the reviewing courts have enough experience with
certain recurring fact patterns that the legal effect of those patterns can be settled with comfort. However, except in those
situations in which appellate courts feel comfortable in developing the law in such a manner, trial courts should be permitted
some rein to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination. See Childress,
125 F.R.D. at 338.
With this concept of reasonable suspicion in mind, we now address Pena's claims. Pena first argues that the trial court erred in
finding that the stop by police was supported by reasonable suspicion. He claims that the police did not have reasonable
suspicion because they had not interviewed the 7-Eleven clerk beforehand to assure that a crime had taken place. In response,
the State maintains that the dispatched report was sufficient for the stop.
The United States Supreme Court has held that an officer may stop and question a person "when the officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." United States

v. Place, 462 U.S.

696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). In determining whether such reasonable suspicion exists, we have
indicated that under certain circumstances, police officers can rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory stop. State v.
Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989). Here, we think that the dispatcher gave Officer Bench sufficient information for him to
form a reasonable suspicion that Pena or the driver had committed a crime, justifying the stop of the car in which Pena was a
passenger. We cannot agree that Officer Bench was required to allow a suspect who matched the detailed description given by
the store clerk to continue until another officer had the opportunity to go to the 7-Eleven store and interview the clerk. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the dispatched report contained articulable facts to support a
finding of reasonable suspicion.
Second, Pena argues that when the police finally read the Miranda warnings to him, he did not effectively waive his rights
because he did not fully understand English. A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from a defendant's "actions and words,"
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369. 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757. 60 L.Ed.2d 286 {1979). and is based on the "totality of the
941

circumstances." •941 State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 224 (Utah 1989) (citing Fare v. Michael C. 442 U.S. 707,725 99 S.Ct. 2560
2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). We review the trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver for correctness. State

v. Sampson. 808

~.~.?..

P.2d 1100, 1111 (Utah Ct.App.1990), cert. denied,
f'.2d 327 (~.~-~.~...1
..~.~.!.li cert. denied, .............~.:§.:........ , 112 S.Ct. .1. 282, 117
L.Ed .2d 507..(1992). However, this standard of review grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because of the variability of
the factual settings. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 466-67 {Utah 1988). Here, the trial court found that Pena had no
problem understanding English. Based on that factual determination, we find no error in the conclusion that Pena validly waived
his rights.Ifil
Pena next claims that his arrest for giving false information to a police officer was a pretext for the strip search and consequently
was illegal. This contention is based on the assumption that the arrest was improper. Because we find that the officers had
probable cause to arrest Pena, we do not consider his pretext argument. Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1237-38.
~

Finally, Pena claims that the strip search at the jail was unnecessary and intrusive and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Specifically, he argues that the misdemeanor arrest could not give rise to a valid concern that he was carrying contraband or
weapons into the jail facility and, therefore, the strip search was unjustified.
In response, the State argues that under federal law, strip searches are justifiable under circumstances amounting to less than
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personal rights. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 60 l.Ed.2d 447 (1979) the United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of strip searches following an arrest. The Court stated:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.

Id. at 559, 99 S.Cl at 1884.
In this case, the trial court found that the strip search was supported by a reasonable suspicion that Pena was carrying drugs.
Officer Buckholts knew that Pena had been arrested for a drug offense, and he had observed Pena with his handcuffed hands in
the back of his pants as though attempting to conceal something. On that factual basis, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
concluding that a strip search was justified.
We have considered Pena's other arguments and find them to be without merit.fill We affirm the trial court's denial of Pena's
motions to suppress.
STEWART, Associate C.J., and HALL and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
HALL, J., acted on this case prior to his retirement.

111 Salt Lake City Police Department policy allows officers to issue citations for certain misdemeanors. However, identification or some other means
of determining an individuars name and birth date is required before a citation may be issued.

[61 Counsel for both parties tell us that when this case was argued before the court of appeals, the standard of review issue was the subject of
much discussion. From that fact and from the fact that the case seems otherwise unexceptional, we assume that the standard of review is the
reason for the certification. For that reason, we treat the issue in some depth, although how it is decided may not be outcome determinative.
In the future, it would be of assistance to this court if, when the court of appeals certifies a case to us under rule 43, it would indude a statement of
reasons so that we can be sure we address the issues it deems important.

QI In retrospect, it is not clear whether Mendoza m~ant that the reasonable-suspicion determination was one of fact, which would clearly be wrong,
or whether it meant that this issue is an application of law to fact upon which a trial court should be given some discretion and the "clearly
erroneous" language was used to suggest that fact. Such a use of the term "clearly erroneous" to refer to a standard of review for the application of
law to fact, although technically incorrect and potentially quite confusing, is not uncommon. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled.Decision Making and the
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 236-37 (1991 }. In any event, the result in Mendoza
would not have been different if a de novo standard had been applied.
~ We reiterate that "[w]e review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a
clearly erroneous standard." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 {Utah 1992). It is not within the appellate court's authority to review de novo the
factual underpinnings of a motion to suppress.

~

0P

Some may take issue with the our decision not to use the term "clearly erroneous" in the context of reasonable-suspicion determinations, because
that term is already in common usage. The change is necessary, however, in light of our new analytical perspective. As noted before, we use the
term "clearly erroneous" to describe the standard by which we review purely factual determinations. This standard represents a fixed allocation of
power and responsibility between the trial and appellate courts that is grounded in our distinct and unchanging institutional competencies regarding
questions of fact. Because there is no inherent policy component in fact determinations, it will never be appropriate for an appellate court to
overturn a trial court's factual determinations when they have substantial record support. Given this grounding, we decline to utilize the term "clearly
erroneous" to describe the standard used to review determinations that are not forever beyond the power or responsibility of the appellate court to
substitute its judgment, but have only been placed temporarily beyond the reach of de nova review as a matter of appellate court forbearance for
institutional policy reasons. We think that clarity of thought is promoted by using a different term to convey that reasonable suspicion is ultimately a
legal question, and thus the appellate court does have the ultimate authority to define, as it deems appropriate, the contours of the disputed term.
Admittedly, this lexical change may engender some confusion in the short term as appellate judges and counsel become accustomed to it. In the
long run, however, it should prevent the development of two somewhat divergent and likely confused lines of precedent, both purporting to apply to
the same standard of review. If we failed to make this change, "clearly erroneous" would refer to situations in which the trial court has fixed
discretion and the appellate court has a permanently limited role - the review of factual determinations - and would also refer to situations in
which the trial court's discretion is a matter of appellate court grace and the appellate court's role is reviewable over time and circumstances - the
application of fact to law. We believe it is better to change terms now than to attempt to construct and maintain two different legal edifices, both of
which rest upon the same phrase.
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court discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The decision when to create and where to place these fences is an issue of
law, and no deference is accorded to the trial court. Not every case that reaches an appellate court, however, must result in the establishment of a
fence. Until the appellate court has fenced off a particular area of the pasture create reasonable suspicion as a matter of law -

that is, determined that a particular fact situation does or does not

the trial court has discretion to venture into that area -

in other words, to determine whether a

given set of facts satisfies the legal standard of reasonable suspicion.

Ifil We recognize that this "some discretion" standard

is less than precise, but so are many legal standards. It is difficult to describe more exactly

without the benefit of concrete factual scenarios. We anticipate that developing case law will further illuminate the appropriate level of review.

IZ1 The multitude of variable fact patterns is easily demonstrated. See State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 787-88 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable

suspicion when a man seen walking near defendant ran away); State v. Carpena 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (vehicle moving at slow speed in
previously burglarized neighborhood at 3 a.m. did not provide articulable facts on which to formulate reasonable suspicion); State v. Munsen, 821
P.2d 13, 16 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (woman's vague and suspicious responses did not provide basis to suspect that she had committed or was about
to commit crime).

(fil Pena also argues that once the vehide was stopped and he was asked to exit the car, he was in custody or was "arrested" and therefore the
police were required to read him the Miranda warnings before ever asking his name. Because the argument was not raised below, we do not
consider it.

Ifil Pena also argues that the officers "exceeded the permissible scope of the interference," but he is precluded from making this argument because
he did not raise it at the suppression hearing. State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985} ("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular
ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal.").
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Joseph WILES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Jean B. WILES, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 920598-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 15, 1994.
1027 •1027 C. Robert Collins, American Fork (argued), for appellant.
Paul R. Frischknecht, Manti (argued), for appellee.
~

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS, JJ.

OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellant Jean B. Wiles appeals from a judgment in favor of her ex-husband and appellee Joseph Wiles. The trial court ordered
the real property on which Ms. Wiles is living sold pursuant to a lien created by the court when the parties divorced in 1981. We
affirm.

~

I. FACTS
Jean and Joseph Wiles were divorced on January 29, 1981. According to the divorce decree, Ms. Wiles was awarded alimony for
eighteen months, a mobile home in which she was living, and sole possession of real property (the "real property") located in
Sanpete County, Utah, upon which the mobile home was located. In return, the trial court ordered that Ms. Wiles pay her husband

~

$6000 plus 6% interest (the "debt") payable within a ten year period. The trial court placed a lien aga_inst the real property in the
amount of $6000, and ordered that in the event the debt was not paid by December 21, 1991, Mr. Wiles could "foreclose on the
lien at his option."
Ms. Wiles apparently resided on the real property during the years after the divorce. However, she did not pay the debt within the
ten year repayment period granted to her in the divorce decree. Instead, on February 6, 1990, she filed a homestead exemption

~

on the real property pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-4 (1992). At Mr. Wiles's request, the trial court issued an order on July 9,

1992, compelling Ms. Wiles to appear and show cause why the real property should not be sold due to her failure to pay the debt
owed to Mr. Wiles.
Ms. Wiles filed a motion to dismiss the order to show cause, arguing that the homestead exemption precluded sale of the real
property and that an order to show cause was not the proper proceeding to ''foreclose" on the lien. A hearing was held on the
matter, after which the trial court entered judgment for Mr. Wiles and denied Ms. Wiles's motion to dismiss. The trial court ordered
that the property be foreclosed and sold and the proceeds applied toward the judgment owed Mr. Wiles.ill
On appeal, Ms. Wiles claims: (1) the homestead exemption she filed precludes sale of the real property; (2) use of an order to
1028 show cause hearing to enforce the lien violated * 1028 her right of access to the courts under article I, section 11 of the Utah
~

Constitution; and (3) Mr. Wiles cannot enforce the lien because the value of the real property is less than the amount of the
homestead exemption to which she is allegedly entitled.

II. PROPERTY DIVISION AND HOMESTEAD RIGHTS
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homestead exemption in Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-3(2) (1992), she does not have to give up the real property awarded her in the
divorce decree in order to satisfy the debt. Section 78-23-3(2) states:
A homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale, except upon the following
obligations:
(a) statutory liens for taxes and assessments on the property;
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of such property; and
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
Although Ms. Wiles is technically correct in her reading of section 78-23-3(2), the "judicial lien" created by the court in this case is
not that contemplated by section 78-23-3(2).
In Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 {Utah 1987). the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a trial court, when dividing
property, must set off to each party his or her homestead exemption in the property. Id. at 255. The supreme court determined that
a trial court need not set off to the parties their respective share of the homestead exemption because doing so would interfere
with the trial court's ability under Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5 to make a just and equitable disposition of property on divorce.lfl /d. at
256. The Utah Supreme Court cited with approval Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 255 Minn. 80, 96 N.W.2d 14, 24-25 {1959} and Closson

v. Closson, 30__W;,;o.__1_._21_5_P._485. 489 {1923) for the proposition that "where there is no specific statutory provision for the
disposition of a homestead on divorce, a statute (similar to Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5) authorizing the court in the divorce case to
make a 'just and equitable' disposition of the property controls." Race, 740 P.2d at 256.
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Race provides guidance here. Under section 30-3-5(1 ), the trial court has the power to
divide the parties' property in a divorce action. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980). The Utah Exemptions Act
is silent concerning the court's equitable authority and responsibility to distribute the homestead property that the parties enjoyed
together prior to their divorce. Permitting one party to change the trial court's distribution of the parties' assets by use of a

~

homestead exemption would impair the trial court's ability to make just and lasting distributions of marital property.
When the divorce decree was entered in this case, the trial court divided the parties' property by awarding the real property and
mobile home to Ms. Wiles and ordering that Ms. Wiles in return pay $6000 to her ex-husband within a ten year period. As is often
the case when a trial court divides marital property, the court created a "lien" on the real property awarded Ms. Wiles pending
payment to Mr. Wiles of the value of his share of that property. As the trial court correctly reasoned in its decision on this matter, to
allow Ms. Wiles to assert a homestead exemption against the real property ''would defeat the purposes of the Divorce Decree
and specifically would frustrate the Courtf]s ability to divide the property in a divorce proceeding." We agree and hold that the trial
court's distribution of the Wileses' property, including placement of the lien, supersedes Ms. Wiles's ability to enforce the
homestead exemption against her husband's interest in the real property created by the court.ill

I.ti)

1029 *1029 When the court discharges its responsibilities under section 30-3-5 by giving the dispossessed party a "lien" on the asset
remaining in possession of the other party, the "lien" becomes the dispossessed party's share of that asset rather than a
conventional lien created by operation of law or to secure payment of indebtedness.I!l
The conclusion we reach today is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions as well. See Kobriqer v. Winter: 263 N.W.2d 892,
893-94 (Iowa 1978} {homestead exemption ineffective against lien in divorce decree created to guarantee payment of lump-sum
settlement); Bohl v. Bohl. 234 Kan. 227,670 P.2d 1344, 1347 (1983) {lien in divorce decree placed on husband's property to
secure payment of alimony will overcome homestead claim); Haven__v. __Trammell. 79..Ok.', .. ~09, ..1,93 ,P.. 631,._633 (1920} (alimony
award secured by judicial lien on husband's property not subject to homestead exemption); Lettieri v. Lettieri. 654 S.W.2d 554,
559 <Tex.Ct.App. 1983) (even though homestead property exempt from money judgment in divorce decree, court may place lien
on one spouse's homestead to secure payment of other spouse's award).
Finally, homestead laws were created to protect families against outside creditors, not for use by one spouse against the other.lfil
Haven._1_93_P._at_633 (''The homestead law is a family shield, and cannot be employed by either spouse to wrong the other.").

Ill. USE OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
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Ms. Wiles next claims that the trial court erred by ordering that the lien be enforced via an order to show cause. According to Ms.
Wiles, her ex-husband should have filed a separate foreclosure action. Ms. Wiles also asserts that she was denied the right to
fully present her case at the order to show cause proceeding, which violated her right of access to the courts under article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court did not err by following the procedure it did. Under Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(3), a trial court that enters a divorce
decree "has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for... the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable or necessary." Order to show cause proceedings are commonly used by parties seeking to
enforce divorce decree provisions. See, e.g., Dentv. Dent, 870 P.2d 280 {Utah App.1994) (wife used order to show cause to
obtain husband's compliance with procedure for sale of home set forth in divorce decree); Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d
472,474 (Utah App. 1991) (wife moved for order to show cause seeking delinquent child support and insurance and medical
expenses). The trial court properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction when it ordered enforcement of the "lien" it created when it
divided the Wileses' property in their divorce ten years earlier.Ifil
Ms. Wiles's argument under article I, section 11 is apparently premised on the assertion that she was denied the opportunity at
the order to show cause proceeding to fully establish her defenses to the sale of the real property. The record does not support
her argument. Ms. Wiles had the opportunity to petition the court for relief from the debt due to changed circumstances under
1030 section 30-3-5(3) • 1030 at any time, including during the pendency of the order to show cause proceeding. Instead, she chose to
pursue her claim solely by asserting that the homestead exemption barred sale of the real property.fil Her claim for relief under
article I, section 11 is therefore without merit.
At oral argument, counsel for Ms. Wiles also objected to the trial court's order that the property be foreclosed. We believe the trial
court's use of the term foreclosure was imprecise and unnecessary. The trial court has the power to order the property sold
pursuant to the divorce decree without utilizing the proceedings for foreclosure located in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69. See

Dent, 870 P.2d at 282 (trial court signed judicial deed permitting sale of property pursuant to divorce decree).

IV. VALUE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
Ms. Wiles's final argument on appeal is that her ex-husband cannot enforce the lien because the value of the real property is less
than the amount of the homestead exemption to which she is entitled. Because we have determined that Ms. Wiles cannot use
the homestead exemption to prevent the sale of the real property, we do not reach this claim.

V. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by prohibiting Ms. Wiles from asserting a homestead claim as a defense to enforcement of the lien
created by the court as part of its division of the parties' assets. The trial court had continuing jurisdiction to order sale of the real
property by use of an order to show cause proceeding. Finally, Ms. Wiles was not denied any rights under article I, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution. The trial court's decision is therefore affirmed.
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

ill At the time the judgment was entered in August 1992, the amount owed Mr. Wiles was approximately $10,140. According to Ms. Wiles, the
value of the property in 1991 was $4395.

gi Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(1) (Supp.1993) states, in pertinent part: "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may indude in it equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties."
@I This is not a situation in which a judicial lien was created as a result of the entry of a judgment under Utah Code Ann.§ 78-22-1 (2) (Supp.
1993). Under that section, "the entry of judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor.... " Id. Here, the lien was
not created after a judgment was entered against a party. Instead, the lien was automatically part and parcel of the trial court's allocation of the
Wileses' marital property.

.[£ Nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting the divorce court from fashioning a more conventional lien arrangement by, for
example, awarding a party a sum certain evidenced by a note and secured under the terms of an appropriate security document.
[fil Utah cases holding that the homestead exemption protected debtors from execution upon their property have involved creditors without any
marital ties to the debtors. Panag,oe,ulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198 1 69 P.2d 614 (1937): Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 257, 42 P.2d
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Ifil In support of her claim that the

trial court used the wrong procedure, Ms. Wiles cites Utah Code Ann.§ 78-37-1, which states that "There can be
only one action for the recovery or the enforcement of any right secured solely by a mortgage upon real estate which action must be in accordance

with the provisions of (the mortgage foredosure] chapter." (Emphasis added). That section, by its terms, does not apply to a lien created by the
divorce court as a vehide for property division.

ill Ms. Wiles argues that her motion to dismiss the order to show cause made a "prima facie case for a substantial change of circumstances," and
that the trial court should have exercised its equitable powers to discharge the lien. Although Ms. Wiles did refer to past illness in her memorandum
in support of her motion to dismiss and in her accompanying affidavit, she never petitioned the court to modify its previous order regarding the debt.
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Utah Code

Effective 5/12/2015
78A-4-103 Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and
process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:

(a)

~

(i) a final order or decree resulting from:
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or
(8) a special adjudicative proceeding, as described in Section 19-1-301.5; or
(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative proceeding of an agency
other than the following:
(A) the Public Service Commission;
(8) the State Tax Commission;
(C) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed by the executive
director of the Department of Natural Resources;
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(F) the state engineer;
{b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge
of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption,
and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
0) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 441, 2015 General Session
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78B-5-503 Homestead exemption -- Definitions -- Excepted obligations -- Water rights and
interests -- Conveyance -- Sale and disposition -- Property right for federal tax purposes.

~

Vo

(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Household" means a group of persons related by blood or marriage living together in the
same dwelling as an economic unit, sharing furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and
expenses.
(b) "Mobile home" is as defined in Section 57-16-3.
(c) "Primary personal residence" means a dwelling or mobile home, and the land surrounding
it, not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling or mobile
home, in which the individual and the individual's household reside.
(d) "Property" means:
(i) a primary personal residence;
(ii) real property; or
(iii) an equitable interest in real property awarded to a person in a divorce decree by a court.
(2)
(a) An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consisting of property in this state in an
amount not exceeding:
(i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of property which is not the primary
personal residence of the individual; or
(ii) $30,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the individual.
(b) If the property claimed as exempt is jointly owned, each joint owner is entitled to a homestead
exemption; however
(i) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(i), the maximum exemption may not exceed
$10,000 per household; or
(ii) for property exempt under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), the maximum exemption may not exceed
$60,000 per household.
(c) A person may claim a homestead exemption in either or both of the following:
(i) one or more parcels of real property together with appurtenances and improvements; or
(ii) a mobile home in which the claimant resides.
(d) A person may not claim a homestead exemption for property that the person acquired as a
result of criminal activity.
(3) A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale except for:
(a) statutory liens for property taxes and assessments on the property;
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of
the property;
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for
dependent children; and
(d) consensual liens obtained on debts created by mutual contract.

(4)
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), water rights and interests, either in the form of
corporate stock or otherwise, owned by the homestead claimant are exempt from execution to
the extent that those rights and interests are necessarily employed in supplying water to the
homestead for domestic and irrigating purposes.
(b) Those water rights and interests are not exempt from calls or assessments and sale by the
corporations issuing the stock.

(5)
(a) When a homestead is conveyed by the owner of the property, the conveyance may not
subject the property to any lien to which it would not be subject in the hands of the owner.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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{b) The proceeds of any sale, to the amount of the exemption existing at the time of sale, is
exempt from levy, execution, or other process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds
by the person entitled to the exemption.
(6) The sale and disposition of one homestead does not prevent the selection or purchase of
another.
(7) For purposes of any claim or action for taxes brought by the United States Internal Revenue
Service, a homestead exemption claimed on real property in this state is considered to be a
property right.
Amended by Chapter 192, 2013 General Session
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78B-5-504 Declaration of homestead -- Filing -- Contents -- Failure to file -- Conveyance
by married person -- No execution sale if bid less than exemption -- Redemption rights of
judgment creditor.
An individual may select and claim a homestead by complying with the following requirements:
(1) Filing a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead with the recorder of the county
or counties in which the homestead claimant's· property is located or serving a signed and
acknowledged declaration of homestead upon the sheriff or other officer conducting an
execution prior to the time stated in the notice of execution.
(2) The declaration of homestead shall contain:
(a) a statement that the claimant is entitled to an exemption and if the claimant is married a
statement that the claimant's spouse has not filed a declaration of homestead;
(b) a description of the property subject to the homestead;
(c) an estimate of the cash value of the property; and
(d) a statement specifying the amount of the homestead claimed and stating the name, age, and
address of any spouse and dependents claimed to determine the value of the homestead.
(3) If a declaration of homestead is not filed or served as provided in this section, title shall pass to
the purchaser upon execution free and clear of all homestead rights.
(4) If an individual is married, no conveyance of or security interest in, or contract to convey
or create a security interest in property recorded as a homestead prior to the time of the
conveyance, security interest, or contract is valid, unless both the husband and wife join in the
execution of the conveyance, security interest, or contract.
(5) Property that includes a homestead may not be sold at execution if there is no bid which
exceeds the amount of the declared homestead exemption.
(6) If property that includes a homestead is sold under execution, the sale is subject to redemption
by the judgment debtor as provided in Rule 69C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If there is
a deficiency, the property may not be subject to another execution to cover the deficiency.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) When service is required.
(a)(1) Papers that must be served. Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the
court, the following papers must be served on every party:

(a)(1 )(A) a judgment;
(a)(1 )(B) an order that states it must be served;
(a)(1)(C) a pleading after the original complaint;
(a)(1)(D) a paper relating to disclosure or discovery;
(a)(1 )(E) a paper filed with the court other than a motion that may be heard ex parte; and
(a)(1 )(F) a written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, or similar paper.
(a)(2) Serving parties in default. No service is required on a party who is in default except that:

(a)(2)(A) a party in default must be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(8) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear must be served as provided in
paragraph (a)(1 );
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason must be served with notice of any hearing to determine the amount of
damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason must be served with notice of entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d):
and
(a)(2)(E) a party in default for any reason must be served under Rule i with pleadings asserting new or
additional claims for relief against the party.
(a}(3} Service in actions begun by seizing property. If an action is begun by seizing property and no person is or
need be named as defendant, any service required before the filing of an answer, claim or appearance must be made
upon the person who had custody or possession of the property when it was seized.

(b) How service is made.
(b){1) Whom to serve. If a party is represented by an attorney, a paper served under this rule must be served upon
the attorney unless the court orders service upon the party. Service must be made upon the attorney and the party if

{b)(1)(A) an attorney has filed a Notice of Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate
to a matter within the scope of the Notice; or
(b){1)(8) a final judgment has been entered in the action and more than 90 days has elapsed from the date a
paper was last served on the attorney.
(b)(2) When to serve. If a hearing is scheduled 7 days or less from the date of service, a party must serve a paper
related to the hearing by the method most likely to be promptly received. Otherwise, a paper that is filed with the court
must be served before or on the same day that it is filed.

(b )(3) Methods of service. A paper is served under this rule by:
(b)(3)(A) except in the juvenile court, submitting it for electronic filing if the person being served has an
electronic filing account;
(b)(3)(8) emailing it to the email address provided by the person or to the email address on file with the Utah
State Bar, if the person has agreed to accept service by email or has an electronic filing account;
(b)(3)(C) mailing it to the person's last known address;
(b)(3)(D) handing it to the person;
(b)(3)(E) leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or, if no one is in charge, leaving it in a
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place;
(b)(3)(F) leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and
discretion who resides there; or
~

{b)(3)(G) any other method agreed to in writing by the parties.
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(b)(S) Who serves. Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(b)(S)(A) every paper required to be served must be served by the party preparing it; and
(b)(5)(8) an order or judgment prepared by the court will be served by the court.
~

(c) Serving numerous defendants. If an action involves an unusually large number of defendants, the court, upon
motion or its own initiative, may order that:
(c)(1) a defendant's pleadings and replies to them do not need to be served on the other defendants;
(c)(2) any cross-claim, counterclaim avoidance or affirmative defense in a defendant's pleadings and replies to them are
deemed denied or avoided by all other parties;
(c)(3) filing a defendant's pleadings and serving them on the plaintiff constitutes notice of them to all other parties; and
(c)(4) a copy of the order must be served upon the parties.

(d) Certificate of service. A paper required by this rule to be served, including electronically filed papers, must include a
signed certificate of service showing the name of the document served, the date and manner of service and on whom it was
served.
~

(e) Filing. Except as provided in Rule Zill and Rule 26(f). all papers after the complaint that are required to be served
must be filed with the court. Parties with an electronic filing account must file a paper electronically. A party without an
electronic filing account may file a paper by delivering it to the clerk of the court or to a judge of the court. Filing is complete
upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court or the judge.

(f) Filing an affidavit or declaration. If a person files an affidavit or declaration, the filer may:
~

(f)(1) electronically file the original affidavit with a notary acknowledgment as provided by Utah Code Section 46-1-

16(7):
(f)(2) electronically file a scanned image of the affidavit or declaration;
(f)(3) electronically file the affidavit or declaration with a confonned signature: or
(f)(4) if the filer does not have an electronic filing account, present the original affidavit or declaration to the clerk of
the court, and the clerk will electronically file a scanned image and return the original to the filer.
The filer must keep an original affidavit or declaration of anyone other than the filer safe and available for inspection
upon request until the action is concluded, including any appeal or until the time in which to appeal has expired.

Advisory Committee Notes

~
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Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders.
(a) Pleadings. Only these pleadings are allowed:

(a)(1) a complaint;
(a)(2) an answer to a complaint;
(a)(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(a)(4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(a)(S) a third-party complaint;
(a)(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(a)(7) a reply to an answer if ordered by the court.
(b) Motions. A request for an order must be made by motion. The motion must be in writing unless made during a

hearing or trial, must state the relief requested, and must state the grounds for the relief requested. Except for the following,
a motion must be made in accordance with this rule.
(cl)

(b)(1} A motion, other than a motion described in paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3) or (b)(4), made in proceedings before a
court commissioner must follow Rule 101.
(b)(2) A request under Rule 26 for extraordinary discovery must follow Rule 37(a).
(b)(3) A request under Rule 37 for a protective order or for an order compelling disclosure or discovery-but not a
motion for sanctions-must follow Rule 37(a).
(b)(4) A request under Rule 45 to quash a subpoena must follow Rule 37(a}.
(b)(5) A motion for summary judgment must follow the procedures of this rule as supplemented by the requirements
of Rule 56.
(c) Name and content of motion.

(c)(1) The rules governing captions and other matters of form in pleadings apply to motions and other papers. The
moving party must title the motion substantially as: "Motion [short phrase describing the relief requested]." The motion
must include the supporting memorandum. The motion must include under appropriate headings and in the following
order.
(c)(1 )(A) a concise statement of the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested; and
(c)(1)(8) one or more sections that include a concise statement of the relevant facts claimed by the moving
party and argument citing authority for the relief requested.
(c)(2) If the moving party cites documents, interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, or other discovery
materials, relevant portions of those materials must be attached to or submitted with the motion.
(c)(3) If the motion is for relief authorized by Rule 12(b) or 12(c), Rule 56 or Rule 65A, the motion may not exceed 25
pages, not counting the attachments, unless a longer motion is permitted by the court. Other motions may not exceed
15 pages, not counting the attachments, unless a longer motion is permitted by the court.
(d) Name and content of memorandum opposing the motion.

(d)(1) A nonmoving party may file a memorandum opposing the motion within 14 days after the motion is filed. The
nonmoving party must title the memorandum substantially as: 'Memorandum opposing motion [short phrase describing
the relief requested]." The memorandum must include under appropriate headings and in the following order:
(d)(1 )(A) a concise statement of the party's preferred disposition of the motion and the grounds supporting that
disposition;
(d)(1)(8) one or more sections that include a concise statement of the relevant facts claimed by the nonmoving
party and argument citing authority for that disposition; and
(d)(1 )(C) objections to evidence in the motion, citing authority for the objection.
(d)(2) If the non-moving party cites documents, interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, or other discovery
materials, relevant portions of those materials must be attached to or submitted with the memorandum.
uj)

(d)(3) If the motion is for relief authorized by Rule 12(b} or 12(c), Rule 56 or Rule 65A, the memorandum opposing
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court. Other opposing memoranda may not exceed 15 pages, not counting the attachments, unless a longer
memorandum is permitted by the court.

(e) Name and content of reply memorandum.
(e)(1) Within 7 days after the memorandum opposing the motion is filed, the moving party may file a reply
mell)orandum, which must be limited to rebuttal of new matters raised in the memorandum opposing the motion. The
moving party must title the memorandum substantially as "Reply memorandum supporting motion [short phrase
describing the relief requested]." The memorandum must include under appropriate headings and in the following order:
(e)(1 )(A) a concise statement of the new matter raised in the memorandum opposing the motion;
(e)(1)(B) one or more sections that include a concise statement of the relevant facts claimed by the moving
party not previously set forth that respond to the opposing party's statement of facts and argument citing authority
rebutting the new matter;
(e)(1)(C) objections to evidence in the memorandum opposing the motion, citing authority for the objection; and
(e)(1)(D) response to objections made in the memorandum opposing the motion, citing authority for the
response.
(e)(2) If the moving party cites documents, interrogatory answers, deposition testimony, or other discovery
materials, relevant portions of those materials must be attached to or submitted with the memorandum.
(e)(3) If the motion is for relief authorized by Rule 12(b} or 12(c}. Rule 56 or Rule 65A, the reply memorandum may
not exceed 15 pages, not counting the attachments, unless a longer memorandum is pennitted by the court. Other reply
memoranda may not exceed 10 pages, not counting the attachments, unless a longer memorandum is pennitted by the
court.

(f) Objection to evidence in the reply memorandum; response. If the reply memorandum includes an objection to
evidence, the nonmoving party may file a response to the objection no later than 7 days after the reply memorandum is filed.
If the reply memorandum includes evidence not previously set forth, the nonmoving party may file an objection to the
evidence no later than 7 days after the reply memorandum is filed, and the moving party may file a response to the objection
no later than 7 days after the objection is filed. The objection or response may not be more than 3 pages.
(g) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete or the time for briefing has expired, either party may file
a "Request to Submit for Decision, but, if no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. The request
to submit for decision must state whether a hearing has been requested and the dates on which the following documents
were filed:
(g)(1) the motion;
(g)(2) the memorandum opposing the motion, if any;
(g){3) the reply memorandum, if any; and
(g)(4) the response to objections in the reply memorandum, if any.
(h) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a
memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing must be separately identified in the caption of
the document containing the request. The court must grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion
that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.

(i) Notice of supplemental authority. A party may file notice of citation to significant authority that comes to the party's
attention after the party's motion or memorandum has been filed or after oral argument but before decision. The notice may
not exceed 2 pages. The notice must state the citation to the authority, the page of the motion or memorandum or the point
orally argued to which the authority applies, and the reason the authority is relevant. Any other party may promptly file a
response, but the court may act on the motion without waiting for a response. The response may not exceed 2 pages.
0) Orders.

0)(1) Decision complete when signed; entered when recorded. However designated, the court's decision on a
motion is complete when signed by the judge. The decision is entered when recorded in the docket.
0)(2) Preparing and serving a proposed order. Within 14 days of being directed by the court to prepare a
proposed order confirming the court's decision, a party must serve the proposed order on the other parties for review and
approval as to fonn. If the party directed to prepare a proposed order fails to timely serve the order, any other party may
prepare a proposed order confinning the court's decision and serve the proposed order on the other parties for review
and approval as to form. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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0)(3) Effect of approval as to form. A party's approval as to fonn of a proposed order certifies that the proposed
order accurately reflects the court's decision. Approval as to fonn does not waive objections to the substance of the
order.
(j)(4) Objecting to a proposed order. A party may object to the fonn of the proposed order by filing an objection

within 7 days after the order is served.
v.JJ

(j)(5) Filing proposed order. The party preparing a proposed order must file it:

O)(S)(A) after all other parties have approved the fonn of the order (The party preparing the proposed order must
indicate the means by which approval was received: in person; by telephone; by signature; by email; etc.);
0)(5)(8) after the time to object to the fonn of the order has expired (The party preparing the proposed order must
also file a certificate of service of the proposed order.); or
O)(S)(C) within 7 days after a party has objected to the fonn of the order (The party preparing the proposed order
may also file a response to the objection.).
(j)(6) Proposed order before decision prohibited; exceptions. A party may not file a proposed order concurrently
with a motion or a memorandum or a request to submit for decision, but a proposed order must be filed with:

G)(6)(A) a stipulated motion;
0)(6)(8) a motion that can be acted on without waiting for a response;
0)(6)(C) an ex parte motion;
G)(6)(D) a statement of discovery issues under Rule 37(a); and
0)(6)(E) the request to submit for decision a motion in which a memorandum opposing the motion has not been
filed.
(j)(7) Orders entered without a response; ex parte orders. An order entered on a motion under paragraph (I) or (m)
can be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice.
{j)(8) Order to pay money. An order to pay money can be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment.
(k) Stipulated motions. A party seeking relief that has been agreed to by the other parties may file a stipulated motion

which must:
(k)(1) be titled substantially as: "Stipulated motion [short phrase describing the relief requested];
(k)(2) include a concise statement of the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested;
(k)(3) include a signed stipulation in or attached to the motion and;
(k){4) be accompanied by a request to submit for decision and a proposed order that has been approved by the other
parties.

(I) Motions that may be acted on without waiting for a response.
(1)(1) The court may act on the following motions without waiting for a response:
(1)(1 )(A) motion to pennit an over-length motion or memorandum;
(1)(1)(8) motion for an extension of time if filed before the expiration of time;
(1)(1 )(C) motion to appear pro hac vice; and
vJ

(1)(1 )(E) other similar motions.
(1)(2) A motion that can be acted on without waiting for a response must:
(I)(2)(A) be titled as a regular motion;
(1)(2)(8) include a concise statement of the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested;
(I)(2)(C) cite the statute or rule authorizing the motion to be acted on without waiting for a response; and
(1)(2)(0) be accompanied by a request to submit for decision and a proposed order.
(m) Ex parte motions. If a statute or rule pennits a motion to be filed without serving the motion on the other parties,
the party seeking relief may file an ex parte motion which must:
(m)(1) be titled substantially as: "Ex parte motion [short phrase describing the relief requested);
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(m)(3) cite the statute or rule authorizing the ex parte motion;
(m)(4) be accompanied by a request to submit for decision and a proposed order.
(n) Motion in opposing memorandum or reply memorandum prohibited. A party may not make a motion in a
memorandum opposing a motion or in a reply memorandum. A party who objects to evidence in another party's motion or
memorandum may not move to strike that evidence. Instead, the party must include in the subsequent memorandum an
objection to the evidence.
(o) Overlength motion or memorandum. The court may permit a party to file an over1ength motion or memorandum
upon a showing of good cause. An overlength motion or memorandum must include a table of contents and a table of
authorities with page references.
~

(p) Limited statement of facts and authority. No statement of facts and legal authorities beyond the concise statement
of the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested required in paragraph (c) is required for the following motions:

(p)(1) motion to allow an over-length motion or memorandum;
(p)(2) motion to extend the time to perfonn an act, if the motion is filed before the time to perfonn the act has
expired;
(p)(3) motion to continue a hearing;
(p)(4) motion to appoint a guardian ad litem;
(p)(5) motion to substitute parties;
(p)(6) motion to refer the action to or withdraw it from alternative dispute resolution under Rule 4-510.05;
(p)(7) motion for a conference under Rule 16; and
(p)(8) motion to approve a stipulation of the parties.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 302. Applying Federal Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases
In a civil case, federal law governs the effect of a presumption regarding a claim or defense for which
federal law supplies the rule of decision.

~

2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of the
restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is
no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

~

The text of this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in
criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) or any
subsequent revision of that section.

VJ

V}P
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